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PREFACE

It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the

development of risk bearing by insurance from the earliest

times, to the period when the modern institution of insurance
may fairly be said to have become established.

The thesis

will not cover in its scope the history of insurance, nor the
history of any particular period, but will rather survey
each period studied, searching for new developments of

insurance theory, and consider particularly those contribut

ions that represent distinct advances in development.

The

aim of the work is to assemble those early fragments of
evidence that may be found, and so present them as to afford

a perspective of the development of an idea.

It does not

come within the scope of the work to present a complete

record of the numerous instances that represent reduplication
of the idea.

On the other hand mention is made of develop

ments that at the time only remotely bear upon insurance, but

are destined later to become important factors in the field.
The scattering threads that appear in the early periods will

be brought together as the development of the thesis proceeds.
In the assembling of the material, and the preparat

ion of the work, I have been favored with the generous co
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operation and assistance of many.

Without presenting a

detailed list of the individuals, libraries, and institutions,
to whom I am under obligation, I nevertheless avail myself of

the privilege here afforded of acknowledging my indebtedness
to all.

Without the cooperation and assistance so freely

rendered, the work could not have been completed.

I must

. at this time, however, by personal mention, acknowledge my
indebtedness to Dr. John H. Ashworth, head of the Department

of Economics at the University of Maine.

It was under the

direction of Dr. Ashworth that this work was carried on, and
to him my obligations are great.

ledge them.

'It is a pleasure to acknow

CHAPTER 1

PRE-GRECIAN CONTRIBUTIONS.
1. Origin of Bottomry.

So far as extant records furnish us evidence,
loans of the type known during the middle ages by the terms
"Bottomry" and "Respondentia" served as the earliest means

in general commercial use to effect a shifting of the burden
of risk.

Such a contract was familiar to the Greeks as

early as the fourth century before the Christian era, and

was used in connection with maritime loans.

The origin

of the idea is clouded in uncertainty, but such evidence as

we have warrants the presumption that the bottomry contract
is the outgrowth of the contract made between merchants and

their agents in Ancient Babylon.

The essential feature in the bottomry contract

-v

that permits its adaption as a vehicle for effecting insurance,
is the condition which relieves the borrower from loss in the

event of the happening of certain undesired and stipulated
contingencies.

In the Greek contract these contingencies

were those arising out of the "perils of the sea."

The

agreement itself was concerned with a loan, made with a ship
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as security, by which her owner was able to fit her out for

a voyage, or to provide a cargo.

The condition upon

which the loan was obtained, however, made the safe arrival
of the ship at the agreed destination a condition precident
to the repayment of either the advance or the stipulated

interest or premium.

A modification of the contract

occurs where the loan is made, not upon a ship, but upon
goods or merchandise, and in this instance the term
"respondentia" is used.

Insofar as the contingent feature

of the contract is concerned, relieving the borrower from the
payment of interest, and the repayment of principle, in the
event of certain stipulated losses, the contracts are

analogous.

To both types, whether the loans are made on

ship or merchandise, the term "bottomry" is commonly applied,

and for the purposes of this study the term will be so used.
In our search for its origin with the early Babylonians, we

carry the term from the sea, and apply it to landborne risks.

Babylon, during the most remarkable period marked

by the reign of the Hammurapi,

(ciroa 2123 - 2081 B.O. )

occupied the position of a great trading center, and sent

caravans abroad with her manufactured articles to every
corner of the then known civilized world, and her contacts
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with the countries with which she traded necessitated long

and hazardous journeys into strange lands, and among peoples

of all grades of civilization.

It is obvious that the

wealthy manufacturer or merchant, with interests stretching,

perhaps to India, China, Phoenicia, Egypt, Tibet, or any of
the other countries in trading contact with Babylon, would

not himself be able to go with his wares and conduct the
negotiations for trade in person.

In the beginning merchants maintained contact with
their various interests by sending some member of the house

hold to represent them abroad, manage their affairs, and sell
the goods they had to offer.

With the expansion of business,

however, and the need for many representatives,

this simple

expedient no longer served, and the great merchants or finan

ce er8 devised the system of securing individual agents to
represent them on these journeys.

This agency relationship, the oldest form of bus

iness association in Asiatic life, ia known by the name
Oommenda.

Under the terms of agreement by which the assoc

iates operated, the commendatist gave a sum of money or

supply of merchandise to an agent with which he was to do

business.

The agent at a stipulated time, usually upon his

4

return from a journey, rendered an account to his principle,

paid back the loan, to which was added an agreed share of the

profits. 1*
3
That most remarkable legal compilation, that dates

from this early period, the Code of Hammurapi, devotes
several of its sections to the regulation of such business
2
associations.
Under the terms of agreement, the agent who

took the money or goods of a merchant, and went abroad with

them to trade, was liable to repayment of the loan upon his
return, except in one definitely named instance.

If the

agent lost his goods at the hands of robbers, then he was not
obliged to make an accounting, but was freed from the debt,
3
and the loss rested upon the merchant who made the loan.

Such an agreement had all the characteristics of the modern

bottomry agreement, with the exception that the risk covered
by the insurance feature was a risk of loss from robbers,

instead of loss from the perils of the sea.
It is now recognized by students of ancient history

that the Code of Hammurapi was not a creation de novo by

jc

1. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws Contracts and Letters,
p. 281.
2. Code of Hammurapi, sec. 100-107.
3. Ibid..
sec. 103.

Hammurapi himself, or by his councelors, but like other

codifications of law that 'have served as landmarks in legal
development, reverted back to laws of a more remote period.

It is essentially a compilation of existing legislation

4
rather than a presentation of an entirely new set of laws.

Hammurapi'8 part in this great piece of legislation was
limited to the translating and publishing of the older code
5
for the government of his own people.
Indicative of
this development there is evidence to show in the code the
6
inclusion of the older Sumerian laws.
Added to the older

elements are newer statutes modifying the older regulations

or effecting changes.

It might be supposed that in the

compilation of a code such as that of Hammurapi, older laws
that were later modified by newer enactments would have been

dropped to give place to the newer developments.

There is

a reason, however, for the retention of the older sections,

in that a sacred character was attributed to the law, and
they were considered as oracular decrees of the gods, and
therefore binding forever.

For this reason the old laws

4. Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, v.2.,p.87.
5. Jastrow, The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria, p.283.
6. Rogers, op. pit,. Note 2., v.2, p.87.
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were retained, side by side with modifications in the form of
7
new laws that changed their effect and tenor.
It is diffi
cult to place a date as to the origin of the older portions
of the Oode.

A document of a far earlier petiod than that

of Hammurapi, in the reign of Urukagina,

(circa 2700 B.O. ),

refers to certain legal reforms effected by him that presuppose
a considerable body of law already extant.

Upon this evidence

it may be assumed that as far back at least as 3000 B.O., and

probably much earlier than that, a considerable body of law

had been built up to govern the public and private affairs of
8
the community.
Bearing in mind this background to the
compilation of the Oode of Hammurapi, references to particular
practices mentioned in the code do not of necessity fix the

time of Hammurapi as the date of origin of the legislation.
As a matter of fact, the date of origin may extend back to a

period much more remote than that ascribed to the compilation

and promulgation of the Hammurapi Oode itself.
At this point we are interested in determining

whether the clause in the code that releases the agent from
all liability in the event that he is robbed, refers to a

7. Jastrow, op. cit.. p. 284.
8. Rostovtzeff, A~History of the Ancient World, p. 29, also
Jastrow, op. cit.. p. 285.
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custom of merchants already in common practice, or whether,
on the other hand, this clause represents one of the later
enactments included in the code to soften the effect and

mitigate the penalties attached to the older laws.

If we

conclude that the code provided legislation to govern an

existing custom, we are permitted to conclude that a contract
with the characteristics of the bottomry agreement was known

to the Babylonians previous to the promulgation of the code

by Hammurapi.

In the light of the general tenor of the

code, it seems more reasonable to conclude that this law was

one of the latter enactments aimed to correct a situation
into which abuse had probably crept.

A contrary opinion is expressed in a painstaking

and laborious research into the origin and early development
of insurance by Dr. 0. F. Trenerry who advances the theory

that the agreement referred to in the Hammurapi code was a
development between merchants and their agents previous to
the compilation of the law.

It is his theory that because

of losses, traders were unable to meet their obligations, and
in consequence found themselves and their families in a posit
ion where they became the property of their creditors.

9. Oode of Hammurapi, 103.

So
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intolerable did this situation become that some form of com

promise was devised, resulting in an agreement between the

parties whereby the agent if he were robbed and lost the goods
entrusted to him through no fault of his, was to be excused

from further accounting.

The contract thus became a custom

among merchants, and was at the time of the compilation of
the Gode of Hammurapi recognized and given legal force by its
(10)
inclusion in the law of the land.
The theory here advanced

is of considerable interest, in that it places the origin of
the contract at a point more remote than the Hammurapi Code.
In a field where so much is based on conjecture

and supposition, it would seem to be an unwarranted presumpt
ion to present a contrary theory, without at the same time

recalling its hypothetical nature.

However the theory

advanced by Dr. Trenerry, that the Gode of Hammurapi speci
fically refers to a contract of bottomry, using the term in

a sense of a relationship whereby the borrower or agent is
exempted frem repayment in the event of certain specified
losses, seems less probable than does the theory to be here

advanced, that the regulations in the code were designed to
correct an oppressive situation only, and furnished inciden

tally and as an unforseen consequence the seed from which

10. Trenerry, Origin and Early History of Insurance, p.6
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germinated at a later date the contract of bottomry.

The

theory is here advanced, contrary to the opinion of Dr.
Trenerry that the Babylonians had no knowledge of such a

contract previous to the enactment into the law of the
clauses in question, but that out of the compulsory release

of debtors who lost their goods through no fault of their own,
the custom developed and spread, and was voluntarily adopted

by merchants in communities associated with Babylonian in
fluence, but beyond the reach of her laws.

Had an agreement similar to the bottomtfy contract
been the custom previous to the enactment of the laws, specific

provision for lenience to the agent would have been unnecessary.
We get a better insight into the purpose of the law when we
recall the painstaking care exercised by Hammurapi to prevent
the Strong from opressing the weak." ^and to protect those

who might find themselves without any fault of their own at
a serious disadvantage before the law.

In such a position

the borrower or agent might easily find himself.

Under the

Babylonian law the position of the debtor was far from enviable,

and while the Oode retains the general point of view that a

man who contracts a debt which he is unable to pay is a criminal,
11. Oode of Hammurapi. 37-39.
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even though there was no intent to defraud, the Code likewise

makes a move in the direction of mitigating the pressure of

the creditor against the debtor.

The severity of Babylonian

law upon the debtor is evident from those sections of the
Oode dealing with debtors.

That a member of a debtor's

household could be seized as a hostage by the creditor seems
12
perfectly evident
and death of the hostage through natural
causes imposed no liability upon the debtor.

This originally

severe provision was softened considerably by provisions that
13
permitted the operation of the lex talionis
in the event of

death caused by inhuman treatment by a creditor who should
seize a member of a debtor's family.

Likewise a move was

made in the direction of relieving the debtor whose wife and

children were considered part of his chattels, and who might
be forced to sell them for debt.

The code in this instance

14

provided that the wife or children thus sold should be freed
in the fourth year.

So in the laws governing the relation

ship of agent to his principle, the agent was responsible
for the goods entrusted to him.

15

It became apparent, how

ever, that in the event of robbery this was a loss entirely

12.
13.
14.
15.

Oode of
Ibid.,
Ibid..
Ibid..

Hammurapi, 115.
116.
117.
100.
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beyond hie control, yet carried in its train all the serious

consequences attaching to debt.

Rather than giving voice in

the laws to an existing custom in relieving an agent from an

accounting if robbed, it is more probably true that the legis
lators saw in the harsh measures that were used in enforcing

claims against debtors and agents, an element of injustice in

insisting upon an accounting where the loss was beyond the

control of the agent.

Bearing in mind the general trend

toward fairness and the concern for the weaker party that is
evidenced throughout the code, it is a reasonable presumption

that this accounts for the enactment in the code that where

the agent was robbed, he was not to be held accountable for
the goods lost, but to go free.

That is the agent was to

be excused from repayment of the value of the merchandise, or
otherwise making any further accounting.

An almost parallel situation is found in the sections
16
of the code dealing with slavery.
Under the existing law
those harboring a runaway slave, or in any way assisting him

to escape, faced the death penalty.

On the other hand a

reward is provided for whoever returns to his master a slave

16. Oode of Hammurapi, 15-20.
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found in the open country.

However, and here we have a

parallel instance to the law respecting robbery of an agent,
if a slave shall escape from the one who has captured him,

the man by swearing his innocence to the owner of the slave
17
shall be acquitted of all responsibility or blame.
This
is a case where responsibility for delivery to his master

apparently attaches, once an individual takes into his
custody a slave not his own property:.

However, if he

loses custody of the slave through no fault, the law relieves
him from any responsibility.

Penalties were so severe both

in the slavery legislation and in the relationship of creditor

and debtor that the code went to considerable length to protect
parties who might without its protective legislation incur
serious trouble without themselves being at fault.

In the

case of losing custody of the slave, the consequence might
have been death.

In the instance of the agent of a whole

saler, who probably might have little with which to meet

losses, everything was at stake on the adventure, not exclud
ing his freedom and that of his wife and children, until
remedial legislation intervened.

17. Ibid. .20.
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The importance to us of the theory that the section
18
in the code that excuses the agent from making an accounting
in the event that he is robbed, was enacted in the beginning

to protect a helpless agent from responsibility arising out
of a contingency over which he has no control, is found in
the possibility that here is the seed that actually germinated
into bottomry.

In other words we conclude that up to this

point all risk attached to the agent, but out of the compul
sory relief furnished by the Code of Hammurapi a relationship

was established that was later expanded into the contractural
relationship of bottomry, and furnished a simple but early

means for risk bearing.

The relstionship to which the code refers is quite
19
evidently that of principle and agent, with the agent liable
to his principle for an accounting upon his return from an

undertaking.

It is but a step from the entrusting of goods

by a manufacturer to an agent to sell, to the loaning of
money by one individual to another to finance an undertaking,

with the relationship merging from agency to that of borrower.
In the new situation a contractural relationship is established,

18. Oode of Hammurapi, 103.
19. Jastrow, op. cit., p. 298.
Primitive Law., p. 406.

Also Sources of Ancient and
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whereby money to finance an adventure, or the merchandise

necessary, was entrusted by the lender to the borrower.

With the example already set by law, in the instance of the
responsibility of agents, it was a natural procedure to in

corporate in the agreement a release from liability to repay

in the event the goods lost at the hands of robbers, or
possibly from other contingencies that might from time to
time have been agreed upon.

Recalling the commercial

prestige of Babylon, whose weights, measures, and coinage
were widely adopted, it would not be an unexpected develop

ment to find this relationship, with the contingent provision
in the event of loss, adopted by merchants in commercial
contact with Babylon, even though beyond the immediate jur

isdiction of her laws.

By this means, such a contract

could easily have become a customary relationship among

merchants, with the hazards insured against changing with
the needs of the time, or the perils of the journey undertaken.
In Babylon the principle hazard was robbery of the caravan.

In sea-going ventures the perils were those of the sea.

In

each instance the principle involved was identical.

Where the original agency element persisted, the

agent secured for himself a percentage of the profits of the

15

enterprise as compensation, the amount depending upon the

status of the agent and his relationship to his principle.
As the character of the transaction merged into that of a
loan, compensation for the use of the money or goods was
naturally the subject of an agreement, but as in the case of

the bottomry contract of later times, it was very much higher

than the rates of interest charged for ordinary loans.
We are permitted at this point a brief summarizat
ion.

We find we have developed all the essential elements

that enter into the bottomry contract as it later became a

familiar commercial usage.

These essential elements include

first a loan or advance of goods, with the security passing

out of the control of the lender.

Secondly there is the

provision that in the event of loss through the happening of

certain specified contingencies, the borrower is freed of
liability to repay.

Lastly, the interest charge for the loan

is so much higher than ordinary rates of interest, as to in

clude a payment or premium for the assumption by the lender
of the specified risks.
For the purpose of this study, we should like to

show that the contract of bottomry was effected in the course
of its development during this early period primarily for the
purpose of risk bearing.

Such a development we must leave
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to a later period.

The economic effect of risk, however,

must have made itself manifest, and the simplified form of

the contract that we find must have served to stimulate a
foreign trade that might otherwise have languished through a

failure to secure agents because of the risks.

We may at

this point consider the basis upon which the burden of risk
could be carried by one set of individuals and shifted by

another.

Without departing too far into the field of

hypothesis, we have found a development in this early Babylon
ian period that probably gave rise to a contract, simple in
form but having all the essential elements of the latter-day
bottomry.

We have first an agent, and ultimately a borrower,

shifting back to the principle or lender the burden of the

risk attached to inland marine transportation.

We have no

evidence that steps were taken by the risk bearers to effect

a dispersion in individual cases.

The inducement that prompt

ed the lender to become a party to the enterprise is found in
the reward for assuming the risk, and is made possible through

the operation of the principle of marginal utility.

It is

quite apparent that the money lender who finances a voyage out

of one of many units of his capital loses but little in com
parison with the poor trader who borrows, and who might in the

17

event of loss lose not only all of his possessions but his

freedom as well.

On this basis a wealthy lender could assume

a risk that the poorer borrower could not.

Lastly it is to

be presumed that the merchant or money lender, while in con
ducting his business, is at the same time engaged in a number

of such enterprises, and so far as loss was concerned, in
essentially the same position as the modern merchant with

many ships who secures a dispersion through interest in a

multiplicity of risks.

A considerable step in the direct

ion of marine underwritings, as it was known to us in the

early development of marine insurance, would appear could we

but demonstrate the division of individual risks into parts,
each part to be assumed by different carriers.

Such a

contribution is hardly apparent from the evidence, and the
probability of its existence is a matter of pure conjecture.
However, in this ancient period we do have a beginning of risk
bearing.

We are certain of the operation of the laws in the

Gode of Hammurapi, and it is a reasonable presumption that

here was a beginning of the bottomery contract so familiar in
later insurance developments.

Because of the paucity of

evidence we have no means of knowing just the point geograph

ically or chronologically that the contract developed to the

stage we find in ancient Greece.

18

2. Bottomry in India.

India furnishes us a final clue to the development
of bottomry during the pre-Grecian period.

In the Institutes

of Manu, a considerable section of the Eighth Book is devoted
20
to the matter of loans and interest.
Two of these sect
ions point to the existence of a bottomry contract that in

scope and extent approaches the form of contract that we meet
21
in the early classical period.
The time elapsed between the promulgation of the
Oode of Hammurapi and the drawing up of the Institutes of

Manu is at least a millennium.

The origin of the Institutes

in shrouded in uncertainty, and Hindu mythology attributes
them to a semi-d^vine hero Manu, fromwhich they take their

name.

The extravagances of Hindu mythological chronology

place the time of their compilation as far back as 6 x 71 x
22
4,320,000 years.
In its present form the code probably
dates from around 200 B.0. but includes a compilation of pre

cepts known and taught over a longer period.

Older writings

upon which the Institutes in their latter form are based,
indicate a point of origin previous to 600 B.0. and possibly

20. Institutes of Manu, Vlll.
21.
156-157.
22. Smith, History of Mathematics. V.l, p. 34.
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go back to 1000 B.O.

Unlike the Oode of Hammurapi, the

Institutes of Manu do not represent the law of the land, or
the promulgation of a ruler, but rather represent a series

of precepts presented by the teachers for the guidance of the

people.
In the light of the interpretation that we have

given to the pertinent sections in the Oode of Hammurapi, it

is not possible to compare the development of Bottomry among
the Hindus in the light of the Institutes of Manu with that

of the early Babylonians.
and the other begins.

We cannot tell where the one ends
If bottomry developed out of the

legislation of Hammurapi, mitigating the intolerable position

of a debtor who became insolvent through losing by robbery the

goods entrusted to him, and the theory is here advanced that
it so developed, we have no knowledge of the point reached in
its evolution among the Babylonians.

When the contract took

the form of a voluntary agreement entered into by merchants

and their agents, or by money lenders and their debtors, it
is reasonable to assume that it would be changed and modified

to satisfy the demands created by new conditions.

How much

of the development may be attributed to the Babylonians, how
much to the Hindus, or even to intermediary contributors, we

20

have no means of knowing.

That the contract of bottomry had. passed, through a
long period, of development when we meet with it among the

Hindus is evident.

Its scope has been extended, and its

usefulness as a vehicle for transferring the burden of risk

is more inclusive.
The Institutes of Manu that deal with
23
the question do not specify or list the hazards that excuse
the borrower from repayment, but use the expression 11 if by
accident the goods are not carried to the place or within

the time.From this it is apparently the intention to
include all of the perils of the undertaking that fall within

the meaning of the phrase "by accident".

It is specifically

provided that the laws apply to both sea-voyages and journeys

by land, bringing bottomry at last to the surroundings in
which it is familiar to us in connection with sea-loans, and

as a vehicle for marine insurance.
blance of underwriting.

Finally we have a sem

Men who were acquainted with sea

voyages and journeys by land were to estimate the risk.
That is, they were to study the hazards of the voyage, its

probably extent, the destination of the voyage with its
attendant dangers, and on the basis of their observations
to calculate a rate or premium to be charged the borrower.
23. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 156, 157.
24. Ibid.; translated by Sir William Jones.
25. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 157.

25
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Such regulations presuppose a considerable knowledge of risks

and hazards, and intimate strongly that the risk bearing
features of the agreement were beooming important factors.
It would be pleasing if we could leave the develop

ment of bottomry among the Hindus at this point.

It is

necessary, however, to state that with the Institutes of Manu,

as with so many of the ancient oriental documents lino er taint ies
of translation seriously becloud our conclusions.

The trans

lation that most clearly indicates bottomry, and permits the

conclusions with regard to this contract that have been here

advanced, is that of Sir William Jones, who "in addition to
being a profound Oriental scholar, had been peculiarly fitted

to translate an Indian legal code by his own judicial exper26
ience in that country."
In contrast, however, to the Jones

translation are others that permit quite a different interpre
tation.

To emphasize the uncertainty created by the diff

erences in translation, without attempting to exhaust the
possible examples, mention is made here of the scholarly work

In his translation of the first of the
27
two sections in question,
he makes no mention of a lender,

of Prof. G. Buhler.

26. Trenerry, op, pit., p. 68.
27. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 156. Buhler Translation.

22

or of the accidental loss of the goods, but interprets the
clause as a regulation with reference to individuals who

"contract to carry goods by a wheeled carriage for money."
Failure upon the part of the contractor to fulfill the terms

of his contract, that is, if he does not deliver the goods

at the place and time stipulated, he forfeits the reward
agreed upon.

The section following,

28

in the Buhler trans

lation makes reference to the fixing of rates in sea-voyages,

and omits any mention of journeys by land.

Certainly no

reference is made in either section to a loan agreement pro
viding that the borrower is to be relieved of his obligation

in the event of the happening of some undesired contingency.
Considering the evidence in the light of the two translations
cited, we are warned again of the uncertainties attendant upon

any conclusion possible regarding this early period.

In the

face of such translation difficulties as present themselves,
in the interpretation of the code in the light of insurance,

the probability that the sections may refer to a bottomry
contract with an insurance feature is sufficient to warrant

their consideration at this point.
If, as we suppose, the contract of bottomry did
develop out of the legislation of Hammurapi, knowing the extent
28. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 157.

23

of the Babylonian commercial contacts, it is not unreasonable

to assume knowledge of the practice on the part of the Hindus,
and that the source of that knowledge either directly or in
directly was ancient Babylon.

Cornelius Walford, whose pains

taking researches in the field of insurance history justly
entitle his opinion to weight, in his unfinished Insurance

Cyclopedia directs attention in his discussion of bottomry to
the Laws of Manu.

While emphasizing the uncertainty he points

out that the material dealing with the subject is "at least
sufficiently vague to justify a surmise."

As supporting

evidence that the Laws of Manu do contemplate a contract
having the essential characteristics of bottomry, he cites the
*

Vyavahara Mayuka, A Treatise on the Hindoo Law by Nilakamtha
Bhatta, which in the course of a discussion on lawful rates

of interest, states that it has been ordained by Yajnavalkya
that "all borrowers who travel through vast forests may pay
ten, and such as travel the ocean twenty in the hundred."

This clause he believes seems to imply loans to merchants; the
reference to the charge for borrowers who travel through the

forest relating to transport insurance, while the other charge

is for advances on bottomry.
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Walford uses the term

bottomry here in its more particular sense as applying to a

29. Walford, Ins. Oyo., v.l., p.334.
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marine loan, giving the term transport insurance to the land

borne traffic.

It is quite evident that the element of risk

is here considered in fixing a rate for ocean travel at twice
that fixed for a journey through the forest.

The assumption

that reference is here made to a contract for a loan, with

the elements of the bottomry agreement, is justified upon the

Likewise, it lends
30
support to the belief that the section
in the Laws of Manu

basis of the difference in rates.

that provides for the safe arrival of goods, is a law relating
to an agreement having the characteristics of bottomry.

A final point is made in considering the arrangement
of the Oode.

Separate sections of the Oode are assigned to

the treatment of a particular subject.

Two regulations

dealing with compensation or wages would hardly be found in
serted in a part of the code dealing with loans, interest
rates, and other allied matter.

Rather than to believe

that such extraneous matter as the regulation of wages, or

compensation for services rendered was contemplated at this
point, it is more reasonable to assume that ''interest1* was

the rendering intended, and that these sections were drawn up

with reference to loans.

30. Laws of Manu, Sec. 157.
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If at this point we may conclude that a preponder

ance of evidence points to the practice of bottomry by the

Hindus, we may before leaving the question consider the pro

bability of their being an intermediary between Babylon and
ancient Greece.

When we meet with the contract as a well

established custom in Greece.

It is likewise known and

practiced by others of the maritime nations in commercial

contact with Greece.

Legislation regarding the contract
31
was incorporated in the laws of Phodes.
Whence came

the contract to the maritime nations of the Mediterranean?

While the Institutes of Manu, in the form in which

we know them, are presumed to date around 200 B.0., it must
be remembered that the code then compiled included laws,
that at that period boasted great antiquity.

The origin of

the laws probably date back to a period corresponding to the
Homeric age in Greece.

During this period there was but |ittle commercial

aotivity in Greece.

The Homeric nobles satisfied their

simple requirements with the products of their own land,
their riches consisting chiefly in flocks, herds, and slaves.
Luxuries they imported, securing them from traders of other

31. Boeckh, The Public Economy of the Athenians, p. 184-5.
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countries who stopped to dispose of their cargoes.

The

Phoenicians provided most of the articles imported during
this early period, and they in turn secured them by journeying

to the far corners of the then known world.

Wherever there

was a prospect of gain, these shrewd traders were to be found;
their voyages reaching from Britain on the west to India in
32
the east.
That the Phoenicians may have been the inter
mediary by which a knowledge of the practice of bottomry was

carried from the more ancient civilization to the Greeks seems

very probable.

This is the opinion of Dr. Trenerry who

believes they acquired their knowledge directly from the Baby33
lonians.
This assumption, reasonable as it is, is purely
a matter of hypothesis, for there is no direct evidence that

the contract was ever utilized by the Phoenicians in their
commercial ventures.

During the period marked by the great commercial
expansion of Greek commerce, which includes the rise to Commer
cial supremacy of the city of Rhodes, great trade routes were

established between Greece and the far corners of the world.

Rhodes was founded in B.O. 408.

The first reference to

bottomry in Greece occurs around 350 B.O.

To be sure, the

32. Gardner and Jevons, A Manual of Greek Antiquities, p. 388.
33. Trenerry, op. oit.. p. 10
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contract when we meet it in Greece had been perfected, and evi
denced a |ong period of development.

At this time the Greeks

had established a great line of trade from Hellas, past Rhodes
and Cyprus, along the coast of Phoenicia to Egypt.

Over

this route the Greeks secured the products of the far East,

India, Arabia, and Babylon.

It is entirely probable that

the bottomry contract was not introduced into Greece until this
period of commercial activity, when the influence of Phoenicia

upon Greece was upon the wane.
It is likewise possible that India may have been the

intermediary, taking the idea from Babylon, developing it, and
passing it on to Greece, and the maritime nations of that

period.
We may say in conclusion, that if the origin of

bottomry may be attributed to Babylonia, we may likewise credit
India with enlarging its scope so far as the risk element is

concerned, and extending the practice to cover the hazards

attaching to sea voyages as well as undertakings involving land
transportation.

If, as it is entirely possible, Phoenicia

or some other people contributed to this development, the Hindus

have at least left us a record.
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3. Fire Insurance

So far as the problem of fire is concerned, the Oode

of Hammurapi is silent, save in a single instance.

This

mention has regard to the safeguarding of property from theft,
after fire had started.

The law is severe, placing punish

ment in the hands of the injured party.

If, says the code,

a fire break out in a man’s house, and any one who goes to put
the fire out shall take any of the owner’s property, he shall
34
be cast into that same fire.
This has oeen interpreted

to mean that the punishment may be inflicted immediately upon
catching the offender.

35

This section of the code is of interest to us here

only to indicate that the problems arising out of fires had

gained the attention of the law makers, and if there were at
this time any laws that had reference either to fire losses,

or any means of indemnifying sufferers, it might be reasonably

presumed that they would find a place in this code.

There

is nothing to be found in the code that relates to fire insur
ance in any form.

The question presents itself as to whether the Baby

lonians or Assyrians, at any period following the drawing up
of the Oode of Hammurapi, had devised any such system.

In

34. Oode of Hammurapi, Sec. 25.
35. Kocurek and Wigmore, Source Records of Ancient and Primitive
Law, p. 404.
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a paper read by Mr. Charles Stewart, of the Lancashire

Insurance Company, before the Insurance and Actuarial Society

of Glasgow, in the year 1881, he places the beginning of fire •
insurance with the communes of the towns and districts of
Assyria and the East more than 2500 years ago.

The plan

which Stewart believed to have been in effeot is a form of

compulsory assessment, which he says operated in the follow
ing manner

" Judges, priests, and magistrates were appointed
for each town and district with power to levy contri
butions from each member of the commune to provide a
fund against sudden calamities such as drouth and fire.
If the judges were satisfied that the fire was accidental
they empowered the magistrates to assess the members of
the commune in kind or in money, and in the event of any
member being unable through poverty to meet his share of
the contribution, the defficiency was made up from the
common fund.
These communes still exist in a modified
form in China.
In some towns of Russia the inhabitants
are jointly resoonsable for accidental fires and the
government make enforced contributions according to the
status and wealth of the inhabitants of the town or
village.
These communists had and have nothing in
common with the communism of the present day which means
the negation of private property.'1 36.
This statement has been preserved for us by .Bslton,

in his excellent work on the history of fire insurance in
Great Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

36. Quoted by Relton,, An.Account pf the Fire Insurance Companies,
Page 6.
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. Helton gives the quotation in his introductory chapter with
full acknowledgment to Stewart.

Since its appearance in

Helton's book, either through further quotation, or the re

petition of the subject matter in subsequent works, the state

ment had been widely circulated.

The assertion is now

frequently made that a form of mutual fire insurance, through

compulsory assessment, was in operation in Assyria at this

early date.
Unfortunately, the source of Stewart’s information
is lacking.

It is doubly unfortunate, because in the light

of the more complete information we now have concerning this
early period, it seems that Stewart’s statement was probably
based upon faulty information.

As a matter of fact, in 1881,

when Mr. Stewart read his paper the decipherment of Assyrian
cuneiform had not progressed far enough to make possible,
with any degree of certainty, the conclusion he presents with

regard to the existence of insurance in Assyria.
Research in the works of the leading authorities in
the field, as well as correspondence with recognized American

authorities makes inevitable the conclusion that Stewart’s
statement is open to doubt at least until more information is

available.

Commenting upon this quotation, Prof. A.E.R.Boak,

31

Chairman of the Department of History at the University of
Michigan states:-

" I have investigated the quotation which you
enclosed in your letter of Maroh 20, but I have
been unable to find the source from which it is
taken.
Furthermore, I have not been able to find
the slightest bit of evidence to support the state
ments contained in the quotation.
I. have consulted
on this matter with Professor Leroy Waterman, who
is a recognized authority on Assyrian history, and
he tells me that he knows of nothing which would
justify these assumptions.
I believe, therefore,
that the statements should at least be recognized
as extremely doubtful." 37
Referring directly to the same quotation from Relton's book,
•
•
•
5
Dr. W. F. Albright, Professor of Semetic Languages at the Johns

Hopkins University, states:-

" I am afraid that Relton’s statement with regard
to the existance of fire insurance in Assyria more
than twenty-five hundred years ago i» quite without
foundation.
We have a very large number of business
documents of every possible kind from ancient Baby
lonia and Assyria, but none of them refer to any
kind of insurance against death or sudden calamities
such as drought and fire." 38.
Were the matter of community assessments a common

practice, reference to them would be found among the thousands

of documents now deciphered and catalogued.

Hot would the

existance of such a custom be unknown to the modern scholars

37. From a personal letter to the writer.
38. From a personal letter to the writer.
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in the field.

Insurance writers frequently consult

Alton's

admirable book for material on the early development of fire
insurance, and his inclusion of Stewart’s statement in the

form of a quotation has given it widespread circulation
throughout more recent insurance works.

In the light of the

best evidence, however, it seems that Stewart’s statement is
entirely without authority, and there is nothing to warrant

the assertion he makes.

We cannot,

then, agree with those

writers who cite . ReIton or Stewart as authorities, that
mutual insurance in the form of compulsory assessments was

known and practiced by the early Assyrians.

4. Early Partnerships.

For the purposes of this study, we are particularly

interested in such developments as tended toward the amassing

of capital for business enterprise, for without facilities for

amassing great capital the business of insurance would have
39
been impossible.
While we have no evidence that the partnerships of

early Babylon concerned themselves with underwriting risks, it
is of course possible that individuals should join to divide

39. Of. Smith, Wealth of Nations. V.l, iii, 1
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the risks of an enterprise much in the same manner that they
40
did later in Greece.
In fact there is evidence to show
41
that two individuals sometimes joined in financing an agent

though there is no evidence to indicate the practice had
assumed any of the characteristics of insurance underwriting.
However, regardless of whether or not we can connect the for

mation of partnerships at this early date with the business
of risk bearing, we are interested in the development as a

collateral contribution, because of its later importance in
the development of insurance.

The earliest development of joint operations grew
out of the practice of renting flocks.

It was the custom

for the owner of a flock to rent it to another party for a
considerable period of time, part of the consideration speci

fied being a share in the wool, and in the increase of the
42
flock.
Records have been found in the early contracts or

partnership agreements, that they are very simple in their

form.

An example of this simplicity is found in an agreement

that simply states, besides naming the parties to the agreement,

witnesses, place, date, and such legal formalities, that:

40. Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work,
p. 302.
41. Of. Trenerry,
op. cit., p. 52.
42. Jastrow,
op. cit., 353.
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A

"Whatever transactions they engage in, they share in common." °
From this simple beginning partnership arrangements

continued to develop to a stage where individuals were able
to invest a sum of money or a quantity of merchandise in a

common enterprise, and could if they wished entrust the mana44
gement of the business to another.
During the period of
partnership debts contracted by one party carried with it
liability for payment on the part of the other partners, and

definite partnership agreements entailed a definite legal
procedure for their dissolution.

Among the requirements

for the legal and orderly dissolution of a partnership arrange
ment there was included the necessity of rendering an account
before the proper tribunal, and the taking of an oath that
45
the assets has been equitably distributed.
From available

data, it has been determined that such partnerships were effect
ed at a very early period, and continued in much the same form
for several centuries.

That these partnerships were often of

the nature of permanent business enterprises may be determined
from the existing records.

Tipical is a document dated

around 500 B.0. describing the dissolution of a partnership

43. Strassmaier, Nabonidus Inschriften. No. 199. quoted by
Jastrow. op. cit. p. 354.
44. Jastrow. op. cit., p. 354.
45. Ibid.,p. 355.
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that had been a going concern for thirty-one years.

While it is not easy to determine the terms of the

partnership Bsseeiation from the records, cases where the

evidence is sufficient show it to be the ordinary procedure
to effect a division of profits pro rata according to the
amount of capital each contributed to the enterprise.

To

what extent each partner was obligated to contribute his

personal services for the benefit of the concern was not

always certain, but there is ground for the belief that some
of the partnership associations were drawn up with the evident
purpose of requiring certain partners to furnish only the

capital for the enterprise, while others assumed the responsi47
bility for the actual conduct of the business.

A considerable legal terminology grew up around the
partnership agreement.

The terms and phrases are of such a

character, when we meet with them in the early documents, as

to give rise to the belief that they are abbreviations of much

longer sentences.

This presupposes a long period of develop

ment and may be considered as illuminating evidence of the
48
antiquity of the partnership relationship.
Further evidence

46. Strassmaier, Nabuchodnosor Inschriften . No.116. quoted by
Jastrow. op. oit., p.356.
47. Johns, op, cit., p. 287.
48. Ibid..p. 290.
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of the advanced state reached in the development of this
commercial relationship is found in the cognizance taken by
the local courts in enforcing the agreements.

A disolution

of partnership was a formal procedure and involved recourse

to the courts.

Appeal to the courts is sought for the

purpose of settling disputes.

In short, even in the early

days, when we first meet with the relationship, the evidence
shows it to be a long established commercial custom, recog

nized by law and protected in its operation by the courts.

Our interest in the development of partnership is
concerned with the means such business associations afford

for effecting a dispersion of risk.

As a matter of fact,

without some form of association such as partnership, or its

later development, the corporate form of business organization,

the business of insurance could never have developed to its
present form.
As a vehicle for bearing risk, such associations
furnish a means for accumulating small units of capital which

the owners are willing to hazard.
serves two purposes.

This accomplishment

It is obvious that if an undertaking

involves a large unit of capital in a single risk, the number

of individuals with aifficiently large marginal units of capital
which they will subject to the risk will be limited.

On the
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basis then of scarcity, they can and will command a higher
price for the use of their capital.

However, because of the

size of the unit risked, its value to the owner will be high

and the danger of losing it all in a single enterprise will
have the effect of fixing a high price for the use of the

unit.
It now follows that if small units of capital that
would be useless to finance a single enterprise may be accumu

lated, the supply of available capital will be increased.
Likewise, in so far as a comparison is possible, the marginal
utility of the smaller units of capital will be less, and

the reward demanded for their use correspondingly less.

We

have here an apparent paradox, where the sum of the parts is
less than the whole.

In other words, if twenty people

could join in assuming a given risk, because to the owners

of the capital the marginal utility of a twentieth part
would be proportionately less than a twentieth of the whole,

the compensation that would satisfy the twenty and attract
their capital to the field would be very much less than the

compensation that would be satisfactory to attract a single
individual to carry the entire burden.
While these features had not yet manifested them-
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selves in the field of risk bearing in this early period, we
are interested at this point in recording the development
of the vehicle that was to become such an important factor
in the institution of insurance.
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CHAPTER 11.

ANCIENT GREECE.
1. Bottomry in Ancient Greece.
Leaving behind us the pre-classical period, we pass
from the realm of speculation.

Maritime interest (

) furnished a most profitable source of income to
the money lenders of Ancient Greece, and a bottomry agreement
was developed, that in its essential corresponded to the con
tract of modern times.

According to the custom developed by the ancient
Greeks, the ship or the cargo was made security for the money

lent.

.There is a possibility that the money received for

passage and freight was likewise pledged as security.

Loans

were made, so far as can be determined, most frequently upon
the cargo, or a part of it, less frequently upon the ship, and
least often, if at all, upon the money received for passage or
freight.

Because risk of loss rested upon the creditor, the

owner of the ship or cargo, besides securing capital for use in

his undertakings, at the same time insured himself against loss.
A well defined procedure for effecting a bottomry

1. Walford, op. cit., V. 1, p. 334.
2. Boeckh, op. cit., p. 182-3.
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agreement was developed

Contracts were formed by drawing

up articles of agreement, and depositing a record of them
3
with a money-changer.
The form of agreement developed
is a most complete and interesting document, and clauses and

conditions that weri incorporated therein have been retained
and included as among the most essential features of the
modern marine insurance policy

Fortunately we have pre

served for us, in the oration of Demosthenes against Lacritus,

a complete agreement, and another in part in his speech
against Dionysodorus
Because of its importance as indicative of the con-

tribution of ancient Greece, and to facilitate our consider
ation of the contract in the light of insurance developments,

the agreement taken from the oration of Demosthenes against
Lacritus is here given in full:-

"Androcles of Sphettus and Nausicrates of
Carystus have lent to Artemo and Apollodorus, both
of Phaselis, three thousand drachms in Silver from
Athens to Mende or Scione, and thence to Bosporus,
or, if they please, on the left coast as far as the
Borysthenes, and back to Athens, at interest of two
hundred and twenty-five for the thousand; but in
case they shall sail out of Pontus to Hierum after
the rising of Arctutus, at interest of three hundred
for the thousand, on the secutity of three thousand
casks of Mendaean wine, which shall be conveyed from
Mende or Scione in the twenty-oared vessel of which
Hyblesius is the owner.
They hypothecate these
goods, not owing upon them any money to any other
person, nor will they borrow anything further upon
them.
And they shall bring back to Athens in the
same vessel all the goods which they purchase in

Ibid, ^p. mo.
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Pontus for the retufn-cargo.
And, if the goods are
brought safe to Athens, the borrowers shall pay to
the lenders the money accruing due according to the
agreement within twenty days after their arrival at
Athens, without any abatement, except for jettison,
which the passengers have made by common resolution,
or for payments made to enemies, but no deduction
shall be allowed in respect of any other loss; and
they shall deliver the security entire to the lenders,
to be under their absolute control until they have
paid the sum due under the agreement.
And, if they
do not pay it in the stipulated time, it shall be
lawful for the lenders to pledge or to sell the
security for such price as can be obtained; and, if
there is any deficiency in the money which is due
to the lenders under the agreement, it shall be law
ful for the lenders, both or either of them, to levy
the amount by execution against Artemo and Apollodorus,
and against all their property, whether on land or
sea, wheresoever they may be, in the same manner as
if a judgment had been recovered against them and
they had committed default in payment.
And if they
do not enter Pontus, but stay ten days after the
rising of the dog-star in the Hellespont, and dis
charge their cargo in some place where the Athenians
have no right of reprisals, and thence return home
to Athens, they shall pay the interest inserted for
the previous year in the agreement.
And, if the
ship in which the goods are conveyed should meet with
any irretrievable disaster, the security shall be
saved, if possible, and whatever is recovered shall
be the joint property of the creditors.
And
touching these matters nothing shall have greater
effect than the agreement.
"Witnesses, Phormio of Piraeus, Oephisodotus, a
Boetian, Heliodorus of Pithus." 4
We are interested in the insurance features of this

agreement.

It is to be noted first of all that the contract

expressly provides that all of the property of Artemo and Apoll
odorus, as well as the return cargo, to be purchased by them,
4. Translation by 0. R. Kennedy,
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is made liable for the repayment of their loan.

The agree

ment provides that if the security for the loan, when sold by

the creditors, shall prove deficient to meet the obligations,
then the creditors are empowered to seize any other of the

debtor’s property, wherever it may be found, in the same

manner as if a judgment had been recovered.

These features

are concerned with the loan and security therefor.

Our in

terest centers chiefly upon the clause that provides as a con

dition precident to repayment of the loan and interest,

(the .

money accruing due according to the agreement) the safe
arrival of the goods at Athens.

This is the feature of the

agreement that introduces the insurance element.

If the

goods offered as security for the advance be lost on the
voyage, the lender loses his money.

But if it arrives in

safety at the point of destination agreed upon at the time

the advance is made, then the amount of the loan is to be re
paid together with the interest agreed upon by the parties.
Only in the event of the safe arrival of the cargo pledged as
security have the creditors a right to levy against the debtors,

and seize their property in execution after a sale of the
security fails to satisfy the claim.

In other words the

debtors are insured to the full amount of their loan.

In
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the event that the security fails to arrive safely at the

agreed destination, the entire loss rests upon the lender,

who is, as a matter of fact, the insurer.
The hazardous nature of the undertaking, from the
point of view of the lender, seems to have been fully recog

nized by the Greeks, particularly in such a commercial center

as Athens.

Because the loss of the property hypothecated

carried with it both loss of principle and interest, the yield
on such loans was very much higher than could ordinarily be
obtained in the ordinary course of lending money.

Such

contracts, in which the creditor did not undertake the risk,

were prohibited by the Rhodian laws.

The element in the

charge, made for risk was fully recognized, and by the terms

of their law unless the lender undertook the risk of loss he

was not allowed to charge the interest customarily allowed in

the bottomry contracts.

There was no such restriction in

5
the Attic law, though the risk element was fully recognized.
This is demonstrated by the regulation which prohibited using
6
the money of orphans for loans on bottomry.

5. Boeckh, op. cit.,p. 184.

6. Ibid..p. 186.
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In the contract we are discussing, there appears

another most interesting development.

The insurance element

of the agreement is extended to permit an adjustment of the
amount due the creditor in the event of jettison in the first

instance, and again for payments made to enemies.

Both of

these sources of loss were incorporated as hazards covered in
the later development of the marine insurance policy.

Their

appearance at this point is worthy of note.
From the earliest development of a distinct insur
ance contract, jettison was recognized as an insurable hazard,
and losses arising therefrom were covered by the marine policies.
One of the first policy forms of which we have record, was

established by a Florentine ordinance of 1523, and provides:"The said assurers taking upon themselves the risk of all

perils of the sea, fire, jettison, reprisals, robbery by friend
or foe, and every other chance, peril, misfortune, disaster,
hinderance, misadventure, though such as could not be imagined
7
or supposed to have occured, or be liable to occur --- "

And yet we must go back to this agreement, furnished us by
Demosthenes, to find the first mention of jettison, included

7. Fire Insurance Contract, p. 73.
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as one of the risks in the insurance feature of the bottomry
contract.

Jettison finds its justification in the principle

of natural equity.

If the goods of one merchant on a ship

are sacrificed for the benefit of all, then he is entitled

to a contribution from those who have benefited thereby in
proportion to the value of the property they have thus been

able to save.

The levy made to compensate the owner of goods

jettisoned is termed "general average".

The earliest law

dealing with the subject originated in Rhodes, and was adopted
in the Digest of Justinian where mention is specifically made
g
of its origin.
The Rhodian law, as adopted by the Digest
remains unchanged in its essentials to the present day.
In the bottomry contract of ancient Greece, while

jettison is specifically mentioned as a reason for abatement
in the repayment of the loan, the borrower must comply with

conditions specified in the contract.

Certain formalities

are ordinarily required before goods may be jettisoned,
today.

even

In the contract we are considering, in order that

jettison might be the grounds for a claim on the part of the

8 Digest, XIV - Tit 11.
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debtor against the creditor, it was necessary that the property

be sacrificed only after the adoption of a common resolution

by all on board.

Whether this reference to an abatement in

the event of jettison extended to the sacrifice of property
other than that offered as security for the loan is not clear.
Whether the custom of general average was known to the Greeks

is a point upon which we have no knowledge, but the fact that
all on board shall vote to throw over, for the common good,

all or part of the goods of any one of the owners, would seem
to imply a liability on their part to compensate for the

benefit secufed.

It would be an interesting point to deter

mine, whether jettison during the course of a voyage that in
no way affected the physical value of the security, but involved

a claim for general average, was contemplated as a ground for
abatement in the Greek contract of bottomry.

In reference

to modern insurance practice, it is the custom of the under

writer to include in his contract an express agreement to in
demnify the assured for losses arising out of general average.

Equally interesting, though less pertinent, in the
light of modern developments is the stipulation providing that

losses originating out of payments made to enemies, shall be

borne by the lender of the money.

Under modern practice, the

rule with respect to payments made to enemies, has in all
respects been similar to those applied to jettison.

Lack

ing any feature of fraud, and having used reasonable means to

protect the goods, if part of a cargo be voluntarily delivered

to a pirate or enemy, as an inducement to save the vessel and
the rest of the cargo, or if instead of goods, money be advanced
as a ransom,

then the value of that which is saved thereby must

contribute to the loss.

An interesting sidelight as to the

extent to which the equitable principle is carried, is found

in the provision that there is no obligation for contribution

if the enemy or pirate shall by force overpower the ship, and

choose for himself such goods or money as he desires to take.
In this instance the goods lost is not the purchase price paid

for the safety of that which remains.

We are at loss to know

whether in this agreement, in Demosthenes, it was intended that
liability for contributions to general average should furnish
grounds for a claim, or in fact, whether or not there was any

liability even to contribute.

So in the event of payments to

enemies, we know that losses of the hypotheticated goods fur

nished grounds for a claim.

Further than this we cannot go.

With these ancient Greek contracts we need not go
into the question of insurable interest.

The very fact that

the borrower was under obligation to repay the amount of his
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loan, and that he pledged his entire assets as additional
security, is evidence of his interest in the safe outcome of
the undertaking, and that the risks of the voyage rested upon
him, until by means of his bottomry contract he had shifted

them back to the lender of the money.
The doctrine of warranty was operative both as to

statement of fact and promise of performance.

We find the

borrower warranting that the goods hypothecated are free of
any encumbrance, and agreeing not to further encumber them.

Likewise a definite destination was provided for the journey,
and no deviation from the route was allowed unless provision

was made for it in the agreement.

Failure to comply with

similar warranties in a fire or marine insurance contract

would furnish grounds for voiding the policy.

Likewise

there is the provision in the agreement, that requires the

discharge of the cargo in some place where the Athenians

have no right of reprisals.

Oommissions to make reprisals

were granted in ancient times in a manner not unlike the

letters of marque and counter-marque were issued in more modern
times.

It was therefore essential to the safety of the cargo

that the ship should not be unloaded at any place where the
Athenians had the right of reprisals, because Athenian property
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and consequently the hypothecated goods in the particular case
under discussion, might and very probably would have been taken

by those upon whom the Athenians were authorized to prey.

Consequently the condition is inserted in the agreement.

Non

compliance would increase the hazards of the risk beyond that
contemplated in the undertaking at its inception.

This of it

self would furnish ample grounds to void a modern insurance

policy, in addition to the grounds furnished by failure to comply

with a specific condition of the agreement.

The contract shows further a considerable development
in the underwriting procedure.

First of all a specific ship

is named in which the undertaking is to be carried out.

Pre

sumably the lenders of the money ware familiar with the ship,

its size, speed, condition of its rigging and hull, and in
general what factors were present that contributed to the risk.

Likewise periods dangerous to navigation were recognized.

In

the agreement we are considering three thousand drachmas were
lent upon a quantity of Mendaen wine, on the voyage from Athens

to Mende or Scione, and thence to Bosphorus.

If the bofrowers

wished it was provided that they could proceed along the left
shore of the Black Sea as far as the Borysthenes, thence back

to Athens.

The interest charge for this voyage was 22^, or

as it is expressed in the agreement, two hundred and twenty-
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five for the thousand.

But here is the interesting point.

It is provided that if they shall sail out of Pontus to Hierum,
after the rising of Arcturus, the interest rate is increased

to 30$ or three hundred on the thousand.

The additonal rate

is charged to compensate for the increased hazards of nagig
gation of early autumn.
Finally as evidence of the care

exercised by these lenders in estimating the risks and perils
of the journey in the event that the borrowers should exercise
a choice permitted them, and decide not to enter the Pontus,
they were then bound to stay ten days after the rising of the

dog-star in the Hellespont.

This was at the end of July,

the period characterized by the storms of the dog-days.In

the event this option was exercised, they were to unload at a
safe port and return to Athens, paying the interest inserted

for the previous year in the agreement.

This means, because

the year ended about mid-summer, that a delay until the rising

of the dog star carried the borrowers into the succeeding year,
and hence it was stipulated that the lower rate was to apply

if they did not enter the Pontus, and shielded themselves from

the dangerous storms of the dog-days by delaying in the pro
tection of the Hellespont for ten days.

9. Boeckh, op. cit.. p. 190.
10. Ibid, p. 191.
11. Ibid.,p. 191.
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Then there is incorporated into the contract the

feature so important in the later development of insurance,

the limiting of indemnity to actual loss.

We have already

seen that in the instance of jettison, or payment to an enemy,
provision is made for an abatement of the amount due the

creditor.
loss.

This is presumably limited to the amount of the

There is, however, another interesting section that

provides that if the ship in which the goods are conveyed

should meet with any irretrievable disaster, the security

shall be saved if possible, and whatever is recovered shall
be the joint property of the creditors.

If the borrower is

no longer obligated to repay the loan, he is not entitled to
profit by the mishap through retaining the salvage.

As in

the case of the modern insurance agreement, however, hecis

under obligation to do whatever he can to salvage and protect

the property, and turn it over to the creditor, who 'in this

instance is likewise an insurer.

As the agreement is drawn,

and in the absence of fraud, there is no opportunity for profit
to accrue to the borrower through the happening of the contin
gency that results in a loss.

The question naturally presents itself as to the

penalty for non-compliance with the terms and conditions in

the agreement.

To be sure no penalty is set forth in the
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contract, but if there were no recourse to law, and no satis
faction for the injured party, the inclusion in the document

of so many specific conditions would have been a useless
superfluity.

It is to be presumed that any violation of

the terms of the agreement would be fraught with legal conse
quences.

Just what the nature of the procedure would be is

uncertain, but probably would include a forfeiture of the bene

ficial features of the agreement that accrued to the borrower.
It may safely be presumed that if the borrowers should deviate

from the route permitted in their agreement, and the hypothecated
goods should be lost, the creditors would not be obliged to

suffer the loss of their capital, but might proceed against the
property of the debtors on the same basis as they would if the

security arrived safely but failed to satisfy the claim.

A

deviation furnishes grounds for voiding a modern marine insur

ance policy.

The place of departure and destination being

specified in the agreement, it is an implied condition upon
the part of the assured to be performed, that the ship shall
proceed to her destination without•delay and without deviation

from the shortest course.

A change in the voyage, after the

departure of the ship, is considered to be a different voyage,
and the insurer is no longer liable for loss, even if the loss

be not a consequence of the deviation.

When the deviation
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12

is effected liability ceases.

That such was the penalty in

the Greek bottomry contract we are considering seems a most

reasonable assumption.
Up to this point the insurance element in the

bottomry agreement has been emphasized.

Because it is our

purpose here to trace the thread of development of the insur
ance idea, this is the feature in which we are interested.
While every bottomry contract from its very nature must contain

some element of risk bearing to maintain the proper perspective
the fact must not be submerged that the contract of bottomry
is not in all instances per se a contract of insurance.

The

contract had other uses than that of risk bearing, and it is
to be presumed that while this feature of the agreement is not
to be minimized, it was nevertheless for a considerable period

a subordinate factor.

The joint enterprise was a hold over

from an early period.

It is interesting in passing, and essen

tial to our purpose in tracing the contributions of ancient

Greece to the development of the insurance idea, to examine
the evolution of the bottomry agreement.

We are interested

in determining at what point the insurance feature became the

important element in the agreement, and in contrast, to what

12. Burgess v. Equitable Mar. Ins. Go, 126 Mass. 70.
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extent the marine loans represented in the beginning a joining
in a business venture by the lender for a stipulated share of
the profits.

We are interested in considering the elements

of the contract that constitute it an insurance agreement,

and have as an end the shifting of the burden of risk from
the shoulders of one to which the risk already attaches to
those of another more willing to bear it.
At this point we are called upon to distinguish
between carrying the risk on the one hand, and becoming a

partner in the enterprise on the other.

Let us take first

as an example for consideration the case where a capitalist
enters into an agreement with a merchant to finance a venture

for a share of the profits, the merchant furnishing the know
ledge and skill, the capitalist the required finances.

Such

an arrangement, even though the ship or cargo are given as

security upon safe arrival, is not a contract of insurance,
for there is no placing of the capital of the risk bearer in
the position of the capital of another to meet anticipated

risks.

It is essentially a joint venture.

Such a situation

more closely resembles the position of the silent partner in

the modern partnership or business enterprise.

This was the

relationship found in the commanda of the Babylonians.

In

the bottomry loan, unless the adventurer, because of risk,

deliberately avoids the use of his own capital, there is little
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to justify calling the transaction insurance, but rather more
to include it as a form of business association.

Perhaps another comparison might be made, not in the
form of organization, but in the relationship of capital to
the risk.

In our modern form of corporate organization we

have a general classification of securities into three groups.
Regardless of the various forms to be found included in the

main classifications, the three principle groups include first

the bonds issued to lenders, second preferred stock issued to
limited proprietors, and lastly the common stock issued to
proprietors.

Now then, the lender or bondholder expects the

return of his money regardless of the success of the venture.
The preferred stockholder knows that with failure of the ven
ture he will salvage nothing until all obligations are met,

then he may have a preference as to remaining assets.

On the

other hand his share in the profits is definitely determined

by the articles of agreement.

Now then, even though the rate

of interest that a corporation must pay for an issue of pre
ferred stock to attract buyers is in excess of the interest to

be paid upon a bond, the difference cannot be termed an insur

ance premium paid by the common stock to guarantee the safety
of part of the capital.

To partake of the character of insur

ance, the capital risked must stand to bear the losses of other
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capital to which the risk would ordinarily attach.
If it was difficult in the beginning to distinguish

the insurance feature of the bottomry loan because it had more

the characteristics of a joint venture, eventually the insur
ance element became more important and the payment on the

loans instead of being at a rate that included a sizeable
portion of the profits, more closely coincided with a premium

charge above the current interest rates for risk.

Presumably,

as business advanced, borrowers were able on their own credit
to finance their adventures, and were unwilling to pay the

exorbitant interest that was originally demanded.

They were

willing to pay the lender a premium for carrying the risk, but

no more.

When the borrower reached the stage where he might

borrow at one rate of interest, but be under obligation to pay
baok regardless of the success of his adventure, or borrow at
a higher rate but be free of any further obligation in the
event his' ship or cargo was lost, the difference in rate measur

ing the element of risk, then the bottomry loan became insurance.

It coincides with the definition, by then having as its principle
end the shifting of the burden of risk.

It is now an accepted

belief that merchants who might well' have financed themselves
upon sea-ventures out of their own capital, often preferred to
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borrow under the bottomry contract because of the risk inherent
in the undertaking they contemplated, and pay the higher rate of
interest required in return for the security offered.

It

follows if they were at the same time to invest their own
capital in lees hazardous undertakings, that the difference
between the yield upon their own capital, and that paid for the

sea loan, represents a premium paid for risk bearing, and—io
•^herefore-ar-pr-enriTtm-paid ■ f or insurance-.

The contract of bottomry thus developed into a form
of marine insurance, and may be regarded as the earliest form

of indemnity to become a widely known and common practice in the

commercial world.

The commercial nations of antiquity secured

through this means the benefits of insurance, cumbersome in its

operation, this method of indemnifying loss was a decided step
in the development of a means for risk bearing, and for the
people of the ancient world, for whose benefit it operated, it
13
was real insurance in its results.

2. Risk Bearing By Groups.
To ancient Greece belongs the credit, not only for

developing the bottomry contract to a high state of usefulness,

13. Huebner. Histofy of Marine Insurance Annals of American
Academy of Political ana ---------------social Science.v.xxvi.1905
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but also for devising a means dividing the risk so that a single
loss would bear heavily on no single individual.

It is here for

the first time that the partnership organization makes a contract
and contribution to the business of insurance.

The earliest of these associations known in Greece
were the marine trading companies, naturally formed by a group

of associates aboard ship who were uniting their efforts in a
common venture.

The tradition that thus developed in connect

ion with marine undertakings was bound to survive, and the step
from forming groups to go to sea in a ship as partners in an
enterprise, to the formation of groups to finance an enterprise

by means of the bottomry loan, was both simple and logical.
This form of partnership arrangement for effecting bottomry
14
loans was an usual and well known business practice.

The association or grouping of individuals for the

purpose of dividing the risk involved in a single bottomry

transaction furnishes us a striking parallel to the modern
Lloyds associations.

While the Lloyds associations of the

present represent t.he accumulation of years of experience in
conducting the business of insurance,

the theory involved in

14. Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 302.
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carrying the risk is essentially the same as that employed

in the partnership associations of ancient Greece.
This partnership association developed in Greece was

well adapted to the purpose of risk bearing, and was utilized
not only in connection with the underwriting of marine loans,

but also to finance undertakings of other kinds that involved
too great a risk for a single individual.

Athens, a city of

great commercial enterprise, facilitated business operations

through its wide spread adoption.

Ma,ny companies of great

importance were formed there, and included among the partners

some of the wealthiest and most influential men of the city.

15

The usual form of organization included a leader oT

chief, as well as any number Of associates.

All of the mem

bers were not responsible before the law, but upon the leader

or principle associate fell the duty of answering for the
16
others.
As to whether there was any provision in the law
that regulated the affairs of the members or enforced the con17
ditions of their contract of association is uncertain.
It

is to be presumed, however,

that the law took cognizance of a

15. Ardaillon, Les mines du Laurion dans L'antiquite. p 186.
16. Ibid.p. 187.
17. Ibid,?p. 187.
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contract of association that occupied, so important a place in

the commercial life of the time.

It seems certain that the

company secured, a considerable degree of unity and mobility of
action through the device of making the leader the official
representative of the group who entered an appearance for them

whenever necessary.

This form of association admirably

adapted itself to the business of marine underwriting, and
served as a means for carrying on the business of insurance.
The procedure for arranging to carry a bottomry loan,

and at the same time effect a wide distribution of risk was

simple.

To begin with, a single individual might negotiate

a loan on his own behalf, or it might have been arranged by a

leader and two or three partners who were united, for the purpose.

The individual, or the partners who have negotiated the loan,

and who are alone known to the borrower, then proceed to effect
a form of re-insurance.

That is, they further spread the risk

by assigning part of it to other partners whose names do not

appear in the original articles of agreement.

The result of

this dispersion makes each individual liable for but a small
18
part of the total of any one risk.
It is obvious, then,

that an individual with a given sum of money, instead of being
obliged to risk it all in a given venture, or risk it in large

18. Glotz, op. cit., p. 302
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sums, may go about and place part on one risk, part on another.
The loss of a ship in which they are interested would therefore

involve but a fraction of their capital.

There was likewise

afforded an opportunity for the individual whose wealth was
not all in a form to use for bottomry loans, but who might

occasionally have small units available for risk to participate

in a venture.

He too could join in the underwriting of one

or more of these groups.

In this way more capital was made

available for the purpose.

The associations thus formed were

npt permanent partnerships, like companies, but like the Lloyds

underwriters, formed a separate group for every transaction.

Each group formed to underwrite a loan was a societas unius rei.
lasting for a pre-arranged time, usually dependant upon the
19
time of the voyage for which the money was davanced.

3. The Insurance of Slaves.

The earliest example we have of carrying on the

business of insurance, following the method adopted in modern
times, is found in Aristotle.

Today as the business of insurance

is carried on, if a given risk is to be transferred by means of

19. Ibid.,p. 302.
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insurance, it is accomplished by means of the insurer assuming
the burden of risk by contract, in return for the payment of a
stipulated premium by the assured.

Surprise has sometimes

been expressed, considering the development of commerce and

business among the ancient peoples that no form of providing
indemnity in the event of disaster, for the payment of a premium
in advance, was effected on a commercial scale, at least so far
as the available records afford us evidence.

That the princi

ple was not unknown, the Oeconomica attributed to Aristotle,
20
affords us an outstanding example.
In the instance cited,
Antimines a Rodian has been placed by Alexander in charge of the

roads around Babylon, and turned uo the problem of raising money.

Among other devices, he went into the business of insurance.

Owners of slaves, if they wished, were permitted to register the
value of each slave, and to pay eight drachmae a year.

consideration of the payment of this sum (premium)

In

the owner

would receive the price he had registered in the event the
slave should run away.

It is recorded that many slaves were

registered, and that Antimines accumulated in this way a consid
erable sum of money.

20. Oecon. 11, 1352 (b) 33
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The special significance that attaches to this instance
is found, not in its commercial importance, but in the fact that
it demonstrates to us the fact that the principle must have been
well known long before it became a common commercial practice.
21
With the authorship of the Oeconomioa
we are not here particul

arly concerned.

The fact that it has been handed down to us

in the Aristotelian Corpus assures us that it was widely known

and read.

If the case of Antimines were an isolated instance

and the report buried in some obscure document that had since
come to light we could not be sure that the instance was- known.

But to be included in Aristotle was to assure the material being
familiar at least to the scholars and students.

Because of

its importance in giving body to an idea that was subsequently

to be of great commercial importance, as well as making a record
thereof, the passage is here included in full:-

"On another occasion, when providing slaves who were
to serve in the army, he commanded that any owner who
wished should register the value which he put upon them,
end they were to pay eight drachmae a year; if the
slave rqn away the owner was to receive the price which
he had registered.
Many slaves being registered, he
amassed a' considerable sum of money.
And whenever any
slave ran away he ordered the satrap of the country in
which the camp was situated to recover the runaway or
else to'pay the price to the owner." 22

21. Of. Bonar, op. cit., p.32. Also Preface to Forster translation
of Oeconomioa.
Works of Aristotle. Vol.X., W.D.Ross, editor.
22. Oeconomioa, 11. 1532 (b) 33 ff. Forster translation.
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This was indeed insurance, and so far as we .have any
knowledge from the records that have been preserved for us,

represents the first instance of risk bearing where the insurer
in return for the advance payment of a premium, agrees to in
demnify the assured upon the happening of the undesired contin
gency for which protection is provided.

As to what exteirt the

idea was used by others, or whether it was used at all, we have

no information.

That the idea was presented in the Oeconomlca.

not merely as a record of the past, but as an example to be
followed by others who desired to engage in an undertaking for
profit, may be gathered from a further reading of the text.

In the beginning of the second book of the Oeconomica. the

author distinguishes four kinds of economy.

After mentioning

I

and describing them, he then presents a collection of all the
methods that he conceived to be worth mentioning, devised or
employed by men of former times as money-making schemes,

The

information was presented with the idea in mind that others
might make use of it as a means for securing a profit for them
selves.

Then follows a number of examples showing how different

individuals were able to secure money.
Among the examples thus
'
23
listed, is to be found this insurance project of Antimines.
Whether, as the writer suggests, others availed themselves of

23. Aristotle, Oecon. 11, 1346 (a) 26 ff
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the insurance idea thus described, there is no information.

It is to be presumed that at this time the idea failed to sur
vive, for there is no evidence that it ever became at this

early date an important commercial practice.

It is interesting to note in passing, however, that
the project apparently developed in response to a decided need,
and involved a recognition of the economic effect of risk.

The conditions under which slaves were held in military service
facilitates escape, and made slave owners reluctant to subject
24
their slaves to this hazard.
It is obvious that such a

situation would not tend to further the project of Antimines
of providing slaves for the army, on the other hand it would
tend to make the task more difficult.

It might have been ex-

I

pected, as the most logical step, that the authorities furnish

the owners with some form of guarantee that their slaves would
be returned.

This they were apparently unwilling to do.

shrewd Antimines, however, was able to meet the situation.
**

The
He

/

provided a means of eliminating the risk as far as the slave

owner was concerned, and at the same time provided a source of
revenue for himself.

He went into the business of insuring

the slaves.

24. Of. Boeckh, op. cit., p. 101.
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The voluntary feature of the project is worth noteing.

While he commanded that facilities be made available to the

owners for registering slaves, the matter of registering was
entirely optional.

Only those who wished were required to

pay the premium, and thereby secure the protection that was
offered.

It was entirely a business proposition.

was present.

The risk

The person upon whom the burden rested could

for the payment of a premium secure relief by shifting the
burden to the shoulders of the risk bearer or insurer.
We are interested in considering at this point as
well the position of the insurer.

Had Antimines determined

his premium charge on the basis of experience?

Did he set

up out of.his premium collections a reserve for losses?
Were the reserves adequate?

Had he any knowledge of the

elements to be considered in computing an adequate premium?
So far as Antimines is concerned that problem of devising a
premium to meet losses, and leave a compensation for capital

risked, as well as for other expenses, does not concern him.

The problem of the insurer or risk bearer is solved by the

simple expedient of putting the burden on the shoulders of
third parties, who are not concerned with the enterprise.

He provided himself with a means of making good all losses

67

by ordering the satraps to recover runaways, or make good
their value to the owners.

.

The agreement made by Antimines was not unlike that
contract known to modern insurance as the valued contract.

Under the valued policy contract, in the event of a total loss,
the face of the policy for the purpose of adjusting the loss

represents the measure of the damage.

Likewise in the contract

provided by Antimines, the insured is permitted to register the
value which he himself puts upon the slave.

Unlike the modern

insurance agreement, however, the premium amounts to a flat sum

of eight drachmae a year, regardless of the value put upon the

slave.

As in the valued policy, however, in the event of loss

the owner of the slave was to receive the amount for which he
was registered.
From the method of placing the values on the slaves

insured, it might at first glance seem as though sight were lost
of the principle of indemnity, and that the insured would tend

to place a value upon his slaves in excess of their actual worth.

From the text we read that the valuation accepted was that fixed
by the owner.
uation.

Nor was the premium fixed upon the basis of val

Doubtless it was true that the owners who took advan

tage of the opportunity did tend to place a high valuation upon
their property.

Nevertheless, we may assume that those in

charge of the registration were familiar with the upper and
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lower limits of the prices of slaves used in the army, and
probably exercised a control over the valuations.

It is not

to be expected that in a venture of this sort excessive pay

ments would be made, consequently it would be natural to guard
against excessive valuation at the time of registration.
However, it may be that the insurer did not parti

cularly concern himself with value, and the owners could over
insure.

As a matter of actual concern, since the insurer does

not intend himself to meet the losses out of his resources,

but had ordered third parties to provide the indemnity,

valuation means little to him.

And since no effort is made

to make the premium vary with the amount of the risk, and a
flat sum is fixed for each individual slave registered, regard
less of the value placed upon him, it may be reasonably con

cluded that the insurer anticipated as much inconvenience in

securing the return of a low priced as a high priced slave.
The matter of valuation was a concern ultimately only to the

satrap called upon to return the runaway, and then only if he

failed to capture the fugitive.

And the satrap was not a

party to the insurance agreement.

This instance of Antimines:the EdsLiap.from the
Aristotilian corpus, is considered here at some length, not
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because his venture was of itself of any commercial importance,

but because here in his case, a record was made of an idea that
failed for centuries to be adopted as a widespread commercial
practice, and yet was destined to become "the handmaiden of

commerce."
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CHAPTER III

ANCIENT ROME.

1. Bottomry and Marine Insurance.

Whether or not ancient Rome ever developed a contract
of insurance having embodied in it the essential features of

the modern policy, is a question that has been widely debated.

So far as direct evidence affords us grounds for a conclusion,
it would seem that an agreement for shifting the burden of

risk to an insurer having no privity of interest with the in

sured, in consideration of a premium paid in advance, was
entirely unknown to the Romans, and that the only vehicle used

by them for effecting marine insurance contracts was to be
found in their adoption and commercial development of bottomry.
Even though direct evidence is lacking, however, there is

reason to believe that both contract forms were known and in
commercial usage.

Regarding bottomry there is no doubt.

The contract

was widely known and extensively used in the ordinary course of

business.

The titles de nautice fenore and de usuris, which

bear upon these contracts afford ample and undisputable
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evidence of the extended use made by commercial enterprise

of this form of agreement.

Bottomry with the Romans was in

its essentials the same contract as that developed by the
Greeks.

Trajeticia pecunia, the term applied in Roman law

to money lent on bottomry, referred to money lent for mer
cantile adventure beyond the sea, with repayment conditional
upon the safe arrival of the security at its destination.

The insurance element in the agreement was clearly
defined in Rome.

The risk assumed by the creditor was con

sidered as a sufficient reason to warrant a higher rate than

the usual rate of interest.

Contrary to the situation that

existed in Greece, however, the nauticum fenus or usurae
maritimae could be charged, not for the time the borrower held

the money, but only for the time over which the creditor’s
2
risk in the voyage extended.
If this voyage came to an
end, and the loan was not repaid, only the legal interest rate
might be collected, from the time that marked the termination

of the voyage until the loan was repaid.

There was, however,

a provision for a fine in the event that repayment was delayed

beyond the appointed time.

This risk element in the bottomry

agreement was recognized by Justinian, when in 533 he fixed the

1. Roby, Roman Private Law, v.2, p. 75.
2. Ibid.?p. 75.
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rate of interest to be charged on ordinary loans at 6 per

cent.

In the case of fenus nauticum, a special exemption

was made, and twelve percent was permitted on the ground

that such transactions went beyond the mere lending of
money, and constituted an adventure involving the lender,
3
which was subject to the risks of the sea>
Commenting

upon this phase of the Justinian edict, Gibbon, in his
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, says:-

"Persons of illustrious rank were confined
to the modest profit of four per cent; six was
pronounced to be the ordinary and legal standard
of interest; eight was allowed for the convenience
of manufacturers and merchants; twelve was granted
to nautical insurance, which the wiser ancients
had not attempted to define; but, except in this
perilous adventure, the practice of exhorbitant
usury was severely restrained." 4
The legislation of Justinian marks.the first limitation of
5
the rate of interest that might be charged on bottomry loans.

In placing a limit on the rate, however, he clearly recognized
the risk element, and permits a charge therefor.

The utility of the contract as a vehicle for risk
bearing, and therefore a means for effecting insurance, was

readily recognized by the Romans.

use solely to marine undertakings.

JTor did they confine its
As a matter of fact, loans

3. Martin, History of Lloyds, p. 3.
4. Vol. 3, p. 706.
5. Duer, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance, v. 1,
p. 20 - 22. footnotes.
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were made, with a condition inserted in the agreement calling

for the satisfactory outcome of the undertakings financed, as
a condition precident to any obligation of repayment, whefe the
risks covered were not the ordinary hazards of the sea.

There

is, for example, an instance cited of a loan made to a fisherman

for the purpose of purchasing apparatus, repayment of the loan
depending upon the catch of fish.

This was an instance where

the borrower was insured against loss arising out of disburse

ments, in preparation for an undertaking that might turn out
unsatisfactorily.

There is another case, where money was

lent to an athlete for training purposes, repayment to be
6
made in the event he won at the contests.
From these

instances it may be seen that the Romans used the conditional
loan agreement as a means for shifting the burden of risk in

widely different fields, and did not therefore limit them
selves in its application to the field of marine undertakings.
Of the fact that bottomry was well known, and ex

tensively used, there is ample evidence.

Turning, however,

to consider the possibility of the existence of a contract of

insurance, us’ed by the Romans in carrying on their commercial

undertakings, the evidence is less certain, and would seem at

first consideration to justify the conclusion that such a
contract was unknown.

Weight is given such a belief, when

6. Roby, op. cit., p. 76.
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after a consideration of the frequent references and ample

treatment of the question of bottomry to be found in the Roman

laws, in contrast we find a complete silence when we search

for evidences of legislation dealing with an insurance contract.
As a matter of fact, there is no reference in all the civil
law of Rome to the contract of Insurance.

Upon the subject,

not only are the Institutes, Pandects, Code, and Novels, com
pletely silent, but also there is no trace to be found of in
surance as a separate and distinct contract in any of the laws

of the Emperors who succeeded Justinian.

This- fact alone has

led many eminent scholars to conclude that the Romans were
wholly ignorant, both of the term and of the contract of insur7
ance.

Nor does such a conclusion at first thought seem to
be unreasonable.

The full treatment of bottomry to be found

in the law, contrasted with the complete silence concerning the
insurance would seem to permit the presumption that this silence

was due to the fact that the contract of insurance was unknown.

The problem, however, is not so simply solved.

More complete

investigation tends to explain the silence of the law, and
reverses the older opinion that the insurance contract was un
known to the Romans.

7. Duer, op, cit.. v.l, p. 7-8.
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The learned, and. scholarly Duer, in discussing this

question, believes that insurance, if practiced in Ancient
Rome, was effected by a mutual guarantee of associated merchants,

or by the "'division of the burden of the risk among several in
dividuals, who were not otherwise interested in the adventure,
each assuming a proportionate part of the risk.

Hence, it

is his conclusion that marine insurance retained its original

form of a mercantile usage, without finding a place in the law.

Bottomry on the other land, occupied quite a different
position.

Patricians and Senators of Rome during the final

days of the Republic, and Nobles under the Empire, had become

the capitalists of the world, and sought profitable sources of
income by loans outside the city, wherever high rates of interest
might be obtained.

Voyages of great importance were often

projected in neighboring cities where the local capitalists

were unable to arrange the necessary financing.

In such an

instance the natural procedure was to turn for assistance to

the great financial center of the world in the city of Rome.
Because of the high rate of interest, maritime loans became

a favorite investment with the capitalists, and as the business
grew in importance, and extended its scope nationwide, careful

regulations concerning it were enacted, and ultimately incorQ
porated into the works of Justinian.

8. Duer, op, cit., v.l, p. 22 et seq.
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There is, however, a further explanation for the

omission of any legal regulations covering the subject of
marine insurance in the works on Roman law.

Such laws as

effect marine affaire that are to be found in the Code or
Pandects are rather of a supplementary nature than original

in their character.

There are many subjects of great com

mercial importance, besides marine insurance, that find no
laws for their regulation, yet this fact will not warrant a
conclusion that no such laws are in existence.

The explanat

ion of this apparent inconsistency is found in the fact that
the Romans had early adopted the laws of Rhodes as the Roman

legal code for maritime affairs.

’.Then they were first incor

porated into the law of Rome is not clear, but as early as the

time of Augustus they were formally adopted, and their authority
was proclaimed by Justinian through the adoption in the Pandects

of an edict of Antonius in which the' Rhodian laws were directed

to be observed in all cases where they were not contrary to
g
the laws of Rome.
Hence it is to be expected that if there
was in Rome any law regulating the practice of marine insurance,

it was to be found in the adopted Rhodian law, laws which are

now lost to us.

9. Kent, Oommentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 5;
Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 25.
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There are in the writings of the classical authors
four passages, upon which have been centered, the attention of
writers on insurance, and. which have been held, forth as proof
that insurance was not only known to the Romans, but was also

a common commercial practice.

The passages in question include

two references in Livy, dated around 215 B.O., another from a
private letter of Oicero dated 49 B.O., and a final instance
from Suetonius dated at 58 A.D.

Writers have by no means

agreed in their interpretation of these passages in the light

of their proving a reference to a contract of insurance.
They do, however, afford evidence that the insurance idea was

known and understood by business men.
The earliest of these references comes to us from
10

Livy.

The forces operating in Spain, he tells us, had

become destitute, and an urgent appeal had been sent to Rome

for assistance.

Conditions in Rome were not promising; the

treasury was empty, and the people had been taxed to the limit.

In the crisis it was decided to call upon the people for credit,
and to urge those who had already profited through goirennment
contracts,

to furnish the needed materials and be paid when

the treasury should succeed in getting money.

On the day

appointed for letting the contracts, the historian tells us

10. Livy, xxiii, c. 49
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there were a sufficient number who came forward, to take the
contracts, but named two conditions under which they would

advance the supplies on credit.

The first of these was

exemption from military service, and the second was the

assumption by the state of the risks of storms or attacks of

the enemy while the supplies were on shipboard and in transit
to destination.

Both of these demands were granted.

The second mention of this agreement in Livy has to

do with abuses that followed the state guarantees.

Merchants,

he tells us, who had entered into agreements with the govern
ment fabricated fraudulent claims, and attempted to collect

because of pretended losses on the basis of the government’s
ag-reement to indemnify.

Small amounts of supplies were sent

out in old and unseaworthy ships, and after sinking them at

sea, their owners presented false claims as to their value.
This practice continued for two years, and became so great a

scandal as to cause a popular uprising.
The next reference that may possibly be interpreted
as indicating a knowledge of insurance is found in the letter

of Oicero to Caninius Sallust.

The letter was written follow

ing Roman victories in Cilicia and the writer stated that he

expected to receive guarantees to protect himself and the state
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from the possible loss of the public moneys while in transit.

Those who cannot see in this arrangement a contract of insur
ance, assert that what Cicero referred to was a bill of exchange.

On the other hand, if he actually contemplated transferring
money and treasure, then the agreement to guarantee the safe
transportation, was most certainly an insurance agreement.

The final instance mentioned in the classical writers
brings us down into the Christian era, with an elapse of approx
imately 275 years from the instances mentioned by Livy.

This

is related to us by Suetonius, and has to do with the period of
the reign of the Emperor Claudius.

There was, the historian

tell us, in A.D. 58 a severe famine in Rome, resulting in great
With the suuply of corn

distress and popular demonstrations.

low, and little prospect of further importations during the

winter season, Claudius, in order to encourage a resumption of
trade, and continued imports of this valued and much needed
commodity, offered not only to pay a bounty on all corn imported,

but further agreed to be personally responsible for all losses
12
arising from the storms.
Here, as in the cases mentioned
by Livy, we have a similar set of circumstances.

Ownership

of the goods to be shipped remained with the vendors until

delivery at the points specified.

While the goods were aboard

ship the shippers would have been responsible for losses, had

11. Cicero, Epistolae. ad C. Sallust.
12. Suetonius, de vita Caesarum. v., 18.
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they not required an agreement to indemnify them in the cases

mentioned by Livy, and had not such an agreement been volun

tarily offered in the case mentioned by Suetoniun.

The

government, then, is in each case the risk bearer.

It is

therefore correct to refer to the agreement entered into be-

tween the government and the merchants as insurance contracts.
These historical facts, while they prove that in an

emergency the government recognized the effects of risk in

tending to defeat its ends, and proceeded by means of an in
surance agreement to shift its burden, do not of themselves
prove that marine insurance as a private contract was known

to merchants.

The instances are, however, not without value.

If they accomplish nothing more, they clearly demonstrate the
reluctance of merchants to enter upon hazardous ventures with

out some assurance of indemnity.

In the cases here mentioned

it is probably true that the risks were so great that there
would have been difficulty in securing an agreement to indem
nify from private individuals, and because of that, the govern

ment met the need to serve its own ends.

It is not an un

reasonable conclusion, however, to assume that when merchants,

tempted by the allure of great profits, entered upon a hazard
ous adventure in which the government had no interestj they
provided themselves with the required indemnity through a

13. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 17-8.

81

contract with private individuals.
Serving to confirm the theory that insurance was
effected as a private agreement between individuals, there is

14

a passage in the Digest that seems to refer to such a contract.
This consists of the incorporation in the Digest of a judgment

of the learned Preatorian Praefect Ulpian, who passed upon the
validity of the agreement contained in the stipulation: - " Do
you promise that my ten thousand shall be safe? "
salva fore promittis? )'

(Decern milia

If the second party to the agreement

replies, " I promise", then he binds himself to assume the

ri^ks attaching to the ten thousand of the party to whom the

promise was made.

When the question of the validity of this

agreement was submitted tonUlpian, he made an affirmative
decision that ultimately found its way into the Digest.

Commenting upon this passage, Marshall, states that it affords
"greater color for supposing that the contract of insurance

was not altogether unknown to the Romans, than any of the

passages above referred to."

He adds, however, that whatever

sort of contract the passage referred to, it was very little

known when Ulpian made his decision, since he found it necessary to state that it was not illegal.

15

On the other hand

14. Digest, xiv, tit. 1, frag. 67.
15. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, v.l, p. 8.
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there is the possibility that the contract had been commonly
used in business, but that this occasion marked the first time

that its validity was brought into question.

It is not un

common that a custom among merchants is found to persist for
many years before disputes arising out of it come before the
Such may have been the

established courts for settlement.

situation in this case.

The validity of this agreement was

settled for all time in Roman law by Ulpian’s decision, and

its subsequent incorporation in the Digest.
The form in which this agreement was made represents
probably the most ancient of the forms of contract recognized

in Roman law, and was known by the name stipulatio.

The

agreement was entirely verbal, and its validity depended among

other requirements, upon a strict conformation to a specified
formula.

A question containing the terms of the contract was

put by the stipulator, or promisee, and the reply was made by
the promisor.

The act of putting the question, and receiving

the reply was called the stipulatio.

16

It can readily be seen that if the reference in the

Digest to Ulpian's decision regarding the validity of an agree
ment to keep safe the ten thousand of a stipulator, was a

16. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 318.
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reference to an insurance agreement, then the stipulatio may

have been widely used for effecting insurance contracts.

Insurance, would therefore not be of necessity confined to

marine risks, and the regulations in the law that effected
contracts of insurance would be those that applied to contracts
in general.
Whether the contract of insurance was known to the

Romans, however, aside from the insurance element to be found

in the bottomry agreement, will until further information
comes to light, remain a matter of speculation.

In the light

of such evidence as we have, the following conclusion of the
learned Duer warrants thoughtful consideration:-

"The desire of merchants of limited means to obtain
the necessary capital for enterprises in which they
wished to embark, combined with the desire of pro
tecting themselves against the loss of the capital
employed, led to the invention and practice of marine
loans, in which the lender assumes the risk of the
voyage.
It is evident that the same desire of pro
viding an adequate indemnity against the perils of
the sea, must have existed in cases where no advance
of capital, as a loan was needed or desired; that is
in cases judging from our own experience, forming a
vast majority of commercial adventures.
That, to
persons thus situated, to minds actuated by this
desire, the utility of an insurance unconnected with
a loan, should not have occured, it is difficult to
believe, and still more so, that appreciating its
utility, they neglected its introduction and use.
Let it be admitted that the contract of bottomry was
first in the order of invention; reasoning from pro
bability, we should say that the separation in a
distinct contract, of the insurance from the loan
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was an immediate and almost necessary consequence.
For myself, I am persuaded, that were we wholly
ignorant of the laws of the Romans, but knew from
history the extent of their commerce, we should deem
it far more probable, that marine insurance was in
frequent and general use, than loans on bottomry and
respondentia; for these plain reasons, that the contract
of insurance is simpler in its provisions, less onerous
in its terms, more easy to be affected, and of far
wider utility.11 17

While any conclusion with reference to the existence of an in
dependent Insurance contract, due to'the paucity of evidence,

must of necessity be based upon speculation and therefore in
volve much uncertainty, no such uncertainty exists with refer
ence to bottomry.

The evidence here leaves no doubt.

We

know that the contract was well known and frequently used in

the mercantile practice of the Roman people, and served as a

vehicle for providing insurance.

3. Collegia and Life Insurance.
Of particular interest, because possessing many of

the characteristics of life insurance as written today by the

fraternal or beneficial societies, was the practice at Rome of

organizing burial societies, whose functions were, among others

the payment of the funeraticum or death benefit upon a member’s
decease.

Here we- have a situation involving the risk of an

17. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 13-14.
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undesired contingency.

To ward off the undeeired effects,

steps are taken by the individuals concerned through organi

zation and contribution to reduce the undesired probability
to a reasonable degree of desired certainty.

Payment is

made in advance for the service rendered at the time agreed.

Differing from insurance in that it provides for a certain
payment ultimately, there is found here nevertheless the
insurance element of the life policy in that it provides for

the uncertainty of the contingency on a time basis, thus the

protective element is added to the accumulation of a fund
undertaken to meet a certain payment.

This development of

death benefits found its medium in the highly specialized and
widespread system of gilds organized among the Romans.
The tendency to form into groups and organizations
made itself manifest in Rome at a very early date.

According

to tradition the early kings were believed to have organized

the first gilds.

Romulus is said to have been responsible

for the military and political institutions, and Numa, his
successor, is credited with having carried the work from war

to peace with the establishment of such gilds as the shoemakers,
dyers, carpenters, and others engaged in peacetime pursuits.

18. Abbott, The Common People of Ancient Rome, p.216,; also
Plutarch. Lives^ (Numa Pompilius) v.l, p.139.

18
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To what extent such tradition corresponds with historical
fact we are not here concerned.

It is sufficient for our

purposes to note that the formation of the gilds reaches back
in Rome to a very early date.
The information that comes to us concerning their

development during the period of the Republic is meager.
The position of the poor citizen was not a particularly happy
one, nor were the aristocratic writers concerned with includ

ing his affairs in their records.

Under the Empire, however,

the poor workingman began to emerge into a better position.
They became an active and industrious class, interested in
their affairs, and concerned with their welfare.

This period

affords a wealth of inscriptions from which it appears that
the lower classes, that is the grades of workmen including
freedmen and slaves, lived under favorable conditions hitherto
v
19
unknown.
It was in this atmosphere that the social tendency
that manifested itself in the organization of gilds found a

favorable environment for development.

Such groups were to

be found in every strata of the cosial structure, and their
development was particularly fostered among the workmen in

the various trades and occupations.

There were clubs that

19. Waltzing, Etude Historique sur les Corporations chez les
Romans. p. 33 ff.
Stobart,
The Grandeur that was Rome, p. 284.
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were particularly religious in character, others political
in their nature, groups organized, for the purpose of amusement,
20
and lastly the professional organizations.
Just as in this

country today there are clubs, unions, and societies of every
description, so among the Romans, the capitalists, veterans,

religious and laborers united to further their own aims and
interests.

Fascinating as is the examination of their or

ganization and development, we here are concerned only with

the insurance element which they provided.

This element,

closely resembling the life insurance provision of the modern

friendly society, is to be found in those societies, which in

return for the required contributions, rendered prescribed

benefits to their members.
While others of the Roman societies provided benefits
for. their members, notable among these were the veterans organ
izations, for our purpose the collegia tenuiorum serve as the
best example of a Roman gild organized with an insurance feature.
✓
Because of a similarity or organization, And the practice of

providing a death benefit, compared with the mutual fraternal

benefit insurers of the present time, these ancient societies
have been termed the first writers of life insurance.

20. Waltzing, op. cit., p. 33 et seq.
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The death benefit of the flollegia tenuiorum. it is

interesting to note at the outset, was designed not as an in
surance feature to benefit the heirs of the deceased, but
originated in a fear on the part of the poor Roman that he

himself after death would be lacking in the necessary religious
rites and a proper burial.

Hence, in its beginning at least,

the death benefit of the collegia tenuiorum, was designed to
provide the member himself against the unhappy lot of remaining
unburied.
On the lowest plane of the Roman social structure

stood the proletariat, the free wage earners and slaves employed

in the shops and households.

With very low wages, scarcely

above the minimum necessary to procure the means of a bare
subsistence, in the course of providing themselves with a

means for social contact and at the same time insure themselves
against the most dreaded of all risks, burial without proper

rites, the gilds that served these purposes were organized.

21

Because of the extreme poverty of the lower class

Roman, the risk of dying without means of carrying out the
religious rites he believed to be essential was a grave one.

Money of course might be saved, but to the very poor this was
a difficult undertaking.

Nor was there any assurance that

21. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman
Empire, p. 178.
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he would live long enough to save the necessary money, if he
had planned to do so, or should he succeed, that the money

would be used as he desired.
was admirably solved.

Nevertheless the difficulty

From his meager wages the poor work

man, however, might well manage his dues to the collegia, and
thereby transfer the difficulty.

He provided security.

Nor is the importance of this protective feature

to be minimized.

A’’decent burial" has concerned the people

of every age and generation.

Among the civilized countries

today it is matter that influences everyone, yet as society
is now organized every individual no matter how humble his

position or poor his circumstances, need have no fear of the
indignaties that haunted the poor of ancient times.

In

ancient Rome the possible fate of the poor and friendless

presented a picture that was not pleasant.

During the

Republic, and at the beginning of the Empire, there were
provided for the disposal of their remains great public burial
places constructed in the form of cisterns closed at the opening

by a great stone.

Here bodies were thrown, one upon the other.'

A startling and gruesome picture of the common burial place for

paupers, (miserae plebi stabat comune seplucrum) is provided by

22. Waltzing, op, cit., v. 1,, p. 258.
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Horace

23
when he alludes to their bodies cast out (electa

cadavera) upon the ground white with bleaching bones (alb is

ossibus agrum) and infested with thieves and beasts,

(furesque

feraeque suetae hune vexare locum.)
This, the ’’Potter’s Field” of ancient Rome, with

the attendant neglect of proper religious ceremonies and burial
rites was the risk, that in relation to all others, loomed in

In their move to meet the

importance to the poorer people.

risk, and to provide security for themselves, through the

agency of the collegia tenuiorum, a protective system was
effected that served the times, satisfied a need, and created

a system that has been carried forward in its essentials to

the present through the widespread operation of the modern
fraternal and beneficial societies.
In estimating the relative importance of the risk
I

it is especially necessary first of all to bear in mind the
deep religious nature of the Roman, together with the fact

that the last solemn rites in honor of the dead with a fitting

burial were strictly proscribed.

The poor freeman, and the

slaves in Rome had little or nothing in the way of wealth.
There was no ris> of loss here.

23. Horace, Sat. I, viii, 8-18

As a matter of fact they
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could scarcely be said to have hope.

So then, to these people

the nearest and most important risk with which they were con

cerned was the possibility of a future life of unrest.

The

importance of the proper fulfillment of the religious rites is
made clear by Professor Becker, who says:-

"At a very early period the belief was rooted in
peoples' minds, that the shades of the unburied
wandered restlessly about, without gaining admittance
into Hades; so that non-burial came to be considered
the most deplorable calamity that could befal one,
and the discharge of this service a most holy duty.
This obligation was not restricted to relatives
mearly, and near connections; it was performed towards
strangers also; and if one happened to meet with an
unburied corpse, he at any rate observed the form of
throwing earth thrice upon it." 24
Having recognized the risk, the poor Roman proceeded

along the most natural lines to provide for himself a greater
degree of security.

Whenever there is an end of any sort,

if there is a common interest in its accomplishment, the tendency

to unite into groups for the purpose of effecting the common end
manifests itself.

The organization and widespread growth of

the gilds of ancient Rome was a response to this natural tendency.
Occupying its own position of no inconsiderable importance among

all the many types-and kinds of associations thus formed, are

those which have for their end social relationships, to which
have been added the feature of mutual benefits.

Such societies

are numbered among the most important insurance carriers of today,

24. Becker, Gallus. p. 400.
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and such was the type of society founded by the workingmen of

ancient Rome to provide not only a means for cosial contact
but as well an insurance feature that relieved them of the re

sponsibility of providing in some other way for funeral rites
and proper burial.

Such societies were the collegia tenuiorum.

The statutes of one of these organizations found in
Lanuvium Illustrates admirably the points of similarity between

the modern beneficial society and the collegia.

They say in

part: "It has pleased the members, that whoever shall
wish to join this guild shall pay an initiation fee
of one hundred sesterces, and an amphora of good wine,
as well as five asses a month.
Voted likewise, that
if any man shall not have paid his dues for six con
secutive months, and if the lot common to all men has
befallen him, his claim to a burial shall not be con
sidered, even if he shall have so stipulated in his
will.
Voted likewise, that if any man from this
body of ours, having paid his dues, shall depart,
there shall come to him from the treasury three
hundred sesterces, for which sum fifty sesterces,
which shall be divided at the funeral pyre, shall go
for the funeral rites.
Furthermore, the obsequies
shall be performed on foot." 25

The income for the organization comes from two main

sources, the initiation fee, and a system of monthly dues, a
system identical with the custom usually in vogue in the modern

fraternal beneficial society.

In addition there is evidence

that a system of fines and gifts added to the funds in the
26
treasury.
Dues were paid directly to the common treasury,

25. From Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.XIV,2112. Quoted by
Abbo11. Common People of Ancient Rome.p.225.
26. Ibid.,p. 224, and 227.
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and out of this fund all expenses of the organization of what

ever sort were paid.

Next come the provisions and penalties

attached to nonpayment of dues, a six months period of grace
being allowed before the failure to pay operated to cancel

the member's benefits.

Lastly a provision is made for the

benefits, part of the fund to be used for the expense of

burial, and the balance presumably to be distributed to the
heirs or dependants of the deceased.

The likeness here in

dicated between the ancient and the modern is indeed striking.

It is worth mentioning here that it does not seem

to have entered the minds of the Romans that these organizat
ions, in addition to providing the necessary burial rites,

could have served to render assistance in sickness or other
time of need.

As a matter of fact, there probably was in the

beginning at least no intention on the part of the members of

the burial societies to provide even for those whom they left
behind.

The payment to be made upon the decease of a member

was designed for two purposes.

The first of these was to

provide for burial and pay for carrying out of the necessary
funeral rites.

The sum left over after these expenses were

met was to be used in errecting a monument.

Any part of this

money that the family of the deceased should retain for their

own use was in the beginning a diversion of the funds to a use
27
not intended by the collegia.
27. Waltzing, op, cit.. v.l, p. 301, et 303

94

It is to be observed, however, that the funeratioum
could be considerably in excess of the actual funeral expenses,

and the balance was paid to the heirs of the deceased.

If,

originally, it was the intention of these societies to provide
only an amount sufficient to pay for a burial and monument, as

the death benefits were increased, it is to be presumed that
such sums as were left after the necessary expenses were met

would then be retained by the heirs for their own use.
Hence, an institution that was designed originally to provide
only for a need of the deceased developed to provide likewise

for his family.

The question has been raised as to the effect of
Christianity upon these burial societies, with a view to as
certaining whether their benefits were broadened by the con
tract.

The question is answered by pointing out that these

societies had for their end the fulfilling of a religious

rite of a pagan people, and because of the religious character
of the organizations, Christians did not participate in their

activities.

To render comfort and assistance to the unfor

tunate the Christians organized various charitable societies
28
of their own.

28. Waltzing, op, cit., v.l, p. 321. cf.
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An examination of the conditions under which fraternal
organizations operate today, and the organization, aims, and

purposes of the collegia tenuiorum reveals a startling similar
ity between the two, and justifies the conclusion that here

indeed was commenced a system of insurance still in operation
with changes only in the details.

A very substantial percent-

ege of all lives insured today in the United States are insured
29
by fraternal societies.
These societies are primarily

social in purpose, effecting mutual aid among members in time

of need, and providing the usual death benefit upon the decease
of a member.

That these organizations are primarily clubs is

well established, and their character as
upon court authority.

such now rests firmly

While the insurance feature and general

economic aspect has been an important factor in their development,
it can in no way be subordinated to the social appeal; and the
opportunities offered to partake in the activities of these or

ganizations of a purely social nature have likewise contributed

to their growth and popularity.

The funds upon which these fraternal organizations
operate and out of which expenses and benefits are paid are
derived from dues, usually monthly, together with additions

29. Of. Nicholas, Fraternal Insurance in the United States. Annals
of The American Academy of Political and Social
Science. V. 70. (March 1917) p.120 ff.
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made to the treasury through assessments, fines, gifts, enter

tainments and the like.

They are co-operative in their oper

ation, and the claims of members against the organizations are
on the basis of membership and not upon a contractural relation
ship as is set up by the issuance of the life insurance policy.

Non compliance with the rules of the organization, one of the

most important of which is the meeting of dues and assessments,

results in the member being cut off from participation in the
society’s benefits.

There is little in common in the relation

ship of the member to the organization with that of the holder

of a life insurance policy to the commercial company of modern

times.

Yet the benefits do fill a need, and experience shows

that as attractive as is the social side, many members join

alone and solely for the economic benefits, keep their dues
regularly paid, but never take part in the other activities of
the society.
While .the purposes which modern life insurance policies

are designed to meet are many, an analogy may be drawn here
between the present and the past, in that the cost of dying

today furnishes an important problem, important enough

to be

sure for the poor or those in moderate circumstances, but in
creasingly complex as the value of the estate of the deceased
mounts in value.

While in the case of the poor workman or
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slave of ancient Rome the concern was to provide a means for
defraying the expenses of burial and funeral rites, the cause

of concern today with the rich arises out of the problem of
providing ready cash to meet taxes thereby protecting assets

in the estate from the necessity of forced or unfavorable

liquidation for this purpose.

The life insurance policy has

solved the problem today, the system of the collegia tenuiorum

solved the problem of unusual expense attendant upon the death
of the poor among the ancient Romans.
■Lt is hard to see how this system could have been
improved upon with the knowledge of insurance available to the

people of those times.

Likewise it must be remembered that

these organizations were carried on by the lowest classes in
the city, including in their membership slaves and free wage

earners, people whose economic status provided but the most
meagre living, and it is not to be doubted that the benefits
were as welcome and served as well in those days as they do

today.
Because these ages are so far in the past, because

we ao;e unable without some effort to place ourselves in the
place of the peoples of other times, we are inclined to forget
they they were very human, they were moved by the same impulses
and guided by essentially the same instinctive tendencies
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And. this effort of these humble people in a mighty empire,

where wealth and luxury are the bywords,is. worthy of note in
the development of the principle of insurance.

And great as

is the business of life insurance as it is practiced today,
surrounded by science, technical and complicated in its com
putations and calculations, yet it is not an uncomplimentary

statement to term the efforts of the collegia of ancient Rome

as the beginning of this great branch of the insurance business,
because if it lacked in technique at least it was not failing

in purpose.

3. The FirBt Mortality Tables.

The development of acturial science, without which

the modern plan of life insurance would have been impossible,
depends first of all for its point of departure upon the con

struction of tables of mortality.

So far as the records furnish

us evidence, the first efforts towards the construction of such
tables followed the enactment in Rome ( 40 B. 0. ) of the
Falcidian Law,

(Lex Falcidia de Legatio.)

The purpose of the Falcidian law was to restrict the
power of leaving legacies

Originally this power was unlimited,
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for by the Twelve Tables it was ordained that whatever dis
position .anyone made of his estate, so shall be the law. (utl
30
legassit suea rei ita jus esto).
The law, as represented

by the Twelve Tables, made it possible for a testator to so
diminish his estate in legacies that the heir or heirs to

whom the residue was due would decline to enter, with the

result that the will became ineffective.

31

The reason that prompted an heir to refuse to enter
when the estate was nearly exhausted, or entirely so, because

of numerous bequests, is found in the Roman doctrine of univer
sal succession.

A universal succession involves a trans

mission of the aggregate of the rights and duties at one given

moment from one person to a successor.

Such a succession

followed upon a death, and the heir was immediately clothed

with the legal person of the deceased, and instantly acquired
not only all of his rights, but likewise all of his duties.

Among the duties was a responsibility for the debts of the
.
„ 30
32
31
deceased.
It can readily be seen that the heirs to an estate

exhausted by bequests might succeed to little more than an

30. Twelve Tables, Tabula V., 3.
31. Roby, op. cit., v. 1, p. 344.
32. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 174. et seq.;

Muirhead, Law of Rome,
p. 158, et. seq.
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accumulation of duties, and steps were early taken by the legis
lators to remedy such a situation.

Three laws in succession

were passed with this end in view.

The first of these, the

lex Furia, as well as the lex Voconia which followed, while

limiting the power of leaving legacies, were still inadequate,

and the third law, the lex Falcidia was passed, and took its
place as a part of the permanent body of Roman Law.

33

It

is with the provisions of the lex Falcidia that we are here
concerned, because it was in an effort to make them effective

that the first mortality table was developed.
The law was passed in 40 B.O., and while under its
terms the right was left to any citizen to leave his property

to whomever he chose, nevertheless, and this is the important
feature of the law,' it was required that the amounts of all

the bequests should be so restricted as to leave the heirs
under the will not less than one-fourth of the estate.

34

Under the operation of this law it became necessary

to ^evaluate not only the entire estate, but in the event that
it appeared the heir or heirs were not to get their fourth part,

if all bequests were paid, it was likewise necessary to appraise

33. Roby, op. cit., V. 1., p. 344 et seq.
34. Institutes, Lib. II, Tit. xxii.
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each separate bequest.

In the case of property the matter

of valuation was not difficult.

Each article was to be

appraised at its true value as an article of commerce.

How

ever, in the event that a testator left a beneficiary a certain

sum, to be paid him annually for life, then the problem of
evaluating the annuity presented itself.

It was in the solution

of this problem that the Roman jurists devised the first mortality

tables.
Wh.- t the earliest means were that were attempted to

ascertain the value of an annuity for the purposes of this law
we do not know;

Aemilius Macer furnishes us the first record.

According to him the method in common use in his time (c.230 A.D.)

for making this computation was as follows: - The value of the
annuity was to be computed at thirty years purchase for all

ages up to thirty, and above that age it was to be computed at
so many years purchase as equaled the difference between the age

Using this method described by
35
Macer an annuity value never exceeded thirty years purchase.
of the annuitant and sixty.

Recognizing the inadequacy of this system, the dis
tinguished jurist, the Praetorian Praefect Ulpianus, in 364 A.D.

35. Walford, op, cit., v. 1, p. 98; Roby, op. cit.. v.l, p. 350.
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undertook to compute a table that more nearly adjusted itself

to the probable life term of the annuitant.

The system of

Ulpian placed the value of an annuity at thirty years purchase

for all annuitants under the age of twenty.

The value of the

annuity decreased with the increasing age of the annuitant
♦

until the age of sixty.

At that age and upwards, the value

was placed at five years purchase.

The table as computed by Ulpian follows

Age.

Birth
20
25
30
35
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
55
60

Years' Purchase.

to 20............. ......... 30
it
25 ......... . . ....... 28
it
30 ............. ......... 25
II
35 ............ ...... 22
II
40 ............ ...... 20
II
41 ............ ....... 19
II
42 ............ ....... 18
II
43 ............ ...... 17
II
44 ............ . ...... 16
II
45 ............ ........ 15
II
46 ............ ...... 14
II
47 ............ ......... 13
II
48................... 12
II
49 ................... 11
II
50 ............ ....... 10
II
55 ............ ......
9
II
60 ............ .......
7
and upwards ..... .......
5

The table computed and used by Ulpian represents the
first attempt of which we have any knowledge to measure annuity
values taking age as a basis for making the computation.

The
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elements that entered into his computations are unknown.

How

ever, in the eomputatleii of Ulpian we find the first step in
36
the direction of modern actuarial science.

4. The Fire Problem.
In Rome we find the problem of fire coming prominently
•77
to the front.
Constant reference is made by contemporary

writers to its threats and dangers, and the burdens imposed by
the tremendous losses were recognized.

It may be fairly

stated that the Romans were fire conscious.

Bearing this point

in mind, and recalling the advanced state of development reached

by business organizations, particularly during the period of the
Empire, it would not have been surprising to have found a method

of indemnifying for losses from fire developed on a commercial

scale.

Yet as a matter of fact there were no offices or com

mercial organizations that afforded insurance against losses
_
38
from fire.

That the city was particularly susceptable to fire
39
seems to be borne out by contemporary writers.
Livy tells

36.
37.
38.
39.

Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 98-9; Roby, op. cit.. p. 350.
Homo, Problems sociaux de jadis et d»a present, p. 15.
Becker, Gallus. p. 1, note.
Livy, 5:55.

104

us that when the city was rebuilt after its destruction by the

Gauls, in their rush the people gave little care to making the

streets straight and orderly, and built wherever they found a
space.

To show to what extent this hit or miss system of

locating buildings were carried, he points out that the sewers
which used to pass through the streets were in his time to be

found under the private dwellings (nunc privata passim subeant

tecta).

The result of all this was a mass of building

through which passed a network of narrow and crooked streets,

giving the city according to the historian the appearance of
having been built upon ground that was seized, rather than
40

upon lots marked off with any degree of regularity.

Suetonius

likewise mentions the narrow and twisted streets and the delap-

itated buildings, when we accuse Nero of burning the city
because annoyed by them.

A final contribution to the risk

created by flimsey and crowded construction, delapitated build

ings and narrow and crooked streets, was a result of the diffi41
culty involved in lighting fires,
as well as the religious

custom that necessitated constantly burning fires or lights in

the buildings.

The attitude of the people is well espressed

40. Suet, Neron. 6:38.
41. Morgan, De Ignis Eliciendi Modis Apud Antiquos. p. 16 ff,
et 56 ff.
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by Homo, who says:-

"Incendies, ecroulements, deux mots qui
reparaissent comme une obsession et reviennent comme
un refrain chez tous leB e'crivans du debut de 1’Empire. 42
To Augustus must go credit for taking the first steps

involving action on the part of the state to meet the risk.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, he took the first

and most natural step in the direction of greater security, that
of provided protection.

His biographer tells us that in

addition to adorning the city, Augustus, recognizing that it was

exposed to flood and fire,

(inundationibus incendiisque) made it

safe for the future so far as human judgment was able to provide.

(Tutam uero, quantum providere humana ratione potuit, etiam in
, 42
4344
posterum praestitit.)
To accomplish his purpose, Augustus divided the city
into sections corresponding perhaps to the ward divisions of the
modern American city, and arranged for their supervision.

Night

watchmen were detailed to patrol the streets, and a particular

concern of theirs was to be on the lookout for incipient fires.
(Adversas incendia exubias nocturnas vigilesque commentus est.)

44

It was to these nightwatchmen that Professor Becker alluded when

he. mentioned "the occasional tramp of the Nocturnal Triumveriri,

42. Homo, op. cit.. p. 15.
43. Suet, Aug., ii, 28, 30.
44. Ibid.,28. 30.
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as they passed on their rounds to see that the fire watchmen
were at their posts."

45

For the purpose of fighting fires
46
there were assigned seven cohorts.
Not only were the

duties of ,the members of these organizations so assigned as

to permit a high degree of efficiency through specialization,

but they were also equipped with every conceivable device for
47
fighting fires that the ingenuity of the times afforded.
The organization and equipment of the Roman fire department

is here aptly described:-

"Certes les pompiers ne manquaient pas a Rome et
ils etaient dotes d'une organization remarquable,
Divises en sept cohortes, 'a raison d’une par deux
regions, avec autant de casernes et quatorz postesvigies, les vigiles atteignaient un^effectif total
de sept mille hommes chiffre ^ui, meme pourzune
ville d’un million et demi d'ames, comme l’etait la
Rome imperaile, ne lassait pas que d'etre fort
respectable,z A l'int^rieur du corps, suivant les
habitudes methodiques romaines, la personnel 6tait
strictement specialise; pompiers proprement dits
(sifonarii), .vigiles charges de alimentation en eau
(aquarii), demolisseurs (falciarii uncinarii).
sauveteurs (emitularii).
Le material etait aussi
compl^t que le permettaient les moyens techniques
de l'epoque.
Le pompiers de Rome --- nous le
savons par les textes contemporains et aussi par
^Les trovailles arch^ologiques--- avaient des pompes
a bras (sifones), des crocs (unoinae), des haches
(dolabraej. des scies (serrae), des marteaux (maillei),
Sdes faux (falces), des perches (perticae), desz echelles
a crochetas (scalae), des seaux (hamas)T des eponges
(spon^iae). jusqu' a des pieces de drap (centones).
imbibees de vinaigre et des matelas (emitpla), pour
sauvetage des locataires. 48
45.
46.
47.
48.

Becker, op, cit.. p. 1.
Waltzing, op. cit., p. 127.
Homo, op. cit.. p. 15-6.
Homo, op. cit.. p. 16.

107

In addition to the firemen who manned the pumps, the

water carriers who in addition to working at the fires familiar
ized themselves with all possible water supplies in their
territory, the life savers, and those in charge of demolitions,

there was also an official known as the 11 Questionarius11 whose
duty it was to investigate questionable fires, and who had at
his command that interesting and ingenious means devised by the
ancients for eliciting information, namely torture.

It is

supposed that an interview with the 'Questionarius11 was a dread

affair.

The matter of life saving was under the supervision

of four doctors attached to each cohort, and the general super
vision of the entire operation of fighting the fire fell to
49
the Praefectus Vigilum, the fire martial of the time.

Following the inauguration of a system of fire pro

tection and an organized fire department in the city of Rome
the idea spread.

Ultimately the problem of fighting fires

was entrusted to certain of the collegia, and these organizat
ions, because of their political activities, became a source

of considerable annoyance to the authorities.

Light is thrown upon the situation in the correspon50
dence of Pliny with the Emperor Trahan.
Pliny writes con
cerning a fire at Nicommedia, where a number of private houses,

49. Kenlon, Fires and Fire-Fighters, p. 19-20.
50. PlinJ, Letters. 42-3.
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several public buildings and a temple were destroyed.

These

buildings occupied two sides of a street, and while there was

a violent wind, Pliny blames the loss to the indolence of the
people and the lack of engines,
equipment.

(sipho) or other fire fighting

He tells the Emperor that he has given directions

for the preparation of fire fighting apparatus, and suggests
the organization of a company of fire fighters limited to a
hundred and fifty members.

Bearing in mind the abuses that

had crept into these organizations, he promises that privileges

as well as numbers will be limited, in order to keep the organ

ization under proper regulation.

Trajan in his reply refers

to the companies of other cities, and because they had in

instances formed themselves into factions and caused considerable
disturbance he suggests an alternative soultion.

Rather than

permitting the organization of a fire company, he advises rather
the provision of fire fighting equipment to be used by owners

of buildings, aided when necesaary by the populace.
In the face of this reception of the risk of fire, it

would not have been surprising to find a commercial system of

insurance.

While there has been nothing left us by contem

porary writers to show that there was any such business carried
on, nevertheless there was a well established custom among the
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more wealthy, of making voluntary contributions to those

suffering from losses by fire.

Such a custom has sometimes

been termed insurance by compulsion.

That is, there is no

legal requirement that makes necessary a contribution by one
to the losses of another, but the mores of the group sometimes
exert a force more powerful than law.

Then again the contri

bution to the fire losses of a neighbor is a means- of assuring

for one's self a like treatment in the event of loss.

That

there was such a system in vogue in Rome seems well established.
51
Juvenal gives us an intimation of the extent to which the

custom had been carried among the rich.

Before the fire is

extinguished he says, there begin to arrive gifts of marble,

building materials, statues, bronzes, silver, books, works of
52
art and other valuable presents.
Martial likewise in his
epigrams refers to the contributions that poured in when a
house was destroyed amounting to many times its cost.

We may safely assume that the custom of making con

tributions by neighbors and friends to indemnify the owner of
property who suffered a loss from fire was well established and

the procedure mentioned by Juvenal and Martial was the expected

51. Sat, iii, 215.
52. Epigrams, iii, 52.
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one, rather than reports of isolated cases.

This we may

assume from the fact that in both the cases cited, the writers

are of the opinion that the owners of the property were connect
ed with the origins of the fires, and that they themselves
53
burned the property for gain.
Juvenal points out that
because oftentimes the fire enabled the owner of the property

to; restore his losses with more and better things,

(meliora

ac plura reponit) he may with good reason be suspected of

burning his own home ( et merito iam suspectus tamquam ipse
suas incenderit aedes).

We may assume by inference that

Juvenal was of the opinion that could the doctrine of indemnity
have been enforced in these situations, fires might have occured
less frequently.
Nor was the attitude confined to Juvenal.
54
Martial in his Epigrams has no easy feeling about Tongilianas,
who had purchased a house for two hundred thousand sesterces.

Because contributions.poured into the amount of a million

sesterces, Martial asks if Tongilianus may not be suspected
of having set fire to his own house.

It is certainly true,

that unless the custom of making these contributions were well
established, and the owner of the property reasonably certain

53. Sat, iii, 215.
54. Epigrams. Ill, 52.
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of help, he would never have taken the chance of setting fire

to his house, nor would he have been suspected of such a step.

Suetonius and Tacitus furnish us another interesting
glimpse of the fire situation in Rome.

While the friends of

an individual, through their contributions, could restore to
one who had a fire the amount of his loss, it is obvious that

if there were a great many sufferers, contributions might not

fill the need.

Yet, within limits, the oatastrophy hazard

found its solution.

An instance to the point is related by

Suetonius, who tells us that during the reign of Tiberius a

fire broke out of the Oaelian Mount, destroying many clusters,
The Emperor, in his private capacity,

or blocks of houses.

came forward to reli'eve the suffering ( ad mitigandam temporum

atrocitatem). and restored to the sufferers their losses.

(pretio restituto).

54

According to Tacitus, on two occas

ions such assistance was rendered by Tiberius,

He mentions

first the fire on Mdunt Caelius, after which the Emperor con

tributed to each of the sufferers the amount of his loss.

For

this, according to the historian, he received the thanks of the
senate and the applause of the.people.

The second instance

mentioned in the Annals, refers to the fire which burned part

54. Suet, Tib..xlviii
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of the Circus near the Mount Aventine, as well as the area of
the Mount itsel-f.

Again, as in the previous instance, Tiberius

made good to the owners the value of the tenements destroyed,
expending according to the record, a hundred thousand great
55
sesterces.
The means for ascertaining the amounts lost

by the different individuals is of interest, in that it furnishes
the earliest record of a committee selected for the purpose of

determining the amount of losses by fire.

The four sons-in-law

of the Emperor were chosen for this duty, and to assist them
there was appointed to the committee a fifth member nominated

by the Consuls.

It was this committee who ascertained the

damage, before payments were made by the Emperor to the suffer56
era.

To what extent contributions in the event of a disaster
could be depended upon from the Emperor is not easy to state.
Such contributions, however, would not be altogether unexpected

in Rome.

Private benefactions were so usual as to be expected

by the people, and particularly once a precedent was established,
it would be a natural sequence that the people would look to the
Emperor or the very rich for assistance in such disasters as

were so great that friends could not with their contributions

55. Tacitus, Annals. 4, 64; et 6, 45.
56. Ibid.. 6, 45.
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reimburse the sufferers.

Contributions from the Emperor or

the State, however, would, ordinarily be expected only in the

event of disasters.

Of more interest is the custom of contri

butions from friends in the case of the isolated loss.

Such

instances are more important, because more frequent, and tend
to show that the Romans by means of this customary insurance
had effectively shifted the burden of the risk of fire.

The business element in Rome was ever seeking new
57

sources of income, and when we recall the exploit of Crassus
during the last century of the Empire, whose salvage brigade
accompanied him to fires where he would make a bid to owners

for their property still burning, it is indeed surprising that

the fertile minds of the Romans did not turn to the field of
fire insurance.

It is worth noting in passing that the in

genious Crassus is said to have amassed a fortune that left

to his estate after the most liberal donations, property to

the value of nearly ten million dollars.

This must have been

t

a most profitable undertaking due to the value of some of the
properties.

Cicero, classed as a man of moderate tastes, is

said to have possessed eighteen different estates, and to have

paid for his city house a value equivalent to approximately

57. Stobart, The Grahdeur that was Rome, p. 131.
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58

$150,000.

It seems as if insurance would have been a

profitable venture as well as salvage.

However, from the

records available, we are forced to the conclusion that among
the ancient people the business of fire insurance did not exist,
and that such recognition as was given the hazards, concerned

itself with the twofold problem of prevention, and providing
indemnity for losses by contributions from friends and neigh
bors,

5. Partnership and the Corporation .
A final contribution to the science of insurance from

ancient Rome is found in the development of the corporate forms

of conducting business.

This form has proved one of the most

satisfactory means for the accumulation of capital for the pur

pose of providing the indemnity promised by the insurance

carrier under the contract of insurance.
The cooperative principle of carrying on big business
enterprises through the formation of companies (societates) was
in practice in Rome at a very early date.

It was to these

companies that Livy referred, when in 215 B.0. the Roman state

appealed for supplies on credit, and three companies of nineteen
men each came forward to supply' the needs.

59

Polibius, like

wise throws light upon the development of the company, as well

58. Ibid, p. 154~
59. Livy. 23;28.
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as the widespread business interests of the Romans, as far back

as the second century before the Christian era.

He refers in

his history to public contracts let for repairs and construct
ion in all parts of Italy, for the collection of revenues from

rivers, harbors, gardens, mines and the like, and comments
that nearly everyone is interested financially in this work

either as a contractor or as an employee.

The contractors,

he says, purchase the contracts from the censors, in some in

stances for themselves, in other instances they have partners
in the undertakings, while a final group concern themselves
with going as surities for the contractors, pledging for them
60
their property to the treasury.

Business in Rome in these centuries just preceeding
the advent of the Christian era passed through a great period
of expansion.

The period is recalled as one of prosperity and

development, and the degree of organization reached by business

cannot but excite admiration.

A financial center was developed

in the city, and a market was in daily operation in the Forum
near the temple of Castor.

Here trading in real estate, slaves,

and other goods was carried on daily, and likewise here was to

60. Polibius. 6; 17.
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be found the banking center of the city.

Because Rome had

not yet developed the corporate form of business organization
with transferable shares, the need for a stock exchange or

market had not yet made its appearance and there is no evidence
of the existance of such an institution.

The importance of

the companies and the corporations in the field of business in
Rome, and the business arising out of their organization and
financial needs, however, developed here a great banking and

financial center.
The interests of the shareholders in these companies

extended to every quarter of the then known civilized world,

nor were these shareholders limited to a few wealthy financiers

of the capital.

On the contrary ownership of shares in an

enterprise was quite the usual thing among those whose resources

would permit.

"Poor crops in Sicily, heavy rains in Sardinia,

an uprising in Gaul, or 'a strike!- in the Spanish mines would
touch the pocket of every middle class Roman."

61

Roman law took careful cognizance of the partnership

as a business relationship, and under its direction it reached

a high state of development ultimately culminating in the cor62
poration.*

61.
62.

The law provided for combinations of a temporary

Abbott, op. c.it., p. 212.
Justinian,Institutes, Lib. iii, Tit. xxv.
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character, that is for doing a particular piece of business,

as well as for the more permanent organizations designed to
.carry on a continuous trade or enterprise.

63

These assoc

iations or partnerships were easily formed and needed no formal

procedure to become effective, the only essential element re-

64
quired being the simple consent of the parties to the agreement.
Dissolution was equally simple, depending either upon the consent

of the partners, or the renouncement of the agreement by one of
■ 65
the partners.
A break occured in the partnership likewise
at the death of a partner, for under the law a partner’s heir
did not become a partner, even if it were so provided in the
agreement at the beginning of the association.

66

A step in advance from this simple form of association,
the private partnership, ia found in the large companies of tax
farmers.

Dissolution in this instance did not follow the

death of a partner

67

and steps were provided for registering

the share of the deceased in the name of the heir, thereby

making him a partner.

In such an instance the companies were

said to corpus habere, that is to be corporations.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Roby, op. cit., v. ii, p. 128.
Ibid, p. 120.
Ibid?jP.129.
Ibid,.p.129.
Ibid..p.133.

They were
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recognized as entites by law.

They had a dbmmon treasury,

and a manager who could sue, be sued, and make agreements on

behalf of the corporate body.
ever, were not transferable.

The shares or interests, how

This corporate organization of

the Romans marks a decided step in the direction of the joint

stock corporation with transferable shares.

Recognizing the

importance of the corporate form of business as a vehicle for
risk bearing the contribution of this development to the

science of insurance is at once apparent.
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CHAPTER IV.

MIDDLE AGE8 AND RENAISSANCE.

1. The Gilds as Insurers.

With the decline of the Roman influence early in the
sixth century we are brought to the period of the Middle Ages.

During this period the principle of mutual insurance received
an impetus in its development and expanded to include in its
8cope many risks that had hitherto remained imiMBiirsd.. The gild

was the agency through which this development was effected.
Gilds were voluntary associations for religious,

social and commercial purposes.

Their origin is shrouded in

uncertainty, and is a much debated question.

Attempts to

trace their origin from the Roman collegia, have not been
attended with success, nor does’the evidence warrant the con

clusion that their beginning may be traced to the sacrificial
feasts of the anicent Teutonic nations.

In fact there is

good reason now to believe that there is no single source from

which they sprung, but that they are rather a manifestation of
the social instinct in man that has given rise from the very

earliest times to the tendency to form groups when drawn
together by a common interest.^

However, because the Roman collegia flourished for
1. Seligman, Mediaeval Guilds in England, p. 9-10.
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centuries before the rise of the gilds of the Middle Ages, and
because there is a point of contact between the two, especially
in those countries where the Roman influence had manifest itself,
the question presents itself as to whether the collegia made any

direct contribution to the gilds.

Any conclusion to that

effect is based upon presumption, there being nothing in the

way of documentary evidenoe to substantiate such an inference.

2

However, recalling the tenacity with which tradition clings, it
is not to be expected that Roman customs and institutions were

entirely without influence is those centuries to which Roman
dominion had extended, and a presumption is created that here
at least the gilds in their development reflected the influence
of the earlier collegia of Ancient Rome.

The word gild has a special significance.

It is

derived from the Anglo-Saxon gylden, or geldan meaning "to pay",

and in the earliest records it appears meaning in some cases a
contribution, in others a feast, and still again an association.
It is not difficult to trace the relationship of one meaning
with the other.

The common contribution with a distinguishing

feature of early unions, and the word gild, meaning to pay was

eventually applied to the society as well as to festivities whose

2. Walford, op. cit., vol. v, p. 342.
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expenses were met by the common payments.

The word, gild

in the course of time same to be used generally to mean a
'’society", and was eventually used to designate organizations

whose aims and purposes differed from the earlier Anglo-Saxon
4
unions.
The gilds as they developed among the Teutonio

nations during this period may be divided into four general
classifications,
(4) craft gilds.

(1) religious,

(2) firth,

(3),merchant, and

Their development was fostered and encour

aged by the Church, and its teaching of charity and mutual aid

and assistance in times of difficulty prompted many of the pro
visions that were included among the benefits available for

members.

Besides such activities as almsgiving, care of the

sick, burial of the dead, providing Masses for the souls of
the deceased,

there were likewise established insurance funds

for the benefit of the members from which they received indemnity

in the event they suffered certain losses.

Thus, in addition

to the other purposes for which they were organized, they were

essentially mutual insurance associations, aiming to indemnify

the few in the event of great losses through the cooperation
of the many.

They were in truth, says Walford,

the insurance

3. Seligman, op. cit.. p.103-4, also Smith, Ehglish Gilds, p.xix.
4. Ibid,.p. 105.
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associations of the Middle Ages, and probably the only ones

which were required or could have existed in that state of
5
society.
It is with the insurance features of the gild
organizations that we are here concerned.
The insurance feature of the gilds was usually made

effective through regular payments by the members into a common
fund, out of which disbursements were made to- those suffering

losses from certain specified disasters.

The more common

of these included fire, flood, or robbery, though the gild
system of indemnity was eventually extended to cover most of
the risks which attached to the enterprises of the time.

This recognition of risk, and the formation of an

association operating on a mutual basis, having for one of its
aims the dividing the losses of the few over the many, is a

distinct step in the direction of the modern practice of insur

ance.

As a matter of fact, so far as there is any available

information, these gild organizations of the Middle Ages were
the first permanent associations to effect property insurance.

The benefits that each gild provided were those pre
sumably that were of greatest concern to the membership.

While some gilds were organized for special purposes, or in

cluded unusual provisions in their regulations, there were

5.

Walford, op. cit.. vol. v, p. 341.
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other features that were nearly always to be found.

Care for

the fitting burial of the dead at the cost of the gild was a

feature most generally incorporated in the regulations.

This

it will be remembered was the chief concern of the members of

Continuing, however,

the collegia tenuiorum of ancient Rome.
6
at the point where tne Romans left off,

the gilds likewise

provided help to the poor, the sick, the infirm and the aged,

sometimes with money, sometimes with food or clothing.

Next

they extended.the arm of protection so as to render assistance

to those who were unfortunate enough to suffer losses caused by
fire, flood, or robbery.

Relief not unlike the accident and

health insurance of modern times was provided in the event of
need in old age, at the loss of signt or limb, upon becoming

deaf, dumb, or being afflicted with a serious malady such as

leprosy.

Then there were gilds who rendered assistance to

those who lost cattle, or for the fall of a house.

Others

provided relief in the case of shipwreck, in the case of 1»=

pris9Jsmentt or for the legal defense of members who became in
volved with the law.

Sometimes provision was made for gifts

to the young people so that they could get started in the world,

and for young women doweries were provided.

Assistance was

frequently rendered in temporary pecuniary difficulties, some

times as special instances, and in others as a regular feature
6. Waltzing, o,p. cit., v. 1, p. 300-1.

124

of the gild benefits.

In short the insurance feature of the

gilds was expanded and extended to meet the needs of the times,
7
and the manner of accomplishment cannot but excite admiration.
In the Anglo-Saxon period (827 - 1013) gilds with a

feature of protection can be traced to an early date.

The

earliest mention of gilds occurs in the laws of Ine, and in the
Q

laws of Alfred.

These laws, as well as those of Aethelstan

and Henry I. reproduce still older laws that recognize the

9
universal existance of gilds as a well known and accepted fact.

The advances made in gild organization early in this
period are shown by the Judicia Oivitatis Lundoniae, the Statutes

of the London Gilds, which were made a matter of record in the

time of King Aethelstan (925 - 941).

The insurance features

to be found in the gild organizations are admirably illustrated

in the regulations made for governing these tenth century London
associations.

Commenting on their provisions the learned Dr.

Lujo Brentano says that one might call these gilds "assurance
companies against theft."

The insurance feature was cer

tainly one of the important purposes of the association.

The

gilds in and about London at this time seem to have united to

7. Smith, op. cit.. xxxvi. Walford, op. cit.tv.5. p. 343.
8. Seligman, op. cit., p. 13.
9. Walford, quotes Smith, op. cit., v. 5, p. 342.
10. Bretano, English Gilds. 1 xxv.
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form a single gild, apparently under the direction of the

authorities.

The preamble to the statutes states that they

were ordained by the bishops and reeves of London and confirmed
by the pledges of the gild-brethern.^^
The gild had for its

object the recovery of stolen stock and slaves, if recovery

were possible, but where recovery could not be accomplished,
then the gild was to indemnify the loser by means of pro rata

contributions from the members.
Among the chief regulations were the requirement that

all of the members should contribute a stipulated yearly payment
to the common fund.

If any property were stolen a common

8 earch was undertaken, and the members contributed a shilling

toward expenses.
exempted.

Poor widows unable to make the payment were

The regulations specified the amount of indemnity

to be provided in particular instances.
commanded a half pound "if it be so good".

For example a horse
If it was deemed

nojt worth the maximum payment, then the sum to be received by
the owner was to be determined by the value of the lost animal.
Provisions were likewise made for payment,

loss of an ox, a cow, a hog or a sheep.

in the event of the

A slave who succeeded

in escaping was paid for "according to his value."

11. Brentano, op. cit., p 1 xxv.

The money

necessary to meet these losses was taken from the funds on hand

but it was provided that such funds as were needed over that on
12
hand were to be secured by a call among the members.
Payment for the lost property was made as soon as the

contributions were secured, but in the meantime, the owner of
the property who had suffered the loss was required to continue

the search until payment was made him, and provision was made

for compensating him for ithi§> expense.

Whoever suffered

loss was obliged, if he intended to make a claim,

to give

notice within three days, and to continue the search, for "the
gild will only pay for stolen, not ungarded property; and many
13
men make fraudelent claims 1 "
aere we have at this early date a mutual insurance

association designed to indemnify its members for losses from
stolen cattle or slaves.

have stolen himself.

A slave who escaped was said to

Those who drew up the regulations for

the association had a clear understanding of the fundamental

principles that should govern an insurance organization.

For example, first of all, insistence upon indemnity without

profit is a feature of the regulations.

A maximum indemnity

is provided, but payable only in case the property lost warrants

it.

In the case of inferior property, the value only is to be

12.Seligman, op. cit., p. 14. Walford, op. cit., v.5, p 360-1.
13.Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 361.
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This rule serves the double purpose of minimizing

paid.

the

moral hazard, and at the same time setting an upper limit
Finally the gild is wary of fraudelent

to possible claims.

If the owner of the property is negligent and does

claims.

not report his;

loss promptly, or if he fails to carry on a

search, then he is not entitled to compensation.

From the

standpoint of the development of insurance principles the re
gulations of this gild are noteworthy.

Gilds were widely organized during the eighth, ninth,

and tenth centuries,

14

and in the Norman Period (1066 - 1154)

continued to be established for the purposes of promoting

religion, trade, and charity.

The specific aims and purposes

of the many organizations that sprang up varied with the needs
and circumstances of the gild members.

Each gild had its

own regulations, governing the contributions of members, the

benefits provided for them, and their various duties and obli

gations.

At the pinacle of their development they were very

wealthy, and had acquired no inconsiderable power.

At the

beginning of the Reformation in England their wealth was so
notable as to attract the attention of Henry VLL1, whose needs
were still unsatisfied after he had exhausted the resources of

the church.

Indicative of the great wealth accumulated by

14. Walford, op, cit., v. 5, p. 387
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the gilds at this period is the loan advanced by twelve city
gilds, of over twenty thousand pounds, secured by lands mort*

gaged to them, for the purpose of providing Henry means for

carrying on his wars with Scotland.

The cupidity of the

crowns was aroused, and shameless acts of confiscation followed.

The policy of Henry was carried on by Edward VI, and Elizabeth,
with the result that the gilds rapidly declined.

15

It does not come within the scope of this discussion

to describe the many different rules or purposes to be found

in the course of the

’ development of the gilds.

For our

purposes we are not concerned whether the payments to the
common fund were yearly, quarterly, or as was the case in one
instance, weekly.

Nor need we trace in the different organ

izations the great diversity of benefits.
the principle was the same.

In each instance,

The insurance protection that

the gilds afforded was a form of mutual protection, with losses
met out of a fund built up by regular payments and augumented

by special assessments.

So far as the insurance idea is con

cerned a lengthy examination of many gilds would involve needless
repetition.
It is sufficient to say here, that when the burden of
t

risks that attach themselves to human enterprise began to weigh

too heavily, the gilds served as the first means among the

15. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 387.
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general populace for effecting insurance.

They stood, says

Dr. Brentano, "like a loving mother, providing and assisting,

at the side of her sons in every circumstance of life, cared
for her children even after death; and the ordinances as to
this last act breathe the same spirit of equality among her

sons, on which all her regulations were founded, and which

constituted her strength."

16

They took the place in old

times, says Mr. Toulman Smith, of the "modern Friendly or
17
Benefit Society,"
and "the idea by which all were penetrated",
says Dr. Seligman ,"was the partial realization of the doctrine

of universal brotherhood which the early church so zealously
18
strove to diffuse."

2. The Joint Stock Company.
We have considered in passing the development of
business associations, because of their ultimate importance qs

providers of the means for amassing the great capital necessary

for conducting the business of insurance.

Partnership assoc

iations were developed in the Babylonian times, and were used
in the business life of Greece and Rome.

16. Brentano, op. cit., p. cxxxiii.
17. Smith, Introd. English Guilds, p. xiv.
18. Seligman, op. cit.. p. 19.

In Rome a permanent
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form or organization was developed, said to have a body (corpus

habere) and here was the beginning of the corporate form of
business organization.
In the Middle Ages the private partnership continued

a standard form of business association, and was commonly com
posed of a number of individuals who were relatives.

there was the association furnished by gild membership.

Then
Here

each member furnished his own capital, and carried on his bus

iness undertaking, but under the guidance of the group regulation.
Lastly there was still in common use that earliest of all assoc
iations, the commenda.

As used during the Middle Ages, the

"Oommendator" furnished the capital for some business venture
or undertaking.

as the "Tractor".

The second party to the transaction was known
He was the manager, and to him fell the

responsibility of carrying out the undertaking.

His compen

sation for his services was usually one-fourth of the profits,

though this was often varied, particularly if the "Tractor" as
19
he often did, furnished part of the capital.
However, in quite another direction we find the earl

iest appearance of the stock company.

It developed in mediaeval

Italy, out of the custom of managing the public debt.

The

19. Knight, Barnes and Flugel,Economic History of Europe, p. 124
and Day, History of Commerce, p. 116-7.
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system in operation in the event of a public loan, involved
first the division of the total amount to be borrowed into a
large number of smaller sums, so that a number of borrowers
might participate, thus facilitating the undertaking.

The

procedure was not unlike that followed today in public finance,

by dividing the amount of a loan into a number of smaller sized
bonds.

To guarantee payment of both principle and interest,

it was a customary procedure to turn over certain sources of

revenue to the creditors, or assign for the purpose certain
taxes.

To handle the revenue thus obtained, the creditors

were obliged, on their part to effect some suitable form of

organization.

They had to provide for the receipt and admis-

istration, or division of the monies that were turned over to

them, and this involved the employment of agents, book-keepers,

and other administrative assistance.

In short they were

obliged to form a corporate organization whose shareholders
were the public creditors.

The first actual stock company, however, to develop

out of this association for the administration of the payments
on a public debt, occured in Genoa, and dates from the fourteenth
<

century.

The Genoese government, had in carrying out her

conquest of Chios and Phocaea, become heavily involved in debt,
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and was without resources to meet her obligations.

Chios

and Phocaea were sources of alum and gum mastic, valuable

commercial products, and because the state had no other means

for paying the debt, the alum works and other properties were
themselves placed in the hands of the creditors for a period
of twenty years, so that they might secure themselves through

the income thus to be obtained.

At the end of the twenty

year period the state was still unable to fund the debt.

The

property already turned over to 'the states creditors was there

fore left in their hands.

The shares into which the debt was

(divided now represented shares or Interests in the alum company,

the status ohanging from that of state creditor with oertain
♦

recource8 held as security, to that of proprietor, with shares
that were transferable representing the holdings of each stock

holder.
An example of the application of the corporate principle

to a business organization is found in the Bank of St. George

in Genoa, said to be one of the most famous of the mediaeval
business institutions.

This bank grew out of a merger of these

state creditors, one group being the owners of the alum works

already mentioned.

Its organization effected in 1407, it

carried on an extensive banking business, accepting deposits,

and investing its funds, as well as managing state revenues,
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and. carrying out other business enterprises.

There were said,

to be approximately five hundred, shareholders who elected the
20
boards who managed the banks affairs.
Thus for the first time was developed the joint stock

corporation with transferable shares.

Hundred of individuals,

foreigners, children, women, or others who knew nothing about
conducting the business of the undertaking could furnish small

or large units of capital and derive a share in the profits of
the business.

At the same time the individual investor, be

cause his shares were transferable could readily withdraw from

the enterprise, without any interuption in the company’s affairs,

by the simple expedient of selling his holdings.

Finally the

shareholders all have an interest in the management of the
company proportional to their holdings, and are thereby enabled
21
to choose, for managers those in whom they have confidence.

It is not the place here to go at length into the
advantages and disadvantages of the corporate form of business
organization.
time.

These are too well known for repetition at this

We are interested, however, in recording the development

of the joint stock company, for not until the joint stock com
pany was used as the vehicle for risk bearing did the business

20. Knight, Barnes and Flugel, op. cit.f p. 125.
21. Day, History of. Commerce, p. 147,
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of insurance expand with any great degree of stability.

In

fact it may be stated that the modern business of insurance

marks as its point of inception the chartering of the first

incorporated insurance companies.

This however, was at a con

siderably later period.

3. Fire Insurance.
The need of protection from fire was recognized during

the peridd of the Middle Ages, and one of the more common pro

visions in the rules of the gilds, was the insurance feature
that provided the members assistance in the case of loss from

this cause.

Fire insurance as a commercial undertaking, how

ever, was slow in developing.

The earliest law of which there is a record bearing

upon the question of fire and indemnity was promulgated in the

year 1240 by Thomas, Count of Flanders, and Johanna hie Countess.

Under the terms of this law a means of indemnity is provided,
and a community of liability established, and is known as the

custom of Furnes.

By article XI of the law termed Oora. or

Keure it is provided:-

"In quacunque villa combustio facta fuerit occulte,
tota villa statim solvat damnum per illos quos eligent
coratores; quod si malefactor sciri poterit, bannetur
perpetuo, et solvetur damnum de ejus;residuum vero
cedat comiti.
Qui vero de nachbrant aoclamatus fuerit,
per quinque coratores purgare se poterit; alioquin
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suspendetur, omnia bona sua erunt in gratia comitis,
restituto prius damno illi qui damnum habuet: si prius
tamen querimoniam fecit," 22
Thus it is provided by the law that in whatever house a fire

shall have been secretly made, the whole place immediately
makes good the damage through those whom the guardians select.

But if the malefactor can be found out, he is banished forever,
and the damage is made good out of his property, the residue

he yields up to the court.

The law then goes on to state that

he who can exculpate himself from the accusation will be commended

All of

by the guardians, but in the meantime he is suspended.

his goods are at the pleasure of the court; the damage being
first made good to the injured who has made complaint.

Thus

it is seen that whoever suffers a loss by fire is assured of
indemnity if the cause of the fire is unknown.

If, however,

the person responsible for the damage can be found, the loss is
made good out of his property.

Presumably he has the oppor

tunity to appear and free himself from blame, thereby relieving

himself of the punishment of being banished forever, though

his goods remain in the custody of the court to make good the
loss caused by the fire.
The custom is not unlike the French law known as

"voisinage" in that a property owner, if a fire starts on his

premises, and damages a neighbor, is responsible to him for

22. Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 438,
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that damage.

In France one insures not only his own property,
2;

but his liability for loss to his neighbor’s property as well.""
In the community of liability under the custom of Furnes, is

found one of the earliest instances outside the gilds where the
risk of fire was definitely recognized, and steps taken to

effect a shifting of its burden.
The instances in this period that relate to providing

indemnity for losses arising out of fires are scattered and un
related, but may indicate a gradual increase of attention to

the ri&k and a groping in the direction of fire insurance.

In

1302, in the oily of London, we find an instance of a guarantee

of indemnity for loss originating from fire made by an individ

On January 13, one Thomas Bat is reported as having come

ual.

before John le Bund, Mayor of London, and the Aidermen of the

city, and bound himself to keep the city of London indemnified
from "peril of fire and other losses" which might arise from

his houses that were covered with thatch and situated in a
certain designated parish.

He further agreed to roof his

houses with tile, and have the work finished about the next

Feast of Pentacost.

Failure on his part to make the agreed

improvements carried the right to the city’s officials to roof

the house with tile themselves, and pay for them out of the
' ■ •

*

....----------------

-

---- -----

23. Shepley, Insurance Practices in Foreign Countries, p. 41.
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As security for the indemnity, his rents, lands, and
24
tenements were hound.

rents.

The instance here referred to seems to relate to a

guarantee by an individual to assume responsibility for damage
arising out of his property until such time as he can correct

objectionable features to the satisfaction of the authorities.
It is an agreement to indemnify, but a limited contract.

It

can hardly be termed a shifting of the burden of the risk of

fire, for the indemnitor is not concerned with fires that ori

ginate from any source other than from his houses covered with
thatch.

Such being the case, the agreement furnishes the most

limited form of protection, though it furnishes us the earliest

record we have of an individual assuming the responsibility for
indemnification from loss by fire.
There is a reference that would indicate the practice

of fire insurance in Scotland early in the fifteenth century.
The information is vague, and furnishes no evidence as to the

form in which the insurance was effected.

It is stated that in 1427 an act was passed in the
Seventh Parliament of King James I., of Scotland which bore the
title "The leave to Merchants to sure their gudes."

24,

Relton, op. cit., p. 8.

The act
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itself is now lost, and information concerning its details are
wanting.

Such knowledge as we have of the legislation of

James, dealing with the subject of fire concerns itself with

fire protection and not with the matter of insurance.

The

shred of evidence found in the title of the foregoing act
furnishes us little information that is of value, though we
may conclude from this title of the law that some form of fire
25
insurance was known to the merchants and used by them.
The lag in the development of fire insurance is

readily apparent, and such fragments of evidence as we have
from this period indicate a lack of interest in fire risks.

To a certain degree the problem was handled by the gilds.

It

is nevertheless true that the advantages of fire insurance made
less of an appeal than did those offered by marine insurance,

and in consequence fire insurance failed to keep pace in its
development with the insurance of sea-risks.

This lag may be attributed, not so much to a failure

to apply the principle of insurance to the risks arising from

the hazards of fire, but rather to a characteristic of human
nature.

There is tendency on the part of individuals to dis

regard risks to which they have become conditioned.

25.

Relton, op. cit.. p. 8.

They
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There is an

become entirely unconcious of their existence.

inertia whose importance must not be underestimated that grows
out of habit, and serves at the same time as a protection to
our institutions and a drag upon progress.

When the individ

ual had adjusted himself to an accustomed method, he will deviate
from the habits thus established only upon the application of
some extra stimulus.

Man likes to do things the old way, and

has a dread of new methods or change, and for this reason tends

to postpone the adoption of something new that through the
action of his intellectual capacity he has fully decided to

accept.
The application of the principle to insurance readily

illustrates the reason for the development of marine insurance

while fire insurance lagged.

A casual consideration of the

risks attaching to every sort of human enterprise classifies

them roughly into two divisions, the absolutely unavoidable,
and those assumed by choice.

Disease, accident,

the onset of

physical incapacity with old age, and death are risks that all

must face.and non may escape.

On the other end of the scale

there are forms of business enterprise where hazards attach,
which, attracted by profits, the individual undertakes through
choice.

Between these two are many degrees of risk attaching

to an individual in modern society, in theory assumed from choise

14D

but as a matter of fact undertaken because of the requirements
inposed by the group of which the individual is a member.

As

a matter of theory one need not make use of furniture, nor use
a dwelling for shelter.

As a matter of fact, however, the

mores of the group eliminates free choice, and the individual
is faced with risk.

Such risks as offer no choice as to

whether they will be assumed or avoided are those to which the

individual tends to become conditioned.

regard.

These he tends to dis

But if a new and strange enterprise is suggested,

before making a step he weighs all the risks, is conscious of

'

all possible consequences, and his decision regarding the under

taking is made upon the basis of this appraisal.
8uch was the relationship between the hazards of fire

and those of the sea.

Buildings, stocks of merchandise, fur

niture, and the like were always owned.

The individual became

conditioned to the risks to which they were subjected.

The

human tendency to do things as they had always been done mani

fested itself, and current custom and methods as a matter of
habit were accepted as good enough.
Here a choice must be made.

Not so with marine ventures.

The unconscious acceptance of risk

changes to the conscious assumption.

Because there is a greater

range of free choice, risks that seem too great will be avoided.

One of the means devised for relief was found first in the
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bottomry loan, and ultimately in the marine insurance contract.

Because the assumption of fire risks was part of an automatic
*

order they received little attention.

A passage from the Wealth of Nations seems to illus26
trate this tendency as it operated in Smith's day.
Comparing

fire and sea-risks, the later are more alarming to the greater
part of the people, and the proportion of ships insured to those

not insured is much greater than is the case with houses.

This

is indicative of the conclusion already drawn that where: risk

imposes a burden, the intensity of the desire to shift it varies

directly with the ability of the individual to avoit it.

Man

as has already been pointed out may in theory be free to live

without the customary habitation*, yet as a matter of fact the

dictates of the mores of his group are such as to make the occu
pation of a habitation compulsory.

Shipping on the other hand

to the average citizen offered a free choice, and before an in

dividual takes his fortune, or a part of it and risks it in a
sea voyage, he weighs carefully the consequences of loss against

possible gains, and finds himself willing to forego part of the

gains for the sake of a. greater degree of security.

In the

instance of the house there was no element of choice, the individ

ual finds himself conditioned to the'risk, and tends to bear it.
In the case of the sea risks a venture is proposed that offers
26. Smith., Wealth of Nations. I, x, pt. 1.
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a complete freedom of choice as to whether or not the under
taking with its attendant hazards will be entered upon, and here
we find the tendency veering toward seeking a means of protect

ion before the project to which the risk attaches is commenced.
As individuals acquired greater properties, and as

cities grew, and hazards increased, the tendency to ignore the

hazards of fire continued.

It was not until the great fire of

London in 1666 that brought the world face to face with the

menace, and broke down the unconscious and habitual disregard
for the risk.

4. Marine Insurance.

We now come to the d evelopment of the modern form of
effecting insurance.

The risk bearer, or insurer in return

for the payment of sn agreed premium assumes the burden of a
designated risk by agreeing to indemnify the assured in the event

that he suffers a loss.

With the decline of the Roman influence,

there is little

in the way of recorded evidence to throw light upon the development
of marine insurance until the revival of commerce in the Middle

Ages.

It is not easy to believe, however, that an insurance

institution such as bottomry, so widely known and so useful in
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the commercial world, should fall into disuse without providing

a substitute in its place.

It is easier to believe the records

as lacking, than to believe the great shipping centers carried
27
on their business without insurance protection.
Under the feudal system there were trade organizations

of cities, and of separate callings, that may have furnished
28
some form of marine insurance,
and marine risks were among
29
those covered by certain of the gilds.
Even though some

protection was afforded from these sources, recalling the extent
of the diffusion of Roman influence particularly through the
incorporation of Roman laws into later codes, it is not to be

presumed that bottomry was unknown or fell into disuse only to

be revived again at a later time.
The period from the fifth to the eleventh century is

extremely poor in 'documentary evidence, and records of business
transactions or mercantile practices that might throw light upon
the field of insurance are lacking.

It may be supposed, however,

that the practice of bottomry was uninterrupted down to the

ninth century, for in the Basilica, a compilation of laws made

by the Byzantine Emperor Basilius in 867 - 880 A.D., there are
to be found regulations regarding the practice that follow in all

27. Campbell, Insurance and Crime, p. 69.
28. Ibid., p. 69.
29. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 343.
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important particulars those that appear in the Digest of

Justinian.
Beginning with the twelfth century, the Jus Navale

Rhodeorum, A Greek compilation whose date is placed earlier than
1167 A.D., likewise contains regulations regarding loans on
bottomry essentially the same as those to be found in the earlier
Digest.

30

At this point, however, we come to a break, for

the two important marine codes governing the European nations
are conspicuously silent regarding either bottomry or marine
insurance.

The most ancient collection of European maritime law
' is the famous II Oonsolatio del Mare.

There are few obscure

I

marine ordinances that anti-date the Oonsolatio, but they are
rela.tively unimportant and are not generally included among the
sources of European commercial law.

31

The origin of the

Oonsolatio is shrouded in obscurity, being attributed on the one
hand to the ancient kings of Arragon, while on the other the

credit is given to Pisa.

Regardless of the point of origin,

the importance of the compilation in the’ legal system of the
day is readily recognized.

Having been completed and in force

as early as the eleventh century, the regulations it contained

30. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 337.
31. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 36.
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were regarded as law and followed during the period succeeding

their promulgation by all the nations of Southern Europe.

32

The Oonsolatio, although it contains a full account

of other marine customs and usages contains no mention of in
surance or loans on bottomry, though there are several chapters

that indicate or presuppose the use of bottomry.

33

There is,

likewise, provisions for- a contract that has a trend toward
mutual insurance.

It indicates that owners of ship and of

goods often agreed that all losses should be apportioned among
them in accordance with the interest of each.

This amounted

to an agreement by the parties concerned to apply the principle

of general average to all losses suffered by any of the contracting parties.

34

The inclusion of such a provision, however,

only serves to emphasize the failure to mention directly either
boftomry or insurance.

Another important legal compilation of this period is

found in the Roles 0*01eron, known also as the laws or judgements

of Oleron.

Concerning the time and place of their origin

there is considerable controversy between the Ehglish and French

32. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 37, also Marshall, Law of Insurance
v. 1, p. 15-16, and Qretiia.8, De jure Belli ac Pads,
lib. 3, c.l, f 5, N. 6.
33. Walford, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 337.
34. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 38, note (c).
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authorities.

On the one hand it is stated that they were first

published in their present form by King Richard I, on his return
from the Hold Land, and intended to have the force of law in
English as well as in French possessions.

On the return hand

French jurists claim that the laws were first compiled under the
authority of Queen Eleanor, mother of Richard, and were published
35
by her at her favorite isle of Oleron.'
Others reject both
the English and French claims, and place the date of publication

at 1266, a half century after the death of Queen Eleanor and her

son.

36

Upon insurance as a distinct and separate contract, as

well as upon the subject of bottomry, the judgments of Oleron

•n
4. 37
are silent.

Considerable importance has sometimes been attached to
the fact that during this period two important compilations of

law, such as the Oonsolatio, and the Roles D^leron, mention
directly neither bottomry nor insurance, and has given rise to

the belief that the one had fallen into disuse and the other had
not yet been developed.

The danger of concluding, however,

that bottomry was no longer used in commercial practice, and that

insurance was unknown, solely because affifmative evidence is

35. Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 16.
36. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 38-9.
37. Walford, op, cit., v. 1, p. 337.
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lacking in legislative expression is easily demonstrable.
Practices common to merchants have existed for long periods

before it was deemed necessary to incorporate regulations
concerning them in the legal system.

Experience shows that

in the case of insurance, it has existed probably in every
country for a long time as a practice among merchants before
the subject became a matter of law.

In the case of insurance

a negative decision based upon the absence of positive legal
evidence is far from convincing or certain.

When we turn, however, to the legal code of the
Hanseatic League, the language of the law leaves no room for

doubt.

This famous confederacy of merchants and traders, who

were mostly of Teutonic nationality, through its members
carried on a vast foreign trade and became the great sea carriers

of the northern nations.

The League published various sea

codes during the thirteenth century that were ultimately con
solidated in a single authoritative code, known as the Laws of

the Merchants and Masters of the magnificent city of Wisby.
The laws take their name from Wisby, an ancient city of Sweden,
38
on the western side of the Isle of Gothland in the Baltic.
Located about equally distant from Sweeden, Russia, and Germany,

this city during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries rose

38. Mason, The Royal Exchange, p. 69.
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to a position of great wealth and power, and became a center
for the extensive commercial and trading operations of the

members of the League.

39

The date of the promulgation of these laws is not
certainly known, the claim being made by some that they are
older eveh than the Roles D1Oleron, by others that they are a
40
translation of the Roles.
The similarity in their context

lends weight to the hypothesis that they at least were founded
41
upon the laws of Oleron.
Instead of anti-dating them it
is believed that in drawing up the Laws of Wisby, use was made
of the regulations found in the Roles D'Oleron, modifications
being made for the purpose of better adapting them to the needs

and usages of the commercial states of northern Europe, for
42
whom they were compiled.
The claim of the northern writers

that the code is older than the laws of Oleron, or even as some

state, the Oonsolatio del Mare, is not considered to be well
founded.

That learned and distinguished French writer Oieirat

ventures the opinion that when the Roles D1Oleron were published
43
the Magnificent city of Wisby had not yet become a town.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Parsons, Treatise on Maritime Law, v. 1, p. 10.
Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 17.
Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10.
Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10.
Marshall, op, cit., v. 1, p. 17.
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While the date of their promulgation is now conceeded

to oe near the close of the thirteenth century,
the fourteenth,

45

44

or early in

their importance is not to be underestimated.

Following their publication they became the sea code and recog
nized law of the northern nations.

Their authority and impor-

’ tance was recognized by Grotius when he wrote:"Lex Rhodia navalis pro jure gentium, in illo mari
Mediterraneo vigebat; sicut apud Galliam leges
Oleronis, et apud onmes transrhenanos, leges
Wisbuenses." 46

In the Laws of Wisby mention is made for the first
47
time in an European code of the practice of bottomry.
Re

ference is made to the practice in such a way however, as to

permit the inference that it was a well known commercial custom
that had long been in use.

Bottomry during the Middle Ages

furnishes no new contribution to the science of insurance, but
remains in its essentials the same contract as practiced in

ancient Greece fifteen hundred years earlier.

There is evidence,

however, tha.t the cumbersome features of bottomry as an insurance

contract had manifested themselves to the far seeing and able

44. Duer. op. cit.. v. 1, p. 41.
45. Martin, History of Lloyds, p. 4.
46. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. 2, c.3, quoted by
Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 17.
47. Martin, op, cit., p. 4.
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traders of the Hanseatic League, and a step was made in the
direction of a contract of insurance apart from a loan.

There

is no mention of insurance as such in the Laws of Wisby, though

a section of the code refers to a practice that would Indicate
such a dontract.

It is stated in Article 66 of the laws:-

"Si le maistre est contraint de bailler caution
au bourgeois pour le navire, le bourgeois sera
parcillement tenu bailler caution pour la vie du
maistre." 48

It is pointed out that giving security for the safe return of
the ship is the same thing as insuring her, and counter security
4
for the life of the master indicates the insurance of his life.
Oleriac, in his version of the laws included in Article 66, the

following, which follows immediately after the paragraph already
quoted:- .
"O’est d dire que, contre les hazards de la mer et de
la mort, il ne peut echoir de requisition raisonnable
a bailler caution; regullerement le bourgeois doit
risquer son bien, et le maistre sa liberte et sa vie,
bien y puet estre fait polisse d'asseurance. " 50
This second paragraph, which mentions directly the subject of

insurance, does not appear in some of the older editions in

48. Quoted by Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 41, not e (a).
49. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 41.
50. Quoted by Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 17.
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which the laws are published., and it is believed that instead
of being a part of the original text it represents a comment

upon or exposition of the paragraph in the laws that immediately
51
proceeds it.
Regardless, however, of this second paragraph,
Article 66 of the Laws of Wisby have been interpreted to mean

that.if the merchant obliged the master to insure the ship, the
merchant shall be obliged to insure the master's life against

the perils of the sea.

52

Hence, in a single regulation, pro

vision is made for a contract of marine insurance, and a contract
of life insurance, and in terms that imply a familiarity with
the practice upon the part of those whom the law was designated

to effect.
While it has been suggested that the Laws of Wisby
are of a much later date than that commonly ascribed to them,

and for that reason a section devoted to insurance is not sur
prising, the evidence against this theory is strong.

Another

opinion accounts for the mention of insurance by stating that

the section relating thereto is an interpolation of a later
date.

The final view, and this has the weight Of authority,

being held by the eminent Emergion and others, holds that both
marine and life insurance were known and practiced at this early

, .
53
time.

51. Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 17.
52. Angell, Law of Fire and Life Insurance., p. 29.
53. Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10-11.
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There is a passage from an old. historical work, the

Oronyk van Vlaenden which tends to confirm this belief, and

affords further evidence that insurance, as effected by the
modern insurance contract, was" understood and in common use

by the members of the Hanseatic League.

In the Chronyk there

Is a reference to insurance in the following terms
"On the demand of the inhabitants of Bruges, the Count
of Flanders permitted in the year 1310, the establish
ment in this town of a Chamber of Assurance, by means
of which the Merchants could insure their goods,
exposed to the risks of the 8ea, or elsewhere, in
paying a stipulated Percentage..
But, in order that
an Establishment so useful to Commerce might not be
disolved as soon as formed, he ordered the laying down
of several Laws and Regulations which the Assurers as
well as the Assured, are bound to observe." 54

Bruges was at this period a great trading center of the North,
and a chief market, and one of the principle sea-ports of the

League.

Indicative of her importance as a sea-port and trading

center, it has been stated that it was no uncommon thing for a
hundred and fifty tall ships to enter the outer harbor of the

city on a single tide.

If we could stop at this point and

rely upon the statement of the Ohronyk, the practice of insur
ance by the members of the Hanseatic League would seem to be

demonstrated.

54. Quoted by Martin, op. cit., p. 6 .
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Referring to this passage,however, Walford, states that
some of the best authorities on the subject, metioning Pardessus

and Reddie, do not regard the authenticity of this part of the

work as established.
from Bruges,

Bar w#ri there any insurance ordinances

that might confirm the statement in the Ohronyk.

Walford believes, however, that an explanation of this lack is
to be found in the suggestion that the regulation was so analagous to the Roles D^leron as to have been either drawn from

them, or as he says some writers have affirmed, been adopted
55
into them.
Martin, in his discussion of the history of
Marine insurance, sees no good reason to doubt the authenticity
of the Ohronyk.

and presents a forceful argument when he says

that if there is no evidence that has come down to us in Confir

mation, neither has there been any to disprove the statements,
and there is an extreme probability that far seeing merchants

of the Hanseatic League should have devised the institution of
56
modern insurance.
In the evolutionary development of risk bearing by

insurance, a degree of continuity is to be found in the field of
marine coverage.

In the Laws of Wisby, however, a mutation

develops, in that in addition to ship or merchandise, the life

55. Mason, op. cit., p. 71.
56. Martin, op. cit., p. 6.
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of the master of the ship is made the subject of insurance.
Here for the first time we find in the law a definite provis
ion for effecting insurance upon the life of an individual.

That the idea of life insurance may have developed from this
beginning is not an unreasonable supposition.

There is in

1641 an English case that would intimate that the practice
here provided for was adopted by the English.

It had to do

with recovering under a policy effected upon the life of the

captain of a vessel during a voyage he was about to make to

the West Indies.

The contract had been effected in the same

manner as an ordinary shipping policy, and suggests an early
57
connection between marine and life insurance.
It would
have been a simple and reasonable sequence for insurance upon

lives to develop as a form of protection entirely apart from

marine insurance or marine hazards.

If such a development

can be recognized, it takes as its point of departure Article

66 of the Laws of the Merchants and Masters of the Magnificent

city- of Wisby.
The legal evidence now takes us to the other end of

the continent.

The first definite ordinances concerning marine

insurance come to us from Spain.

57. Angell, op. cit., p. 388.

The Magistrates of Barcelona
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on four separate occasions during the fifteenth century promul
gated ordinances dealing directly with the subject of ma,rine
58
insurance, dating respectively 1436, 1458, 1461 and 1484.

These-laws are designed, not to make provision for effecting

insurance, but rather recognizing its existence, are designed
to secure its full benefits for the community, to prevent over
insurance, and to eliminate fraudulent transactions.

59

The earliest of these ordinances to be found affords
evidence of the existence of older regulations dealing with

marine insurance that have been shown through the passing of
time, and other circumstances to be defective and inexpedient.

A translation of this ordinance in Spanish from the original in
Catalan ri® in the records of the city of Barcelona.

The evi

dence of the earlier laws is found in the preamble:-

"Oomo las ordenanzas hechas para los seguros
maritimas y mercantiles que se hacen en Barcelona
sobre generos y mercaderias de vasallos del Senor Rey,
y se cargan en navios o fustas de extrangeros, prohiben
que ninguna persona pueda asegurar en ellos sino la
mitad del ooste; y atendieno al tiempo que oorre y a
otros respectos, no son practicables en provecho de la
causa publica, antes necesitan de coreccion y enmienda."
60.
The date of the earliest appearance of marine insurance in
Spain is therefore shrouded in uncertainty, but antidates by a

58. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 35.
59. Martin, op. cit., p. 25.
60. Quoted by Duer, op, cit., p. 34, note (c).
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considerable period the law of 1436.
The insurance ordinances of Barcelona are of especial

interest, not only because they furnish evidence that marine

insurance was known and practiced in Spain at this early date,
but they likewise throw a light upon the understanding that

these people had of the real purpose of insurance.

With the

view of eliminating fraud, numerous clauses were inserted in
the laws prohibiting insurance for full value, but leaving some
61
of the risk upon the insured.
Likewise the principle of

With the advent of marine insur

indemnity was recognized.

ance as a separate contract, it immediately became possible
for the owner of a vessel to insure it for full value, then
borrow a like amount by means of a bottomry contract.

Having

no investment in the ship, a loss would mean to the owner a

return of double its value, less expenses for insurance and
for fitting out the voyage.

The loss of the ship would be a

decidedly profitable happening for its owner under such circum

stances.^

Steps were taken to make this situation impossible.

The Barcelona ordinance of 1436 provided

that if anyone borrowed

on bottomry, in estimating the interest of the owner these loans

first must be deducted.

The law further placed a limit of

insurance that might be obtained at three-fourths the value of

61. Martin, op. cit., p. 25.
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62
the ship, from which again must be deducted, all loans on bottomry.
Here, so far as the records are a guide, we have the first

effort made to limit the amount to be collected by the assured

in the event of the happening of the contingency insured against,
to a sum not in excess of the actual loss sustained.

These

old ordinances of Barcelona coincided, in their provisions re
garding the payment of losses, to the modern theory that insur
ances is designed solely for indemnity.
In these ordinances we meet a further regulation that

is of interest as marking a step forward in the development of

insurance.

For the first time we find in the law evidence cf

steps taken to prevent the issuance of wager policies.

Under

writers were required to make oath that the “insurances are real

and not fictitious," and were forbidden to use the words in their

contracts, "value more or less, or done or not done" —vsleguen
63
mes o menys, o haje o no haje.
Here we have an ordinance
concerning the important principle now incorporated into modern

insurance law, that the insured must have an insurable interest

in the property covered.

It may be added here, that the prin

ciple fell into disuse, and gambling policies, where there was

no insurable interest whatever on the part of the assured, were

62. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 338.
63. Martin, op. cit., p. 24.
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a common practice for many years after.

The existence of

these early regulations in Barcelona, however, furnish illumi
nating evidence of the degree of understanding of the aims and

purposes of insurance possessed at this time.

7ith the ordinances of Barcelona in the fifteenth

century we find marine insurance an established institution.
By the way of confirmation and evidencing the extent of its
use,

there are records of decrees bearing upon the subject of

insurance from Venice that in point of time ante-date the earliest
of the recorded ordinances of Barcelona, though as has been stated
the earliest of these Spanish ordinances recorded are not the

first.

The Venitian decrees, while not strictly insurance

regulations, in the sense of making provisions regulating the

contract, as do the Spanish ordinances, nevertheless are con

cerned with the subject matter of insurance, and demonstrate

beyond a doubt the existance of an insurance system among the
Venitians at the dawn of the fifteenth century.

The earliest

of these documents is a manuscript act in Latin, dated May 15,
1411, and refers to insurance as an established practice.

The

purpose of the act is to prohibit the inhabitants and citizens

of Venice from making insurance contracts on foreign vessels.

It is pointed out that the insurers cannot have information
concerning the condition of foreign ships, or of the merchandise
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upon them, yet influenced by the hope of small profits,

incur the risk of great loss.

they

After setting a date, beyond

which such contracts were no longer to be effected, for -those
who failed to comply with the degree severe penalties were pro

vided.

Another document dated June 1424, refers to the state

of war existing between the Genoese and Catalonians, and the
Florentines and the Genoese.

- It then states that the custom

in Venice of insuring foreign property .may be the means of in
volving the state in these wars,and citizens, subjects, or

allies of Venice are therefore prohibited, under penalty of for
feiting twenty-five percent of the value of the thing he has
64
insured, from making such contracts.
A comparison of the decrees of Venice, and the ordinan

ces of Barcelona furnish us no evidence as to which of the

countries were first to practice insurance.

In both instances

the earliest of the records supply evidence that insurance was
then an institution of long standing.

The trade of Barcelona,

was at the time of the promulgation of the early insurance or
dinances, carried on principally with Italy, and presumably there

was an exchange of ideas concerning the practice of insurance
between the two countries.

The insurance ordinances of Barcelona

were followed before the close of the century with the promulgation

64. Hopkins, A Manual of Marine Insurance, p. 20-21.
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of similar legislation in Venice.
Nor is it to be supposed.,

that the practice of insur

ance thus evidenced, in these two countries was beyond any doubt

limited to the Mediterranean.

A mercantile practice of Venice

was certain to find its way to England, because the Italians,
or Lombards, as they were known, had already secured a strong
foothold in England and were competing commercially with the
65
powerful Hanseatic League of the North.
Presumably, by
this time marine insurance had spread through the lanes of

commerce, and was well known and commonly used by merchants and

ship owners throughout the whole of continental Europe.
Up to this point we have been concerned with examining

the evidence to be found in the law.

Useful in indicating the

degree of development of the insurance contract, the law, how
ever, offers us but little help in determining its time and
place of origin.

We are interested in this point and must

turn for assistance to historical opinion.

The oldest treatise in a modern language dealing with
the subject matter of insurance is that entitled Le Guidion' de

la Mer, published in 1671 by Oleriac, a learned French jurist,
in the second part of his work on the usages and customs of the

65. Mason, op. cit., p. 71-72.
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sea.

(Us et Ooutoumes de la.Mer.)

No account is given by

Oleriac of the author or origin of the work.

Dr. Duer is of

the opinion, basing his conclusion upon the character of the

style, and other internal evidence, that it was probably written
close to the end of the century preceeding its publication in

Oleriac's work.

This is in agreement with Pardessus and

others who fix the date between 1590 and 1600, making Rouen
66
the place of issue.
Concerning the authorship of Le Guidion,
the theory has been advanced that it probably was not the work
of a single individual but the combined labor of a group, possibly
an association of underwriters such as Lloyds, who prepared a

code for the benefit of themselves and the public as well.
References to insurance in the Guidion are many, and
there is evidence that at the time of its appearance marine

insurance was in general practice on the continent of Europe
67
as well as in England.
Oleriac states of it "that it was

originally composed for the use of the Merchants of Rouen, and

is so complete in itself, that it fully explains all that is

necessary to know on the subject of marine contracts and naval
commerce; and that nothing is wanting to it but the author's
68
name."

Olaeriac, in his commentary upon the first article of
Le Guidion, gives us the earliest statement in any work on in66. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 45.
67. Martin, op. cit., p. 41, ff.
68. Marshall, op. cit.,v. 1, p.22.
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surance concerning its origin.

He asserts that insurance

was invented by the Jews, who when they were expelled from
France by Philip Augustus in the year 1182, sought and found

refuge in Italy.

This opinion is founded, he says, upon a

statement in the universal history of Giovanni Villani, who
according to Dr. Duer, died at an advanced age in 1348 " the
69
most justly celebrated of the early Florentine historians."

Oleriac’s theory, based upon Villani*s statement, is that the

Jews in transporting their effects from France to Italy, devised
the insurance idea to protect themselves from loss.

They

accomplished this by making the payment of a presentt called a

premium, the consideration to the insurers for assuming all the
risks of the voyage.

It is his idea that the Italians and

Lombards, who were spectators of the Jewish transactions, pre

served the forms of the instruments used, and afterwards adopted
70
them in their own commercial undertakings.
Marshall in his Treatise on the Law of Insurance,

com

menting on the opinion thus advanced by Oleriac, states that
although adopted by so respectable a writer, it carries very
71
little of the air of probability.
Duer, on the other hand,

69. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 29.
70. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 4.
71. Ibid..v. 1, p. 4.
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relying upon the evidence of Villani, in whom he places the
greatest confidence, agrees with Cleirac that it would have

been a most reasonable thing for the aBtute and sagacious Jews
to have resorted to the idea of insurance in protecting them72
selves while transferring their property.
It may be added,

however, that regardless of the soundness of this theory of

the origin of insurance, it cannot be questioned that the in
stitution of insurance was known in Italy at the time of
Villani’s work, and had already been in existence for a con
siderable period of time.

Another hypothesis concerning the beginning of the
insurance contract as used in modern times was advanced by
Vilagut, a docter of canon law, in his treatise De Usuris

published in Venice in 1589, and involves a consideration of
the teachings of the church concerning interest.

The corpus

juris canonici, prohibited interest, though from the teachings

of St. Thomas Aquinas ( 1227 - 1274) it will be seen that

certain exceptions were made.

Apparently the payment made for

bottomry loans, where the risks attaching to the venture fested

upon the lender, were not included in the prohibitions relating

to interest, and in the latter Middle Ages the doctrine that

72. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 30.

164

73
risk justified interest payments became well established.

Bottomry, which was the insurance vehicle for carrying marine

risks, until the insurance contract was developed, was there
fore considered permisBable and a high rate of interest in
such cases legitimate.

In 1234, however, a decree was pro

mulgated by Pope Gregory IX which declared:"Naviganti vel eunti ad Nundinas certam mutuans
percuniae quantitatem pro eo quod suscipit in se
periculum, recepturus aliquid ultra sortem, usurarius
est censendus." 74

This decree created an entirely new situation.

Alauzet, a

French writer commenting upon this decree states that while
some grammatical doubts were at first raised as to its true

interpretation, it was soon understood to be a total prohibit
ion of loans on bottomry and respondentia as usurious, and he
adds that it was for the purpose of evading this prohibition,

by separating the assumption of the risk from the loan of the

money, that the contract of insurance was invented.
With this theory advanced by Alauzet, Dr. Duer is

not inclined to agree.

While admitting that the quotations

of passages from the early writers cited by Alauzet give to
his hypothesis "an air of great probability", he nevertheless

believes that if the decree of Gregory IX gave rise to the
invention of the contract of insurance the fact would have been

73. Spann, History of Economics, p. 27-8.
74. Quoted by Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 31.
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notorious.

He further objects that if the decree had been an

authoritative interdiction of the church and if the practice of
bottomry were ever discontinued, why was it so soon revived as
to become almost universal in every country in Europe subject

to Papal sway, with no evidence that would point to a modificat
ion or revocation of the decree of Gregory.
however,

Alauzet states,

that soon after publication, by reference to the con

text of the entire document, it was apparent that the true

meaning intended was "usurarius non est censendus11. the important

word non having been omitted by mistake.

75

If this were true,

then the decree instead of condeming the practice of bottomry

was designed specifically to

exempt it from the usuary prohib

itions, presumably intending to give expression in a decree to

an exemption that custom and precident had previously sanctioned.
It is possible,

then, to answer Dr. Duer’s objection that the

practice of bottomry spread throughout the nations under Papal
sway, following the promulgation of the decree of Gregory, with

the assumption that when the decree was finally understood, it

was interpreted as a specific permission to take interest for
loans on bottomry.

At the same time, the hypothesis that the

decree was the immediate cause for developing a contract for

75. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 32.
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risk bearing without the advancing of a loan is equally tentable.

If the decree as originally promulgated inadvertently stated

that such loans were condemned when it was the intention to

state that they ^ere not condemned as usurious, then a period
of doubt and uncertainty must have followed, and during that
period the contraot for risk bearing without the attendant loan
could have been developed.

Whether or not the decree of Gregory IX was actually
the immediate cause of the development of the insurance contract,

it is not unreasonable to believe that the pressure exerted

against money lending by regulations against usury were instrum
ental in bringing it about.

Shakespeare has protrayed for us

in the figure of Shylock, the position of the money lender.

The business of money lending in Christian countries was regarded
as illegitimate, and those engaged in it despised aB usurors.
The fact that there were certain exceptions made to the rule

prohibiting interest would hardly succeed in removing the stigma
that attached to the business, and as long as the Church regul
ations were interpreted to prohibit interest taking, most of the

business of money lending was carried on by the Jews and other
non-Chrisitans.

With the development of commercial enterprise, and
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the increasing use of money for the purposes of production,
the difference between usury and interest was brought out in the
Papal decrees.

The crime of usury was limited to consumption

loans at exorbitant rates, while Pope Innocent IV (d 1254)
defined as legitimate a charge for the use of commercial and

industrial capital, if risk of loss or sacrifice of gains were
76
an element of the transaction.
With this distinction

clearly understood, there was a tendency for the Lombards and
other Christians to engage in the business of lending money

for productive purposes, leaving the smaller personal loans
to the Jews.

With the dawn of the thirteenth century the

civil laws in Italy began to distinguish loans on the basis
of risk.

There was permitted first the simple charge of in

terest, that might be compared to the pure interest rate of

modern economic theory.

To this might be added a charge for

perdictable risks, and lastly a charge for the varying risks
that attach to any business undertaking.

77

This emphasis

upon risk and the charge therefor tended to place a decided

measure upon the cost of its assumption.

It was but a step

from this point for merchants, who borrowed on bottomry for the

protective feature, when they required no financial assistance,

76. Knight, Barnes and Flugel, op. cit., p. 115.
77. Ibid.,p. 119.
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to pay for the protective feature without taking the loan.

And the Lombards, described by a contemporary poet as:

" A

nation clever, sagacious, prudent, active, adroit, far seeing
in council, learned in the science of laws and right,1’^®
might be expected to see the advantages of the insurance con

tract, and provide a means for taking the step.

Regardless of the date of the introduction of the

contract in the other nations of Europe, weight must be given
to the hypothesis that the contract originated in Italy.

As

already suggested, it is of course possible that the Lombards
were not the absolute originators of the idea, but to them at
least the credit seems due for introducing it throughout the

continent.

During the Middle Ages the spread of commercial

institutions was from the south to the north.

As early as

the twelfth century the Papal collectors had penetrated to the
remote parts of northwestern Europe, and were instrumental in

disseminating the financial ideas of the south.

the only carriers of the Italian influence.

Nor were they

The Italian

merchants followed the travelling markets of fairs of Northern

France, Germany, and England, and they were accompnaied by the
Lombard money changers.

Expanding their operations
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throughout the continent during the thirteenth century, the

Lombards became powerful financiers and their influence was
In the hands of their colony in London rested the

great.

foreign trade of the kingdom, and to them tradition ascribes
on
the introduction of insurance to England.

Added to tradition is a powerful argument from
etymology.

The word policy which is uded today to designate

the name of the written insturment containing the contract
r

comes to us from the Italian.

The word in the English lan

guage, or in any other language than the Itadian, has no meaning
save that arbitrarily ascribed to it.

Polizza, the Italian

word from ★hioh policy is derived is used as the name of a con
tract in writing that furnishes evidence of, or creates a legal

obligation.

Hence its application to the insurance contract

by the Italians was perfectly correct, though it was by no
means limited in its meaning to such contracts alone, and

applied equally well to a promissory note, bill of exchange,
or other similar document.

The term has been carried out

of the Italian as a name for the insurance contract, and it is
to be interpreted as meaning that when the Italians introduced

the insurance idea they designated the agreement a polizza, and

80. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 33.
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the Italian term was accepted and used to designate that parti
cular type of contract, the insurance agreement.
As there is no absolute certainty as to the place of
origin of insurance, so the time of its beginning is likewise

shrouded in uncertainty.

We know that a custom of merchants

can exist for many years before the usage becomes a matter of

formal law.
31
prevail.

Such customs have the force of law where they
It is reasonable to presume that insurance was

known as a custom among merchants for a long period
became the subject of formal legislation.

before it

The evidence from

the laws, and from the historians, however, is not to be doubted,

and we can with reasonable certainty fix the time'of the appear82
ance of insurance as not later than the close of the twelfth
83
or the beginning of the thirteenth century.
Likewise, a
preponderance of evidence favors the conclusion that the idea
originated with the Italians.

81. Marshall, op, cit., v. 1, p. 19.
82. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 18.
83. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 28.
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CHAPTER V.

PERIOD OF FINAL DEVELOPMENT, 1500 - 1720.

1. Marine Insurance.

The arrival of the sixteenth century found, that in
the maritime nations the practice of marine insurance had be

come general , and. its principles well understood..

In that

earliest treatise on the subject of insurance, Le Guidion de

la mer, to which reference has already been made, it indicates
that at the time of its publication marine insurance was known
1
and practiced in France, Spain, Italy, Flanders and England.
For many years after the turn of the century, insur

ance underwriting had not become a specialized business, but
was carried on by merchants who from time to time committed
themselves to risks by subscribing policies as a side line to
their other affairs.

In England the early policies were

issued in this manner, and just as the insurers were merchants,

so the business of insurance was in the hands of the sworn

brokers who acted as the merchants’ agents in the buying and
selling goods.

It was the custom, though not followed in

1. Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 309;

Marshall, op, cit.,v.1, p.22.
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every instance, to have the policies drawn up and attested by
2
a notary,
Lombard street seems to have been the headquart
ers for merchants engaged in taking marine risks,

though there

appears to have been no particular control of centralization
3
of facilities.
From the regulations governing the conduct of the

business of insurance to be found in Le Guidion, it is apparent
that at the time the treatise was compiled, the business in
Rouen was likewise in the hands of numerous underwriters, with

out any centralized place of doing business.

Some centralizat

ion was to be found in the provision for a registrar of policies,
who it was provided must establish his place of business in a

frequented location, and display over his.door a sign reading
"Office of Insurances".

He, it was specified, must be of good

reputation, well acquainted with the details of insurance, and
have a knowledge of book-keeping, so that he might enter and
keep a list of the policies submitted to him, and he further was

required to keep his office open during the entire day, with

either himself or a clerk always in attendance.

The underwriters,

however, were not in any central location, for it was provided
that whenever a policy was offered to the registrar for completion,

2. Wright and Fayle, History of Lloyds, p. 35.
3. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 33.
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it must be carried to all of the underwriters in a specified

order, so that all might have an opportunity to participate in
4
the venture.
It may be fairly presumed that these rules,
drawn up for the regulation of the business of marine insurance

at Rouen, fairly depict the customary manner of carrying on the

business of insurance in the other maritime nations of Europe.
Because of the uncertainty of the date of Le Guidion

we are in doubt as to when in the sixteenth century the recorded
of insurance first made his appearance.

We do know that in

England during the entire first half of the century underwriters

were scattered, and the business of insurance unorganized and in
the hands of merchants and their brokers.

At the same time the

importance of the business is not to be minimized.

In fact it

was so widely practiced, and commonly known that Lord Bacon in
1548, in opening Elizabeth's first parliament said:- "Dofh not

the wise merchant, in every adventure of danger, give part to
5
have the rest insured? "
So far as there is any information,
the business as carried on.proved itself adequate to the needs

of commerce.
At this point we must mention the establishment of the

Royal Exchange, destined for many years to be an important factor
in the insurance field.

A triumph of the labors and planning

of the famed Sir Thomas Gresham, the first Royal Exchange was

4. Martin, op. cit., p. 41. ff.
5. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, p. 4 ,

174

dedicated by Queen Elizabeth on January 23, 1571, and marked a

long step in freeing English business from the domination of

the Lombardy men, and the Hanseatic traders of the Steelyard.
The Hanseatic traders, known as Easterlings, or Emperor’s men

had for the greater part of five centuries following the reign

of Edward the Confessor, secured a stranglehold upon British
commerce.

This group of traders in London lived upon a monas

tic plan, never married, nor were allowed even to visit any

person of the opposite sex, took all meals in common and sub
mitted themselves to a strict government.

They owned great

yards and buildings on the bank of the Thames, known as the
Staplehof.

This was eventually contracted to Staelhof. and

-anglicized into Stillyards, and finally into the Steel yard.

To break the power of the foreign influence, and at the same
time adopt their business methods was part of the far seeing
6
design of Gresham in establishing his new exchange.
The idea of the exchange was not original with Sir

Thomas.

The question had often been considered, and the

father of Sir Thomas, Sir Richard Gresham had for many years
advocated the erection of an exchange in London.

In the time

of Henry VIII, plans were considered for the erection of a Burse,

6. Mason, op. cit.. j>p 11. ff.
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but sentiment was at that time adverse. '

The merchants pre

ferred to meet and conduct their business on the cobbles of

Lombard street.
In 1571, however, Greshams exchange became a fact.

It became at once the meeting place of merchants, and when the
power of the Steelyard was eventually broken, became the import

ant business center of London.

During the day merchants and

others interested in business congregated there, and their disputes
were;: adjusted, and the negotiations fof new transactions com

pleted.

The fast developing business of insurance, carried on

among the merchants of Lombard street, gravitated toward the
center of business activity that the exchange created.

While

the underwriting continued in the hands of individual merchants

for many years, the floor of the Royal Exchange was destined to
become a center for effecting insurance contracts.

This first

Royal Exchange, built under the guidance of Gresham, and dedicated
by Elizabeth continued for ninety years an important center in

the business life of London.
7
great fire.

It was destroyed in 1666 by the

Following the establishment of the Royal Exchange as

a center for merchants for carrying on their business negotiations,
including in their other affairs the business of insurance, there

7. Mason, op. cit.. p. 13 - 26
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appeared, in the year 1574, or thereabouts, a new development

Apparently sensing an opportunity for securing

in the field.

a profitable inonoply for himself, one Richard Candeler, obtained

from the Queen a patent granting to him and his deputies the
sole right of making and registering policies of all kinds, as

well as other instruments of insurance, made upon ships or upon
merchandise.

In the preamble of the patent, reasons to justify

the grant were set forth.

Because of the secrecy possible in

securing a policy, dishonest or unscrupulous persons were able

to buy insurance from more than one source and thereby defraud
8
the insurers.
Attached to the grant was the proviso that
whenever reform of the office thus established was deemed nec
essary, suit might be made to the Queen or her Council, and
9
Candeler was to conform to their orders.

Immediately there were objections.

The notaries

petitioned against the grejnt of the patent on the ground that
it threatened their business.

their objection.

The brokers likewise voiced

As a result of the opposition there was

appointed a commission of inquiry into the proposed Office of
Assurances.

The commission, however, confined itself to fix

ing the rqtes to be charged for registrations and other services,
10
without interfering with the monoply.

8. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 35-6.
9. Walford, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 486
10. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 36.
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In the early days of the development of insurance,

the courts seemed to be particularly free from disputes arising
out of the interpretation of insurance policies.

The first

case upon insurance to be found in any book of reports was

mentioned by Lord Coke in Dowdale's Case decided in 1588.

An action,it appears, was brought on a policy covering a ship
from Maicombe Regis to Abbeville.

The loss alleged arose

out of the detention of the ship by the King of France in the
River Soane.

In the course of the action the defnndant con

tended that because the detention arose out of the realm, the
12
case could not be tried in London.
It was held that:-

" where as well the contract as the performance of it is wholly

made or to be done beyond the sea, it is not triable under our
law, but if the promise be made in England it shall be tried."

13

It seemed at that time to be the prevailing idea, however, that

disputes arising out of the contract of insurance should be

settled by special tribunals rather than by appeal to the courts.
The first English statute relating to the subject of

insurance is the famous 43. Elizabeth, ch. 12, which has for its

purpose the establishment of a tribunal, before which disputes

arising out of the insurance contract might be heard and settled.

11. Elliott, op. cit.. p. 8.
12. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 24.
13. Elliott, op, cit,, p. 8.
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Provision was made for the establishment of a Standing Commission
for the trial of such cases, to be renewed yearly by the Lord

Chancellor or the Lord Keeper.

It was provided that both the

Judge of the Admiralty Court, and the Recorded of London, were
to be ex officio members of the Commission.
commissioners,

Of the remaining

there were to be included two Doctors of Civil

Law, two common lawyers, and eight merchants.

commissioners were to constitute a quorum.

Five of the

The findings of

the commission were not final, but provision waB made for an

appeal to the Court of Chancery.

The act is of interest, representing the first English

legislation in the field of insurance.

The wording of its pre

amble is especially significant and worthy of quotation, indicat

ing as it does a recognition not only of the great antiquity of
the business of insurance, but also an understanding of its
benefits.

In it we find the following:"Whereas it ever hathe bene the policie of this realme
by all good meanes to comforte and encourage the
merchante,
---- And whereas it has bene tyme out of
mynde an usage amongste merchantes, both of this realme
and of forraine nacyons, when they make any great
adventure (speciallie into remote partes) to give some
consideration of money to other persons (which commonlie
are in noe small number) to have from them assurance
made of their ^oodes, merchandizes, ships and things
adventured, or some parte thereof, at suche rates and
in suche sort as the parties assurers and the parties
assured can agree, which course of dealinge is commonlie
termed a policie of assurance; by means of whiche
policie of assurance it commethe to passe that upon the
losse or perishinge of any shippe there followethe not
the undoinge of any man, but the loss lightethe rather

easilie upon many than heavilie upon fewe, and r;
upon them that adventure not than those that doe
adventure, whereby all merchantes, speciallie th
younger sorte, are allured to venture more willii
and more freely.
14
Not only does the wording of the statute establish beyond

doubt that insurance as a business had long been in existe:

in England when the statute was passed, so long in fact th;
its origin was lost to memmory, but it also puts forth in
suscint terms an appraisal of the economic effect of risk,

the benefits that are to be derived from the device of ins

designed to shift the burden of the risk through effecting

dispersion of the losses.
The act then refers to the custom that had been f
ed previous to the passing of the statute in settling cont

sies, and call attention to a new tendency in the following
"And whereas heretofore suche assurers have used
stande so justile and preciselie upon their credi
as few or no controversies have risen thereupon,
if any have growen the same have from tyme to tym
bene ended and ordered by certaine grave and disc
merchantes, appointed by the Lorde Mayor of the 0
of London, as men by reason of their experience
fitteste to understands and speedilie to decide t
causes, untill of late years that divers persons
withdrawn themselves from that arbitrarie course,
have sought to drawe the parties assured to seeke
moneys of everie several assurer, by suites comme
in her Majesties courts, to their greate charges
delaye8; For remedie whereof be it enacted by the
authoritie of the presente Parliamente:15

14. Quoted by Martin, op. cit., p. 11. ff.
15. Quoted by Martin, op. clt~7, p. 11'. ff.
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Next the act proceeds to authorize the Lord Chancellor, and

the Lord Keeper of the great seal to appoint the commission
already described.

Here through this act was created in effect a per
manent board of arbitration to settle disputes arising out of

policies of insurance.

The commission thus established, how

ever, did not meet with great success, and its decisions have
left no mark on the law of insurance.
confined to London,

Its jurisdiction was

and took cognizance only of insurance on

merchandise, and considered only the claims of the assured.

A further limitation of its scope was found in the fact that
it recognized only policies registered with the Office of
Assurances, thereby helping to perpetuate the monoply of
16
Oandeler and his successors.
Because so many withdrew
themselves from its remedies, the court finally fell into disuse, and was ultimately discontinued.

17

With reference to the Office of Assurances, while

its grant provided a monoply on the registering of policies,
all policies issued were by no means registered in this office.

As a matter of actual practice there were many policies Issued

16. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Vol.3, p.74-5.
17. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. p. 38.
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for individuals by the underwriters without recourse to the
registration privileges of the Office of Assurances.
18
Office eventually dissapeared around 1688.

The

We may now temporarily leave the development of
insurance in England.

For our purpose it would suffice, to

trace the contributions to the science of insurance as they

make their appearance in England.

Nevertheless, because of

the light they throw upon the status of insurance when the
seventeenth century is drawing to a close, we are interested
in giving some attention to the insurance section contained

in that justly famous code, the Ordonnance de la Marine, of

Louis XIV., published in 1681.

The Ordonnance de la Marine was probably the first
19

complete code of maritime and commercial law ever attenpted.

Its scope is sufficiently broad to cover the entire range of
maritime law including insurance.

Compiled under the direct

ion and patronage of Colbert, the celebrated minister of Louis
XIV, it is,said the distinguished jurist Kent, a "monument of

the reign of Louis XIV, far more durable and more glorious
than all the military trophies won by the valor of his armies."

When we consider its originality and the extent of its design,,

la. Hopkins, op. cit.. p. 32.
19. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 43.
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says tiie learned. Duer, and consider the ability with which it

is executed, " we shall not hesitate to admit, that it deserves
to be ranked among the noblest works that legislative genius
20
and learning 'have yet accomplished."
Vallin has written

a commentary upon the ordinance which, says Kent, almost rivals

the ordinance itself in the weight of its authority as well as
in the equity of its conclusions.

Commenting upon-the laws,

Vallin states that universal administration was excited by the

appearance of an ordinance "so beautiful in its economical dis
tribution, so wise in its general and particular policy; so
correct and exact in its divisions; and so learned that it pre
sents as many abridged treatises of jurisprudence as there are
21
subjects which it embraces."
From the Ordonnanoe de la
Marine we date the modern system of maritime and commercial law.

22

A long section of the code is devoted to the subject of insurance,

and these statutes form the basis of the present French law upon
*
23
the subject.

Nor was the influence of the Ordonnanoe de la Marine

confined to French law.
known and recognized.

20.
21.
22.
23.

The influence upon English law is
The English nation never had any general

Kent, Commentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 15.
Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 312.
Halleck, International Law, p. 11.
Elliott, op. cit., p. 3.
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and formally enacted code of maritime law promulgated by legis

lative authority, such as this code of Louis XIV, and the older
codes effected by other of the European maritime nations.

The

deed was supplied first by a number of compilations of existing

laws, and supplimented with numerous decisions based upon find24
Ings in the older European codes.
Here mention must be
made of that great and distinguished juror, Lord Mansfield,
whose work was so largely instrumental in shaping the maritime

law, and the law of insurance in Great Britain.

Finding little

in the way of help in the English common law, he turned to the
foreign codes and authorities.

25

Early in his judicial

career he brought to the notice of the English Bar the Rhodian
Laws, the Oonsolato del mare, the Roles D*Oleron, the treatises
of Roecus, the Laws of Wisby, and above all the then famous

Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV.

Commentary of Vallin.

with -tehe■equally netable

These authorities were cited by him

in Luke v. Luke (2 Burr. 882) and a new direction was given to
the development of English law.

26

The Ordonnance of Louis XiV

containing a digest of the older usages and customs was frequently

24. Kent, Commentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 18.
25. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 28.
26. Kent, op, cit.. v. 3, p. 19.
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cited in subsequent cases, as was also the Commentary of Vallin.

The English text books of law, based as they were upon the de
cisions of the courts, were thereby directly influenced by the
27
provisions of this French code.
We are here interested in the sections of the code

dealing with insurance, for by their means we are enabled to

judge the long strides that had been taken in the development
of the business of insurance up to the time when the code was

promulgated.

The regulations are specific, and in the light

of any insurance legislation that had preceeded them, surpris
ingly complete.

In the beginning of that division of the code devoted
to the subject of insurance, after authorizing both subjects

and foreigners to insure "ships, goods, and other effects that
may be carried by sea, or navigable rivers," the insurers are
then authorized to fix the price to be charged for’ assuming the
28
risk.
In other words rates are to be made by the insurers.

Next in order are several regulations covering the

policy contract.

It is provided that the agreement be drawn

up in writing, but it may be executed without notarial verifi
cation.

A subsequent section prohibits under penalties named,

27. Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 313,
28. Ordonnance de la Marine. Division "Of Insurances" quoted by
Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 310, sec. 1.
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any clerk, secretary qf an insurance chamber, notary, or broker,

from having a policy underwritten in which there were any places
left blank.

Nor were they, themselves, to be concerned either

directly or indirectly in insurances.

There are enumerated

detailed information the policy must contain.

First comes the

name, and place of residence of the insured, with a statement

as to whether the person who is securing the insurance is act
ing in the capacity of owner of the insured goods, or broker.
Next in order after naming the property to be ooveE^dc by the

insurance, the name of the vessel and the master are required,
as well as the port of loading, the port- of destination, points
the ship will touch, the time of the beginning and ending of the
risk, the amount of insurance, the premium, and other details

that may be pertinent or agreed upon.

A declaration was re

quired that any disputes be settled by arbitration.

Here we

find enumerated the essential details to be included in the

policy when drawn up, including the arbitration clause that
29
finds its place in the present day policy of insurance.

Following the regulations governing the drawing up

of the policy, there are several sections dealing with except
ions or specific points.

Without enumerating them all, mention

29. Ordonnanoe de la Marine, sec. 2 - 8.
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may be made of authorization to effect insurance against cap

tivity and slavery, though insurance upon lives was specifi

cally prohibited.

It was forbidden masters to insure the

freight money their vessel might earn, and merchants were like

wise prohibited from insuring profits.

To this day, profits

are not included in measuring a loss under a property insurance

policy, though there has now been devised a policy specifically
30
covering profits.
31
Reinsurance is expressly declared lawful.
nVhile
in times past subject to many abuses, reinsurance is now recog
nized as an important factor in the conduct of the business of

insurance, and is in effect a contract entered into by an

assurer, in order to secure relief from risks to which he no

longer desires to be committed.

By this means he transfers

a part, or all of a burden to the shoulders of other, under
writers, who are called reinsurers.

The principle of Indemnity was recognized by the code.

It was provided that if a policy were made without fraudelent

intent, but for an amount in excess of the actual value of the
goods insured, in case of loss the insurers were liable only

for the value of the goods lost, and the underwriters were to
contribute to the loss pro-rata.

30. Ibid., sec. 9 - 16.
31. Ibid., sec. 20-22.

A difference in procedure
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from that now practiced, under our law was followed in the event
that the insurance was written in several policies.

Instead of

all contributing pro-rata to the loss, as would now be the case
in this country, the policies in meeting the loss are to be

exhausted in the order of their issue, and those that represent

an insurance in excess of the value of the goods insured 4® not

contribute.

The law provided that such insurers as do not con

tribute shall withdraw and return all but a small per-centage of
33
the premium.
The risks insured against, and for which under the

law the insurers were liable, included loss from ’’tempest, ship
wreck, stranding, running foul of other ships, changing the

course or the voyage of the ship; jettison, fire, capture, plun

dering, detention of princes, declaration of war, reprisals,

and generally all other accidents of the sea.”

33

It was pro

vided, however, that if a change of course was made by order
of the insured without consent of the insurers,

the insurers

This rule is extended to other losses that
34
may happen through act or fault of the assured.
Under

are not liable.

modern practice, deviation from a specified route, certain
instances being excepted, will void the policy.

33. Ibid., . sec. 33-35.
33. Ibid., sec. 36.
34. Ibid., sec. 37.
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hand modern insurance law does not recognize negligence as a

ground for voiding the policy, but allows indemnity to the
assured for loss by the peril named, in spite of contributing
35
negligence on the part of himself or others.

The doctrine of concealment was made operative by the

code.

This doctrine, briefly stated, recognizes that the

subject of the contract of insurance is a chance, and that both
parties must contract with reference to the same chance.

Under

this doctrine, facts, material to the risk, known to one party

only, must be made known to the other party.

If the under

writer, by some- means or other knows that the voyage is ended

safely, it would quite clearly be a fraud for him to accept a

On the other hand, if the ship be
36
already lost, insurance would be likewise fraudelent.
The

premium for insuring it.

Ordonnanoe takes particular cognizance of such contracts, and
declares them void if made after a loss that the insurer knew

of, or after an arrival that had been made known to the insurer.
And it was presumed that such information would feach the parties
concerned, if the neww could have been brought, allowing a lapse

of an hour for each league and a half of distance.

37

Elaborate instructions are given for reporting losses,
abandonment to the insurers, and the time within which losses

35. Richards, Fundamentals in the Law of Insurance, in The Fire
Insurance Contract, p~ 76.
36. Ibid., p. 75.
37. Ordonnanoe de la Marine, sec. 38-40 .
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38

may be presumed, to have occured.

Provision is made for

declaring insurance carried as well as bottomry loans in the
event of loss, and in the event of over insurance, where there

is any concealment the insurance is declared void, and the in
surance feature of the bottomry contract inoperative.

That

is the bottomry loans must be repaid, even though the ship be

taken or lost.

Exemplary punishment is provided for whoever

sues for the sum insured if it be above the value of the effects
39
insured, or the interest of the assured in them.

Provision is made for settling claims.

Methods are

named by which goods are to be valued, and for the care and dis40
position of goods detained or abandoned.
There are regulat
ions governing the business operations of brokers, notaries,

clerks and secretaries of chambers of insurance, having to do

particularly with the issuance of policies and their records.

41

Detailed procedure is lined out for carrying on the arbitration
42
of disputed-claims.
The attention which the Ordonnance gives

to these and other details is indicative not only of the scope
of the law, but also of the extent of the business of insurance

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

sec.
sec.
sec.
sec.
sec.

42-52.
53-55,
56-65.
68-69.
70-74.
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when the code was promulgated. ■
The interest of Louis XIV, and his advisers in the

field of insurance, was not confined to legislation, for in
1686 the King together with Colbert and Boucherat, signed a
decree establishing the creation of a Oompagnie Generale pour

les Assurances Grosses Aventures de France in the city of Paris.

(General Company for Insurances and Bottomry Bonds of France).
Here at this date we have the organization of the first stock

insurance company.

The importance of insurance was set forth

in the beginning of the edict.

The preamble and first article

are here quoted:-

"Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre,
dauphin of Viennois, Count of Valentinois and Dijois,
Provence, Forcalquier and adjacent lands, to all those
present and to come, GREETINGS.
"Since we have devoted outselves to the reestablish
ment of maritime commerce, the jurisprudence of which
we have established by various regulations and by our
decree of the month of August, 1681, several of our
subjects have concluded policies and contracts of in
surance with great advantage to themselves, thus avoid
ing large losses by means of the payment of modest
amounts to have their vessels and merchandise insured.
This has caused us to urge several merchants and others
versed in business to combine and form a General
Insurance Chamber, it. the form of a Company having a
common capital and signature, in order to amass a large
amount of money, so that merchants who wish to avail
themselves of this method of reducing the risks which
they incur in their ordinary business may do so and
continue their business with greater facility and safety.
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"For these reasons and others we have stated and
declaired, and we state and declair by these presents,
signed by our hand, what is our wish and pleasure.
”1. That there be established a Oompagnie Generale
des Assurances et Grosses Aventures in our good city
of Paris, at such place as the interested parties may
find most convenient, to constitute it the general
office for insurance business, hold the necessary
meetings there, and there to negotiate the business
of the company." 43

Following this, the decree fixed the number of associates

at thirty.

They were to have a capital stock of 300,000 livres,

divided into seventy-five shares of 4,000 livres each, and the
term for which the association was to function was fixed at ten

years.

Certain stipulations were inserted with reference to'

the policy that the company should.issue.

For example the

clause agreeing that disputes be submitted to arbitration was
required, though provision was made to regulate appeals.

Fees

were established for the registrar, and all persons but those
who were members of the association were forbidden to engage in
the business of insurance or bottomry in the city of Paris,

thereby creating a monoply for the company.

It was provided,

however, that merchants, traders, and others of the cities of

Rouen, Nantz, St. Malo, Rochelle, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Marseilles,

and others should be permitted to continue in the business of
insurance, but only upon the footing that existed previous to
the date of the edict.
43.

The association was permitted to

Quoted in General Fire Assurance Company of Paris.France.
1819 - 1919, p. 6.
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m'ake its own by-laws for the company's regulation, so long as
they were in conformity with the conditions specifically set
forth in the decree.

company.

Here was the first marine Insurance

Then?e were but thirty stockholders, and anyone

else who wished to engage in the business of insurance in Paris
in order to do so must first purchase the stock of some member
44
of the company.

There was an effort made to establish a great marine
insurance company in England, at a period considerably earlier

than the date of the establishment of the French company, but

the efforts seem to have been marked with no degree of success.
In 1660, the proposal was made by a group of individuals, with
a view to providing greater security and centralized facilities,
that a great corporation be established under royal patent for
45
the purpose of effecting insurance upon ships and cargoes.

The originators of the idea, in their estimates placed the
foreign trade of the country at seven million pounds a year,

and pointed out that if they secured even half this business at

.5$, they would have a premium income of one hundred seventy-five

thousand pounds.

As a capital to secure the assured, the pro

moters of the company were to raise a capital of a half million

44. Walford, op, cit., v. 4., p. 313.
45. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 40.
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pounds, to be deposited with the East India Company, or other

wise safely placed.
A favorable report was given the project by the Council

of Trade, upon two conditions.

These were that losses should

be paid without the abatements that were then customary, and
that no one should be prevented from insuring elsewhere.

Un

like the Frenoh company, there was here created no monoply.
This may have been the reason for allowing the project to fall

through.

Without a monoply the projectors were apparently un

willing to raise the necessary half million capital.

Whether

this was the reason, or some other, the company was never or

ganized, and the idea of a company for writing marine insurance
46
was not seriously brought forward for over a half century.
Following the dissapearance about 1688 of the Office

of Assurances created by the grant of Elizabeth in England,
the business of insurance to the end of the seventeenth century

was carried on in much the same manner as it had been under

Elizabeth before the establishment of the registry.

The in

surers, for the most part, were at this time merchants engaged

in other lines of business.
development.

There was, however, one noticeable

Whereas, in the time of Elizabeth, merchants

46. Wright and Fayle, op, cit.. p. 39.
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were the insurers, and the business was carried on largely by

the brokers who represented the merchants in other lines, by
the-beginning of the eighteenth century the business of insur
ance broker had become a specialized occupation.

Two marked defects in the system eventually forced

themselves to the attention of the commercial community, and
were instrumental in effecting the next steps in the evolution

The first short coming was to be found in

of the business.

the lack of any kind of a financial guarantee of stability on

the part of the underwriters.

They committed themselves, as

individuals, to a part of the risk insured by the various poli

cies.

And there was a number of these individuals concerned

in each risk.

Next there was no recognized center for carrying

on the business, but brokers who had policies to complete were

obliged to go from office to office, in oroer to secure sufficient insurers to complete a policy.

47

Without any concerted action, or preconceived design
on the part of any group, underwriters and brokers with common

interests began to assemble in the coffee houses.

Lacking other

meeting places, the coffee houses seemed admirably designed to

serve their needs.

Not only did they serve as a place to gather,

47. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 40. Martin, op. cit.. p. 55
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but it was here also that latest developments in the field were

carried, and here the latest news might be obtained.

The
48

first coffee house of which there is any record opened in 1652.
Within a very short time these coffee houses had become the
popular resort of merchants who patronized them for business

purposes.

Utilizing the facilities of the coffee houses to

their own ends, the merchants engaged in underwriting, and the
brokers, engaged in completing policies, formed the habit of

frequenting these institutions.

The actual business of under

writing was carried on at this time on the floor of the Royal

Exchange, but in the business of underwriting marine risks news
was the all important factor, and the best sources of news were

found to be the coffee houses.

There appears to have been

no effort on the part of the managers to limit their patronage

to any given class.

Any one who desired might be served.

But it was natural that those with common interests should be
attracted, and specialization in the coffee houses -waBe the

result.
With insurance underwriting and the coffee houses, the
name of Edward Lloyd has become inseparably associated.

His

coffee house, destined to become famous in insurance history was

48. Martin, op, cit., p. 52.
49. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. p. 9.
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by no means the earliest of these institutions, nor was it in
the beginning the sole resort of the insurance interests.

There were other coffee houses well known and patronized before

his time, and it may fairly be said that the great institution
known as Lloyds traces its beginning to all of those early

coffee houses that served the insurance interests.

It was by going about from place to place that the

merchant was enabled to learn of the important events of the
day, and of the developments of interest to his business.

There were very few newspapers, and what there were contained
but little of value to the business man.

postage expensive.

Mails were slow and

News was spread largely by personal contact.

Merchants obtained their news by an exchange of information, and
for this the coffee house served as a place of meeting.
Recognizing the value of supplying this business news,

it seems to have been an early custom, not only to supply such
newspapers as were available, but also to post up, or circulate

letters containing matters of interest to those assembled, a

custom not unlike that to be seen among groups gathered in the
board room of a stock exchange house today.

It was due to the

Initiative of Lioyd that his coffee house outdistanced its com

petitors.

Lloyds became recognized as a center for news, and
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in 1696 Lloyd began the publication of his own paper, Lloyd's
News, consisting of a single page that appeared three times
vn
5051
weekly.
The earliest notice of Lloyd’s coffee house is found

in the London Gazette, of February 18-21, 1688.

From this

advertisement it is evident that the first Lloyd's was doing

business in Tower street at this date.

51

From the numerous

advertisements it appears from the beginning that Lloyd's was

frequented by merchants and shipmasters.

It was not until

1691, however, that Lloyd left the old location to establish

himself in the heart of the business world, and to enter into

competition with a group of prosperous and flourishing coffee

houses that clustered around the Royal Exchange.

It is apparent

that Lloyd's from the beginning was a success, and became one
of the largest establishments in the vicinity.

One of the first

advertisements mentioning the house to appear, following the
change to Lombard street, dated in 1692, concerned the sale at

auction of three ships and their furniture, and gave an intimat
ion of the trend in the class of business'.

At the beginning of

the eighteenth century, Lloyd's had not yet become a distinct
insurance center, but was one of a group of prominent coffee

50. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 21-2.
51. Martin, op, cit., p. 51 ff.
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houses frequented by underwriters.

The business of insurance

was still carried on by merchants, and the brokers had to go
from office to coffee house, and coffee house to exchange, in

the course of carrying out their business of completing policies.

5.

Iln - this early coffee house of Lloyd's, however, the ground
was prepared for the sowing of a seed that was to develop into

one of the greatest insurance institutions in the whole world.
The close of the seventeenth century finds the business

of insurance still conducted largely on the floor of the Royal
Exchange, or as often happened carried on directly with individual

underwriters without reference to the Exchange.

There was as

yet no centralization of the business, and so far as specializat
ion was concerned it was at this time limited to the brokers.

Coffee houses were frequented by both insurers, brokers, and the
insured.

Their function was at this time primarily to furnish

a meeting place for those having common interests, and as a
source of news.

With the turn of the century, however, develop

ments in the field of Insurance were rapid.

Because at this

point the different branches of insurance merge, the further

development of marine insurance, during the first decade of the
eighteenth century is treated in the discussion of the Bubble

52. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 55-6.
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Period., which brings us to the granting of charters to the

companies organized, to carry on the business of insurance.

2. Life Insurance.

In the order of development, marine insurance was

first to become permanently established.
insurance takes the second position.

Following, life

When the underwriters

began to write policies upon the lives of individuals is not

clear.

The earliest life insurance policy of which we have

anj detailed information was made in June of 1583 at the Office
of Insurance at the Royal Exchange, in London.

53

When this

policy was made, however, life insurance was probably not at

all uncommon.

As a matter of fact we do know that life in

surance was written many years before this time, for the
treatise Le Guidon to which reference has already been made,
while treating mainly of marine insurance does mention life

insurance.

Stating that while life insurance was practiced

in other nations, it was prohibited to insure the lives of

persons in France, as contra bonos mores.

This form of in

surance, it was stated, permitted innumerable abuses and frauds,

53. Relton, op. cit.. p. 5, note.
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and it was Lecau.se of these that some of the other nations had
"been forced to discontinue the practice.

It may be that

England was one of the countries in which the practice of in
suring lives was permitted when Le Guidon was published.

In

any case we have definite evidence of the existence of the

business in the registering of the policy of 1583.

The circumstances attending the issuance of this eatly
policy are interesting.

On the 18th. of June, 1583, the in

surance was effected on the life of William Gibbons, for

”tr 383, 6s. 8d, for twelve months.

The policy was signed by

sixteen underwriters, each individually for his own share, and

the premium charged was 8 percent.

The history of this early

undertaking hardly reflects credit upon the business dealings of

these early underwriters.

It so happened that Gibbons died on

May 29th, 1854, and it would clearly seem that the insurers were

liable for the amount of the policy.

However, they were not

averse to seeking a way out for themselves, and in an effort to
save themselves from payment contended that the policy had ex

pired before the date of Gibbons deatij.

Their argument was

based upon the assertion that when they named a period of twelve
months as the term of the policy, they intended it to run for

54. Walford, op. cit.. v. 4, p. 295.
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twelve months of twenty-eight days each.

Reckoning upon this

basis Gibbons had outlived the term of his policy, and the under

writers were thereby not liable for payment under the terms of
It is recorded that the law failed to recognize
55
this quibbling, and the underwriters were obliged to pay.

the contract.

The business of life insurance had made little progress

up to the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The first life

policies issued by the chartered companies in 1720 were for a

term of twelve months, and were based upon little else than
chance and guess work.

The progress of life insurance has

been made possible through the development of a scientific system
of probabilities.

To the mathmatician of the seventeenth

century, the business of insurance is indebted for both the

formulation of the theory of probabilities, and for the compu
tation and construction of tables of mortality.

Without these,

life insurance in its modern form would not have been possible.

The earliest consideration of probability is to be

found in the writings of the theologians.

They were concerned

with the course an individual was obliged to follow in cases of
doubt concerning the existence, or the application of a law.

56

55. Street, The London Assurance, p. 15-16.
56. Mercier, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, v.2, p. 261.
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It was understood that when there was certainty with regard to

a prohibiting law, all subject to the law were bound to abstain
from performing suet action as the law forbade.

On the other

end of the scale no obligation existed where there was no law.

In either of these oases there is no doubt, but certainty.
Between these two extremes, however, there can be all degrees

of uncertainty as to the existence or application of a prohibit
ing law.

Doubt in its strict sense is said to exist when there

are no positive arguments either way, or when the arguments are

equal.

Then there can be a preponderance of opinion in favor of

the law, with the opposite opinion still probable.

The opinion

favoring one view can be more probable than the opposite, most
57
probable, or slightly probable.
/

'Out of the problem thus presented grew up the moral

system termed grobabilism.

-

Bartholomew Medina, a Dominican

theologian, was born in 1527 and died in 1581 after a life
devoted to the teaching of theology at Salamanca, and is usually

termed the Father of Probabilism.

Writers are not in agreement

upon the question as to whether he introduced the system or merely

formulated it, when he taught "if an opinion is probable it is

57. Sabetti, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, pp. 43 ff.,
Konings, Theologia Moralis? pp? 23 ff.
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lawful to follow it, even though the opposing opinion is more

probable."

So far as we have any record, however, Medina

was the first to expound the doctrine.
In the discussion of probabilism, the opinion which

favors the law is termed the safe opinion, while the opinion

which favors liberty is termed the less safe.

With the rise

of Ja.nsenism probabilism became a center of controversy.

The

Jansenist theologian Sinnichius, a professor of Louvain, a de

fender of rigorist doctrines, taught that it was not lawful to
follow even a most probable opinion in favor of liberty.

This

brings us to the mathematican Blaise Pascal.

Blaise Pascal, "one of the most sublime spirits in
58
the world"
is known to literature as one of the greatest
Frenchmen of the seventeenth century.

His fame would rest

, secure on his writings alone, but he was moreover a scientific
59
investigator, a great-mathematician, and a theologian.
While
he is noted particularly for his works in the field of mathe
matics, in 1646 becoming a member of the Jansenists he devoted

a great part of his time to religious study.

In 1650, on the

advice of physicians, he withdrew from active pursuits because

58. Smith, History of Mathematics, p. 381, quoting Bayle:
Dictionaire, iv, 500.
59. Pascal, Provincial Letters., Preface, p. 9.
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of failing health.

In 1654 abandoning all of his mathematical

and scientific studies he devoted himself entirely to religion
and became a regular guest at the Abbey of Port Royal a center
of Jansenism.
Perhaps the most famous of the literary works of

Pascal are his Provincial Letters, or Letters from a Provincial
to one of his friends, and to the Reverend Fathers, the Jesuits.

In the work he bitterly attacked the Jesuits, and made bitter

Parts of two of the letters he
60
devotes to the system of probabilism.
The Letters are held
accusations against them.

one of the most brilliant pieces of writing that France had to
that time produced, and their satire, charm, and eloquence

attracted multitudes of readers.

Because of the emphasis they

gave to the question of probabilism,' it may be stated that with

the publication of the Provincial Letters the question of pro
bability was taken from the discussions of the monasteries and
schools of theology and brought to the attention of the world.
While the Provinvial Letters brought the question of

probability to the attention of the world, we owe much more than
this to Pascal.

It is to him we are obligated for the first

explicit formulation of the principle

60. Ibid., pp. 82 ff., pp. 99 ff

>f recurrence, stated in
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a tract called The Arithmetic Triangle published in 1654.

It has been found upon investigation, however, that the material

in this tract was also contained in the correspondence between
Pascal and Fermat regarding a problem in gambling, and the

material here discovered is now regarded as the point of beginn6”

ing from which developed the mathematical theory of probabilities.
Pierre de Fermat, like Pascal was one of the most

noted mathematicians of his time.

He was a counselor of the

Parliament of Toulouse, an office of no great importance.

He

is said to have given no serious consideration to mathematics
until after he was thirty years of age, yet was destined to be

one of the greatest writers on the theory of numbers.

Publishing

little on his own account his discoveries exist in the form of

• marginal notes, or are made known through his letters to Pascal,
■ Descartes, and others.6^
The correspondence between Pascal and Fermat which

gave rise to the development of the theory of probabilities had
to do with a problem proposed by a gambler regarding the divis

ion of stakes in an unfinished match.
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game is interrupted, requires two points to win while his

opponent B needs three.

It can be seen that the game oan be

decided in not over four more trials, for if B should win the

first two and lose

score.

the next two A will secure the necessary

If B wins the first two, and either the third or

fourth B will win.

By no shifting of the possible arrange

ment of scores will there be more than four more trials.

Fermat in determining the chances of each player takes two
letters, a and b and writes down all the possible combinations
that can be formed by four of them as follows:- aaaa, aaab,aaba,
aabb, abaa.... bbbb, and finds the total possibilities to be

sixteen in number.

He then takes his array and determines

which of the cases are favorable to A and which to B.

Because

A needs two successful’ trials to win, he determines that those
cases where a appears two or more -times are favorable to A, and

by the same reasoning where b occurs three or more times, those

cases are favorable to B.

Upon inspection of the sixteen cases,

it appears that there are eleven favorable to A, with five favor
able to B.

The stakes, therefore, are in this 'instance to be

divided in the proportion of eleven to five.

There was another

problem considered which concerned itself with the probability

of throwing a six with a die in eight throws.

Fermat apparently

carried the work no further, but Pasca.1 developed the work,
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S3
carrying his researches to other and more difficult cases.

The theory thus evolved has, in the field of insurance,

proved to be an instrument of incalculable importance.

The

measure of probability is expressed algebraicly by means of a
fraction whose numerator is the number of favorable (or unfav
orable) possibilities, and whose denominator is the number of

all possible cases.

Using the following notation, in which

n represents the number of ways an event can occur, a of which
are to be considered as favorable and b as unfavorable,

then

El
the probability of £ a favorable outcome can be expressed.p=^
Id
and the probability of an unfavorable outcome is written p=j

. A simple illustration of the formula is found in the experiment
of tossing a coin.

There are but two ways in which a coin

may fall, either head' up, or tail up.

The probability that

it will fall head is found by using the number of possible
successful chances as the numerator of the fraction, and the

total number of chances as the denominator, and we have the

probability of tossing a head as -g-.
The probability that it
64
will fall tail is the same.
The probability that a man
aged 35 will live 10 years is according to the data taken from
74173
the American Experience Table of Mortality the ratio 81822 •

63. Sullivan, History of Mathematics in Europe, pp. 68-9.
64. Mills, Statistical Methods, p. 516.
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According to the table of 51,822 men living at the age of 35

there are living 10 years later 74,173.

That is there are

74,173 chances of success, which number is used as the numer
ator of the fraction, and 81,822 the total number of chances

is the denominator.

65

The value of the theory of probabili

ties to the science of insurance, it can readily be seen, is

dependent upon the accuracy of statistical data.

John DeWitt, a Dutchman, was the first to apply the
doctrine of probabilities to the subject of life annuities, in

a report made to his government.
66
•used mathematical calculations.

Here for the first time were

The government in April,

1671 decided to raise funds through the medium of life annuities,
and in July the report of DeWitt was presented, explaining the
basis upon which such an enterprise could with success be carried

out.

In the process of formulation df his theory of annuities,

DeWitt not only applied the principle of probabilities and

compound discount in the ascertainment of the annuity value,
but he also invented a mortality table based upon a plan of
67
equal decrements.
Actual statistical data, however, was

still lacking.

65. Ibid., p. 522.
66. Mason.-op. cit., p. 76-7.
67. Dawson, Development of Insurance mathematics, in Yale Readings,
v. 1., p. 99.
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The first steps in this direction grew out of the
terror inspired by the great plague.

The '’sweating sickness"

which caused, death in a few hours carried, off thousands, and.

there were numerous visitations previous to 1665 causing great

destruction of life.

Rumors, then as now were exagerated,

and in order to reassure a public whose morale was being under
mined, the government ordered the various parishes to issue

bills of mortality.

These bills, however, had a grave defect

as a basis for insurance calculations.

A statement was included

giving the cause of death, but not the age.
computation this was fatal.

in London as early as 1562.

For scientific

Bills of mortality were issued
The beginning of the weekly
69

issuance of bills by order of Elizabeth is placed at 1594.
The first, so far as we know, to turn his attention

to an analysis of the bills of mortality was John Graunt, and

his work constituted one of the outstanding contributions to
the science of insurance.

He gave considerable thought to

the population figures, and in 1661 there appeared the first
edition of his work entitled Natural and Political Observations
mentioned in the following Index, and made upon the Bills of

68. Mason, op. cit., p. 78.
69. Walford, bp. cit., v. 1, p. 283.
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Mortality, chiefly with Reference to the Government, Religion,
Trade, Growth, Air, Diseases, and the Several Changes of the

The work attracted wide attention at the time

said City.

of its publication, and a second edition was published in 1662,

followed by a third in 1665.

While the book was not received

with favor by many, for one reason because Graunt placed the

population of London at 384,000 when it had Heretofore been

measured in millions, nevertheless his work came to the atten
tion of Charles II and this monarch recommended the writer to

the Royal Society.
Among a large number of interesting problems consid
ered in this work, we are interested in the mortality table
which he presented.

He computed that seven men out of every

hundred lived to be seventy, of that number only one will be
alive at 76, and none at 80, while thirty-six died before the
age of 6.

He then made a table showing in 229,250 deaths,

This work of Graunt’s is the first sem70
blance of a mortality table we have in modern times.

the cause of each.

The next to study the question of mortality was Sir

William Petty.

He wrote An Essay on Arithmetic concerning the

70. Mason, op. cit., pp. 80 ff. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 538
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Growth of the City of London, with the Measures, Periods,

Causes and Consequences thereof.

In this work he estimated

the population of the city to he 670,000 in 1682, it having
doubled in the previous forty years.

He was at a loss to

account for this growth, but predicted that the world would

be fully peopled in the next 2,000 years and that the growth

of the city of London must stop pf its own accord before the
71
year 1800.
Among his other works he carried forward a

table based upon results deduced from the London Bills of Mor
tality for a period of eighteen years, 1665-82 inclusive.
The worses of Petty and Gruant exerted a wide influence both in

England and on the Continent, and doubtless were instrumental

in bringing about needed amendments to the Bills of Mortality,
and more exact registrations of births and deaths.

In 1728

not only the causes of the death, but the ages of the deceased
were included in the records.
In 1693 the final step was made with the construction

of a mortality table from actual data scientifically arranged.
In that year Halley, known for his work in Mathematics, and
more particularly as an astronomer, published in a pamphlet a

table of probabilities of the duration of human life at every

71. Mason, op. cit., p. 84.
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age.

Unlike Oraunt and Petty, whose tables were .only approx

imations because the Bills of Mortality from which they computeci

did. not record the ages of death, Halley had secured some definite
data.

It was found that in the City of Breslau, in Silesia,

records were kept which showed, among other data, the age of

the deceased at death.

This was exactly the data for which

the scientific men of the time interested in this field had been

searching.

A member of the Royal Society made application

in 1692 for copies of these records, and copies of the registers
for a period of five years 1687-91 were obtained.

The lists

showed a total of 6193 births, and 5869 deaths.
At this time Dr. Halley’s reputation as a mathematical!

had already won for him great recognition, and he was selected
as the one most competent to work with the materials thus obtained.
The results of this work were published in 1693 in a paper sub

mitted to the Royal Society under the title:- An Estimate of the

degrees of the Mortality of Mankind, drawn from curious Tables
of the births and funerels of the Pity of Breslau; with an attempt

to ascertain the price of annuities upon lives.

Halley assumed

in his computations a stationary population, and proceeded to

construct his mortality table from the record of deaths, showing
the dimunition of the number of lives each year out of an original
72
group.
72. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 106.
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Halley’s table was arranged in a form that showed how many
out of the group of 1,000 at the age of one might be expected

to survive at a given year.

Likewise of the number surviving

at any given year, it could be determined how many of them might

be expected to survive at any subsequent year.

From his table

the chances of living and dying for all ages might easily be
/
determined.

The number of expectant survivors represented the

chances of living, and the remainder, -or those who were not ex

pected to survive, the chances of death.

This work of Dr.

Halley’s marked an important contribution to the development of
Insurance science, and it is to this work that actuarial science
is•heavily indebted.

The next great advance, and the final one to be here
considered takes us into the early part of the eighteenth century

when Abraham de Moivre in 1725 published his work on life annui

ties which appeared under the title:- Annuities upon Lives; or
the valuation of Annuities upon any number of lives; and also of

Reversions.

Preceeding the publication of this work in

1725 de Moivre had already distinguished himself in the field

of mathematics.

.

Although born in France, from the age of 18

he lived in London, and supported himself largely by priva.te
teaching, lecturing, and solving mathematical puzzles.

Because

of straightened circumstances he was unable to devote his time
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entirely to study, and is said to have spent a large part of

his time in a London coffee house, where he picked up sufficient
funds to meet his needs in solving problems.

Among his earlier

works is to be found a paper De Mensura Sortis, submitted to the

Royal Society in 1710, and enlarged into a book in 1718 under
the title The Doctrine of Chances.

The work published in

1725 made practical application of his learning in determining
73
the values of life leases and other life annuities.

When de Moivre turned his attention to the values of
annuities,

the mathematicians had already worked out methods for

arriving at the summation of a series, whem the elements follow
some mathematical law.

De Moire was keen enough to see

that it would be a comparatively simple matter to compute annuity
values if a mortality table could be shown to follow a mathe
matical law.

With this idea in mind, he studied the Breslau

table of Halley, and found within reasonable limits, that for a

considerable period, and possibly for the whole span, the number

that survived to each year, out of a given number starting from

the earliest age of the table, was a term in a decreasing arith74
metical series.
Working from this point he developed the
hypothesis that bears his name, and which is briefly expressed

as follows:

Of 86 persons, one dies every year until all are

73. Smith, History of Mathematics, p. 450, Walford, op, cit.,
v.2, p. 180.
74. Dawson, op, cit., p. 101.
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extinct.

-

The hypothesis assumed, that each year the number of

deaths would be the same, but this number would each year be a
larger proportion of the survivors, who it will be seen were
75
diminishing each year.
Thus the probability of death

would each year become greater, not because of any increase in
the annual number of deaths in the group, but because of the

steady decrease in the survivors, who constituted the denomi76
nator in the probability ratio.
The value in arranging
a mortality table in an arithmetical series, for the purposes

of. computation, is readily seen.

De Moivre continued to

elaborate upon his work, and included in his computation not
only the element of probability as determined from the mortality

tables, but also the factor of interest in the form of discount.
With de Moivre, we are on the threshold of the scientific develop
ment of statistics as applied to insurance.

■

An able and far

seeing worker, his accomplishments in the field of mathematics

won him widespread recognition, and he was admitted to member
ship in the Royal Society and into the academies of Paris and
Berlin.

We may leave insurance mathematics at this point,

for the further developments that followed take us into the more
modern contributions to the ecience.

75. Walford, op. cit., v. 2, p. 181, and v. 1., p. 122.
76. Dawson, op. cit., p. 101.
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While life insurance, up to the early part of the
eighteenth century was largely in the hands of individual

underwriters, and policies were written ordinarily for a single
year, there was a mutual association formed during this period
that enjoyed a long and successful existence.

The formation

of this society dates back to the 24th. of January, 1705.

The

promoters obtained a charter from Queen Anne the following July
and they and their successors were incorporated under the name

of the Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office,

The

principle feature of the insurance element is to be found in the

amount of the death benefit.

A certain amount was set aside

to be divided among the representatives of the deceased.

The

larger the number of deaths in a given year, the smaller would
be the benefit each would receive.

was entirely lacking.

The element of certainty

There was no limitation as to the age

of those who might participate, nor was there any difference in

the amount paid for membership by those of different ages, and
the benefits were the same for all who died in any given year.
There appears to have been some concern, however, in selecting
the applicants for policies.

Those who wished to become members

of the association were required to appear personally before the

members of the board of directors for questioning.

Each

director might put such questions as he wished, and upon the
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withdrawal of the applicant, gave hie opinion of the eligibility

of the candidate.

There was no formal medical examination.

The society did, in the course of time, recognize certain hazar
dous occupations as disqualifying for membership.

Among

these were foreign residence, and members of the army or navy.

The society thus organized continued its operations for one
77
hundred and sixty-one years.
Life insurance in the beginning of the eighteenth

century merges with the other forms of insurance^

Any further

study of the subject finds its treatment with the general con

sideration of the development of insurance during the first
quarter of that century.

Up to this point the recorded con

tributions to the actual development of life insurance have

been slight.

The developments of the mathematicians, how

ever, which had not yet been to an appreciable extent applied,

represent a turning point in the history of all insurance.

3. Fire Insurance.

Friday, September 2, 1666, murks the date of the Great
Fire.

It is also an important landmark in the development of

77. Walford, op. cit., v. 1., pp. 74 ff
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the business of fire insurance.

It is hardly correct to say

that fire insurance dates from that day, though the stimulus
that the fire gave to the introduction and growth of the idea

is not to be denied.

A consideration of the eafly attempts

to establish a means for effecting fire insurance indicates how

little known and poorly understood was the idea, but it like
wise indicates that it did not originate with the London fire

of ’66.

For example in the early part of the century the
proposal was made that all proprietors of land should insure

the houses of their subjects against fire, in return for the

payment of a premium that should be a percentage of their value.
The originator of this idea presented it for consideration to

Count Anthony Gunther von Oldenburg in 1609.

It was his idea,

considering the number of fires and property lost thereby, that
the Count might, after showing.his subjects the danger of such

losses, propose to them that he would upon receipt of a specified
annual payment agree to pay the amount of the loss to those

whose property should be damaged by fire.

The proposal called

for the placing of a valuation upon the property, and to pay at

the rate of lfo for the insurance.

Fire from any cause was

apparently to justify a claim, with one exception mentioned,
that arising out of the misfortunes of war.
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The originator of the plan was quite confident that

over a period of years it would prove profitable for the in

surers.

While it would probably be true that losses would be

heavy at first, he thought a calculation of the number of houses
consumed over a long period would show that the losses were by

a considerable margin less than the premiums collected.

He

also recognized the value of careful underwriting, for he did

not recommend that all the houses in each town be accepted for

insurance, but that the risks be selected.

He does not in

timate upon what basis the selection was to be made, but does
state that indiscriminate acceptance might result in unduly large

claims.

The Count evidently gave the matter serious consider
ation, but eventually decided against entering into the venture.
This decision was founded, as it happens, not upon his finding

any fault with the plan, but because it seemed to him that
Providence might be tempted.

He felt, moreover, that his

subjects might be displeased, and forming improper ideas of his
conduct accuse him of avarice.
said,

"God," he is reputed to have

"had without such means preserved and blessed for many cen

turies the ancient house of Oldenburg; and he would still be

present with him, through His mercy, and protect his subjects
from destructive fires."

Because of these scruples he rejected

220.

the scheme, but in dismissing the author of the idea, it is
78
reported that he rewarded him liberally.
Turning from continental Europe to Great Britain,

we find under date of 1635 a petition addressed to Charles I,
in which his attention is invited to the suffering caused from
losses by fire.

The petitioner, whose name by the way does

not appear, prays that the King grant him authority to insure

against losses from this cause.

The petition carried with

it an agreement for a payment to the King, and an upper limit
for rates.

This petition is considered to be a preliminary

draft, submitted for consideration.

In 1638, hox^ever,

William Ryley and Edward Mabb petitioned the King to grant them

a patent to run for a term of 41 years, permitting them to in
sure against losses from fire in accordance with a set of pro

positions which they annexed to their petition.

In tracing

the development of the fire insurance idea, we are interested

in the term of these early proposals.

They state;-

'•Propositions touching the prevention of fires in
London and the parts and suburbs thereof.
The
owners or inhabitants of houses within the City and
suburbs of Lond., together with the Citty of West
minster and Borrough of Southwake, paying 12 pence
per ann. for every, house yielding 1^20 yearly rent,
if more or less after the rate or 12 pence yearly ’
for every it 20: shall have his house or houses reedified according to His Majesty’s proclamation, and
sett in as good or better state as they were before
in case any loss or casualtie by fire shall happen
73. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 439
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unto them.
For security hereof there shall be de
posited Jr 5000 into the Chamber of Lond. which shall
continually lay wholly and entire to receive for int.
i. 5 in the Jr 100, which increase shall runne until it
shall amount to L- 10,000.
And there shall also be
kept a continual watch in all parts of the Citty and
suburbs all night, that if any fire should break forth
it may presently be espied.
And engines shall be made
and kept in every ward thereof to be ready at hand for
the quenching of the same, and the watch brought
speedily to the fire, and those severall watchers in
every ward shall speedily repayre themselves to assist
where the fire shall be.
Reserved of water shall be
made in convenient places for sudden use." 79’

The petition was referred to the Attorney General, who approved
of the plan.

There is no evidence however, that it ever

became operative.
On the continent, however, fire insurance was known

and practiced.

Relton, quoting Beckman, who wrote in 1781, .

refers to the institution of insurance offices to indemnify
losses sustained by fire, and calls them a most useful imitation
of marine insurance.

Beckman states that so far as he is able

to learn, fire insurance offices were first formed toward the

middle of the century before he wrote, though he adds, houses
were insured by individuals much earlier.

Commenting upon

this statement,’ Relton says that a German writing in a general

way might fairly be presumed to draw his information from German

79. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 440
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sources, and. that possibly his opinion was based, upon some

transaction in his own country of which knowledge has been
We have no idea, he adds, that his statement applied
80
in any way to England.
It is possible that Beckman had

lost.

reference to some of the early German gilds that ^ere in some

instances converted into distinct insurance associations.

An

instance in point is the Feuer Oasse at Hamburg, said to be
one of the earliest distinct Fire Insurance Associations of

which there is any knowledge.

This association was the out

growth of a merger in 1676, of several small Brandgilden (Fire
Gilds) that had as early as 1591 entered into Fuer Contracts
for mutual insurance.

There were fire gilds in Schleswig-

Holstein in the early part of the fifteenth century, in the

form of local mutual fire insurance associations on the state
81
or municipal plan.
There seems to be no evidence that

the gilds in England developed into distinct insurance assoc
iations, nor that any fire insurance association following the
decline of the gilds, had become fairly established previous

to the fire of 1666.
September 2, 1666 marks the date of this conflagration,

and so great was the calamity that the anniversary was observed

as a Fast Bay fof over a. hundred years.

80. Relton, op. cit., p. 18.
81. Relton, op. cit., p. 7.
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four days end nights, and its destruction spread over 436 acres
of the city’s area.

Over 85% of the buildings of the city

were estimated destroyed, with a property loss estimated at ten
82
million pounds.
The blow staggered the city and the king
dom, and it is not surprising that the attention of business

interests was then drawn to the field of fire insurance.
Immediately following the fire, it is reported that
83

mutual insurance groups were formed to effect fire insurance.
These societies granted insurance, not exceeding five hundred

pounds on a single risk, and continued in active business for a

considerable period.
In 1667 Dr. Nicholas Barbon opened his office for the
insuring of houses and buildings against loss from fire.

Dr.

Barbon, having failed in the practice of medicine, for which

profession he was educated, turned to building, and was one of

the first of the builders to engage in extensive operations
following the fire.

He became involved in numerous financial

and business schemes, one of them being insurance, and died in

1698 heavily in debt, leaving a stipulation in his will that his
executor should never pay his debts, a stipulation which the

executor, after reading the will to the creditors, promised re
ligiously to fulfill.

Our interest in Barbon centers in the

82. Bissell, History of Fire Insurance in Europe. In Yale Res.dings, v. 2, p. 61, also Pepys1 Diary, Sept.2,1666, et. ff.
83. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 441.
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fact that he was the first projector of fire insurance in
84
England who succeeded in bringing his scheme to maturity.
In the beginning Barbon carried on his business as an individual,

and in principle his policies were the same as the marine policies
of the time, that is policies underwritten by individuals.

Barbon’s office merged in 1680 into The Fire Office,
in which he joined with himself several others in the organizat
ion of the first joint-stock proprietary company for fire insur85
ance in London, and probably the first of its kind in the world.
The name assumed by the company was The Fire Office, thought it

was for a considerable period commonly known as The Insurance
Office at the backside of the Royal Exchange.

A significant

reference to this company is found in the advertisement appearing

in the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, of May 7, 1680.

The advertisement states
"There is a new office to be kept at the backside of
the Royal Exchange, London, and will be opened on
Thursday next.
They do undertake for a very reasonable
rate to secure the houses in London and the suburbs
thereof from fire, and if burnt down to build them
again at the cost of the office, for which end is pro
vided a considerable bank of money, and a fund of free
land, to such a value as will secure those that agree
with the office.
There being now in print a particular
thereof, we need not give you any further account." 86
The company continued in business for a considerable time, and

in 1705, adopting the name Phenix Office from the mark it placed

84. Relton, op. cit., p. 21.
85. Ibid., p. 28.
86. Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 444.
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upon buildings that it insured, and operations were then carried
The date when this office discontinued

on under that name.
86

business is unknown.
In 1683 there appeared the proposals for a new society

to provide protection, but this society unlike Barbon’s was
organized on a mutual basis.

The proposal was entitled:-

A Proposal of a New Way or Method for Securing Houses from any
Considerable Loss by Fire, by Way of Subscription and Mutual

Contribution.
Society.

The project was to be known as the Friendly

The following year the original proposals were

amended, and the mutual insurance association was launched.

In

accordance with the proposals of the society issued in 1684,

every person becoming a member was obliged to obligate himself

by subscribing an instrument to submit to a tax or assessment
limited to 30s for every hundred pounds of insurance.

This

money the assured is to retain, but makes a deposit of 6s. 8d
to remain in the hands of the association as a pledge.

There

follow other clauses providing for the profits of the undertakers,
expenses and the like, and give the basis for estimating the
87
necessary contributions.
De Foe is his Essay on Projects,

86. Quoted by Walford, op, cit., v. 3., p. 444.
87. Relton, op, cit., p. 58., Walford, op. cit., v.3., p. 456.
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after having mentioned Barbon’s office, in connection with his
discussion of the origin of fire insurance, says that this
office was soon followed by another, where all who subscribed

pay their quota to build up any man’s house who is a contributor,

If it shall happen to be burned.

It was said that considerable

rivalry existed between this new organization and the older
Fire Office.

The age old controversy that wages today, was

at its height, and hinged upon the question as to whether mutual
or non-mutual insurance was the superior.

Sensing the contro

versy, De Foe states that while he will not decide which is the

best, or which succeeds the best, he is willing to venture the
88
opinion that the mutual form brings most money to the contriver.

Just as with The Fire Office we had the first nonmutual insurance society, so the Friendly Society was the first

mutual fire insurance association.

The time when the society

ceased to do business, and the circumstances of its ending, are

both shrouded in uncertainty.

There is a reference made to

it in a digest of the laws of insurance published in 1781, and

it is believed that possibly because of depleted funds after the

fires that occured during the years from 1784 to 1786 the company

sought to strengthen its proposition in a merger.

It is stated

that in 1714 the society was absorbed into another organization

88. Relton, op. cit., p. 62.
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known as the Union.

The Friendly Society may be said to mark
89

the beginning of mutual fire insurance associations in England.

Between the scheme of Barbon, that became the Fire
Office and the establishing of the Friendly Society, the corporat-

ion of the city of London went into the business of issuing fire

policies

A considerable business was written, but the under

taking was short lived, and just a year and a month after the

authorities had entered upon the venture, they decided to abandon

the business and the Chamberlain was ordered to return the premiums
90
advanced and cancel the outstanding policies.
We come now to the first of these early societies that

survived into the period in which modern insurance was developed

In 1696 the Hand in Hand mutual insurance office was opened.

The original title of the organization was Contributors for insur
ing Houses, Chambers, or rooms from loss by Fire, by Amicable

Contribution within the cities of London and Westminster and the
liberties thereof, and the places thereunto adjoining.

The

title was afterward shortened to the Amicable Contributors for
Insuring from loss by Fire, and after a final trimming it was

reduced to the brief Amicable Contributorship.

It was not

until 1706 or thereabouts that the name Hand in Hand attached
itself to the company.

This name probably grew out of a reference

89. Relton, op. cit., p. 68.
90. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 455.
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to the emblem or trad.e-me.rk of the company which consisted of

The name was not formally adopted by the
91
company until considerably later, probably about 1713-4.

two clasped hands.

Because this was the oldest of these early companies to survive
int<5 modern times, the Hand in Hand has sometimes been referred

to as the first fire office to transact business in England.

This,however, is not the case, for policies were actually written
by Dr. Barbon, both as an individual and through The Fire Office,
as well as by the corporation of London and the Friendly Society.
This Hand in Hand fire office is not to be confused with the

American company of the same name, though it served as its model.
The American company was not organized until 1752.

Like its

English model it began with a long cumbersome name, that was

eventually shortened to the Philadelphia Oontributionship,
adopting however the plan and badge of the older company, and

was known as the Hand in Hand.

This was the first fire insur

ance company to be started in America, and is today one of the
92
outstanding institutions in the field.
Up to the time of the organization of the Hand in Hand

the business of fire insurance was confined entirely to the in
suring of buildings.

It was not until 1704 that the idea was

91. Relton, op. cit.. p. 71., Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 460.
92. Gray, One Hundred Years, pp. 42-3., Gall and Jordan, One
Hundred Years of Fire Insurance, pp. 12-3.
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extended to the insurance of goods.

It is recorded that at

this time there was founded the Lombard House, in Duke street,

Westminster, and had for one of its aims the insuring of house
hold furniture and stocks of merchandise from loss by fire.

This was a mutual insurance venture adopted by an organization

that had the previous year been organized under the name of the
93
Charitable Corporation.
The original idea of the corporation
was to lend small sums of money to the poor, and it received a

charter from Queen Anne in 1707.

The insurance feature of the

organization, because it represents the first attempt to extend

the idea of fire insurance to household furniture, or to mer
chandise, is of particular interest.

The company operated

by requiring a deposit, depending upon the amount of coverage

the insured desired.

This deposit was to be returned at the

end of the policy term to the insured with interest,

the pro

rata share of all losses occuring during that time first being

deducted.

It is interesting to note the optimism of the pro

moters of the scheme.

The organizers expected to be able to

more than meet such losses as would happen from the interest on

the insurance fund.

Losses they believed would be small, for

93. Walford, op. cit., p. 3., p. 463.
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among the other precautions,

the company had provided " a

competent number of watermen with coats and silver badges"
who were to attend fires and help to remove the insured goods
to a place of safety.

In addition, warehouses were provided

in all sections of the city, to which goods that were insured
might be sent, when in danger, and left thereuntil the danger
had passed, without any charge to the assured.

While in the

agreement there was a liability on the part of the assured

to

further contributions, the sponsors of the idea were of the
opinion that the need for such an assessment seemed hardly

probable.

So far as the rates were concerned, there seems to

have been no distinction between classes of goods, but there

was a provision that goods in timber houses should pay double

the rates provided in the proposals.

While the first to write

fire Insurance on merchandise, this association made no lasting
mark in the business of insurance.
We next come to the name of Charles Povey, inseparably

associated with the development of the modern business of fire
insurance.

Povey appears on the scene around 1706, and the

period between that date and 1710 marks a turning point in the
history of fire insurance.

It was possibly in 1706 that Povey

set in motion his project for writing fire insurance, that was

known as the Exchange House Fire Office, and was located in
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Hatton Garden.

Relton is not certain that the business of

fire insurance was actually commenced at this time, and basing

his conclusion upon references in Povey’s secret history, places

the date of beginning of the fire business at 1707-8.

Accord

ing to Relton, in 1706, Povey started the Traders1 Exchange
House, for insuring lives, and it was after this probably, that
the fire insurance scheme was set on foot.

Though it may have

been planned in 1706, the fire business was probably not in
95
operation until 1707-8.
The first of Povey’s fire offices

was organized to write business in the city, and the policies
were issued by himself.

man affair.

The office was essentially a one

This earlier city office was followed by another

undertaking, known as the Exchange House, Fire Offices in the

The exact date of the beginning of this office is
96
surrounded in obscurity, but is placed by Relton in 1708-9.
Country.

Povey as was the custom adopted an emblem for his company, and

for this purpose used a figure of the sun.

Just as in the

case of the Amicable Contributionship, the company was eventually
known as the Hand in Hand from its emblem, so Povey’s office
became known from its mark as the Sun Fire Office.

94. Walford, op, cit., v. 3., p. 465.
95. Relton, op. cit., p. 261.
96. Relton, op. cit., p. 268.
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Povey, however, soon found, the business of fire in
surance more of an undertaking than was suited to the assets of

a single individual.

From the evidence, it appears that his

early ventures were not entirely profitable, and he then pro
jected a company to take over his ventures, upon terms it is

to be presumed that reflected to his advantage.

In 1709 the

Company of London Insurers was in the process of organization,

but it was not until the following yea.r that organization was
completed and the new company ready for business.

The new

company absorbed the two Exchange House Offices, and on April 7,
1710, the deed of co-partnership of the new company was executed,
and the business of fire insurance had turned a corner, and this
date stands as another important landmark in the history of the
97
business.
The Sun Fire Office, or the Company of London
Assurers marks the beginning of fire underwriting by non-mutua.l

companies, and this company organized in 1710, is today the old
est non-mutual fire insurance company in the world.
Because the company marks a turning point in the de
velopment of the business of fire insurance, we are interested

in some of the details effecting the organization.

The preamble

to the deed of co-partnership stated that the Company of London

Assurers had set up an office of insurance named the Sun Fire

97. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 467.
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Office, within the cities of London and Westminster, and the

Liberties thereof, and that proposals had been published, and
that the company intended to carry on the business of insurance

in all parts of Great Britain and Ireland.

The organizers of

the company agreed that the number of members or partners should

never exceed twenty-four, and that if any right or interest in

any of these partnerships should devolve upon a "female or infant"

she or it should while owners of the share appoint some one to
act in their stead.

All losses were to be equally borne by

the members, and expenses are to be likewise apportioned.

Calls

were to be made when necessary, and profits equally divided

among members.

There were regulations as to meetings, the

making of by-laws, fines, committee rules, the appointment of
a treasurer and secretary, and other such details.

While there

was a power granted to transfer shares, there was no right of
98
survivorship.

The first contracts of this association with the

assured provided for the payment of losses up to five hundred
pounds, but only upon the condition that there be a sufficient

sum of money in the bank to satisfy all the claims arising from
that quarter, otherwise but a proportionate part was to be paid.

98. Relton, op. cit. , pp. 277-8.
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By the terms of the first set of proposals, hated. April 10,
1710, provision was made to reserve out of the quarterly pay
ments received, Poth in London and all parts of Great Britain,

an amount that was deemed to be more than sufficient according
to careful calculations,

and damage.

to make good each sufferer’s whole loss

It was provided that the money thus reserved

should be equally divided among the sufferers in proportion

to the amount of their losses, but not in any case to exceed
five hundred pounds on each policy.

There was nothing in the

policy that pledged the twenty-four members to contribute to
losses, and under the terms of the proposals Insufficiency of
funds to meet claims left the assured definitely the loser,

for the policy holders were excluded from contribution.
This exclusion thus expressed:

"No person insured shall ever

be liable to make any further payment or allowance towards

repairing the Loss and Damage of any Sufferer." definitely
99
removed this insurance project out of the mutual classification.

Because of this limitation on the payment of losses, it is easy
to see that in the event of a serious fire in any given quarter,
the policy holders might be heavy losers.

As a matter of fact,

it is believed, however, that the company from the beginning
100
paid all losses in full.
The fact, however, that an option

99. Relton, op. cit., p. 279.
100. Walford, op. cit., p. 3, p. 468.
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was left to the company to pay only so much of the losses as

the reserve fund permitted, made the policy an unsatisfactory
form.

- This fact was early recognized by the officials of the

company and a change was made.

In 1715, or thereabouts, the

old arrangement was discontinued, and a new policy was issued,

in which the company bound themselves to satisfy the assured's
entire loss, up to the limit of the policy, which was still not
101
to exceed five hundred pounds.
From the very beginning the company took a leading

position in the business of fire insurance.

It was the first

company to undertake the insurance of merchandise and household
102
furniture, as well as buildings, throughout England.
By
1720 the company had reached a point in its development where

it had outstanding nearly 20,000 policies, and insured approx

imately ten million pounds sterling..

This amount was deemed

too great a risk for twenty-four persons, and with the business
still growing it was decided to divide each share into one

hundred parts, with the arrangement that the original members
might sell as many of the new shares as they deemed wise.

The

active management of the company was kept, however, in the hands

of twenty-four members.

TheJLr capacity was now changed from

101. Relton, op. cit., p. 237.
102. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 468.
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that of the original board, where each represented his own in

terests, but under the new organization, the new board had the
103
same powers and authority as the original members.
The
name of the company was eventually changed to the Sun Insurance

Office.

The partnership organization was abandoned, in 1726,

with the formation of a joint stock company, with the capital
104
stock divided into shares.

The organization of the Sun brings us to the threshold
of modern fire insurance practice.

The Sun, if we were to trace

its development, would in fact bring us down to the present time.
During this early period which we have just considered, there
were other companies.

We have, however, considered those

that mark turning points, or decided contributions in the de

velopment of the insurance idea.

From this point on, the

different branches of insurance thus far developed, marine,

life, and fire, either merge or overlap, and must now be con

sidered together.

4'. The OharteredOemp&Biee'.

The second decade of the eighteenth century will
always be remembered as an era of stark speculative madness.

103. Relton, op. cit., p. 287.
104. Walford, op. cit.. v. 3., pp. 478-9.
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Strange as it may seem, when the bubbles had burst, and the

wreckage had cleared away, we find the business of insurance

in the final stages of the development that carried it to the

threshold of modern times.

In fact, if a date can be named

that marks the beginning of insurance as practiced today,

that

date may be fixed at the close of the Bubble period, with the

granting of Royal Charters to the London Assurance and the

Royal Exchange.
In the early years of the eighteenth century, John
Law, a Scotchman, held at one time in a London Prison under

sentence of death for murder, escaped to Paris, and there or

ganised the now famous Missippi Company.
by a furor of speculative madness.

France was gripped

Closely following the

schemes of Law in France, came the huge South Sea Bubble in
England, attended by a speculative mania that held in its grip

the people of all stations and classes.

The South Sea Company was organized in 1711 by Robert

Harley, Earl of Oxford,
of ten million pounds.

to take over England's floating debt

While the government guaranteed a

return of six percent for a term of years, the important feature

of the venture that lent it its speculative flavor was the grant
of the monoply of trade with the southern Atlantic coa.sts of

America.

The project, it may be stated, met with strenous
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opposition on the part of some of the cooler heads associated

The speculative fever, it seems, had

with the government.

already commenced its work, and reason and speculation have never

been known to go hand in hand.

And so the South Sea Company

was founded.

Crowds swarmed to Change Alley, and stock prices
So loud was the uproar, and so great was the

began to soar.

confusion that attended the mad scramble of the multitudes

seeking the path to quick and easy riches, it has been stated,
that the market was at times in utter confusion.

The soaring

market for the South Sea Stock, however, soon carried it out
of the range of thousands who were unable to purchase the

coveted security.

Yet the fever for quick and easy wealth

had played no favorites.

for stocks.

Rich and poor alike were scrambling

Nor were there lacking swindlers and rogues to

satisfy the demand.

Other companies sprang up in the neigh

borhood, and opportunities to subscribe for their stock were
offered a gullible public.

The advertised capital of these

undertakings, when the South Sea Company was riding on the

crest of public favor, reached the stupendous sum of five
hundred millions sterling, an

amount said to be about five
105
times as much as the current cash of all Europe.

105. Mason, op. cit., p. 57.
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It has been calculated that during the period the

South Sea mania lasted there were launched more than two
thousand schemes, mostly in the form of joint-stock undertakings.
One project after another was put forth.
remained in business but a few hours.

great.

Some of the organizers
But their profits were

And the stream of buyers seemed never-ending.

glance at some of the proposals is enlightening.

A

One under

taking was organized to furnish funerals in any part of Great

Britain.

There was another that had for its purpose the

making of looking glasses and coach glasses, and required for
capital the modest sum of two million pounds.

Another scheme,

with a bit more of the speculative zest, had for its purpose
the transmutation -of quicksilver into malleable fine metal.
There was a scheme, with a capital of three million pounds, for

•the building and rebuilding of houses throughout all of England,
and another for supplying a town with fresh water.

Another

device was to manufacture boards out of sawdust, and most in

genious of all, there was organized a company 11 for carrying on
an undertaking of great advantage, but no one to know what it is."
The guiding genius of this last mentioned undertaking decided

upon a modest half million pounds as capital, to be divided into
five thousand shares, each of one hundred pounds.

But we still

have to come to an illuminating feature of the organization.
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A subscriber was not required to deposit a hundred pounds for
Two pounds only were required, and in return for

a share.

this payment, the subscriber was promised a hundred pounds a

year on each share thus taken.

It is reported that the sub

scriptions for stock in this promising venture were opened in

the morning, and before night deposits amounting to two thousand
pounds had been collected.

And when the manager closed that

night with his two thousand pounds, he closed his door for the
In the morning his office and company were no

last time.
106
more.

In the midst of this orgy of speculation, and the
organization of get-rich-quick undertakings, it was not to be
expected that the business of insurance would be slighted.

Nor was it.

During the period of the Bubble mania, there

were brought forth about a hundred schemes that were concerned
with insurance.

Besides companies for insuring houses and

goods from fire, as well as ships and merchandise at sea,
there were companies organized to insure "horses dying natural

deaths, stolen, or disabled," and another office undertook to
insure "Masters and Mistresses against losses they shall sustain

against servants thefts, etc".

106. Mason, op. cit., p. 60.

There were insurances for
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"Insuring and Increasing Children’s Fortunes"; for "Insurance
from death by drinking Geneva"; for "Assurance from lying";

for "Insurance from Housebreakers"; for "Rum Insurance"; for

"Insurance from Highwaymen"; for "Assurance of Female Chastity";
for "Insurance Against Divorce"; and numerous others.

The

extent to which the absurdity was carried may be estimated from
the organization of "A project to insure uniformity amongst

Protestant dissenters"; and "Another to insure it amongst the
107
Orthodox".

Among all these insurance projects there was one that
stood out because of its simplicity.

The project was easily

grasped, and the promises were attractive.

Organized by an

old man named Le Brun, there was opened in Change Alley, the

Office of Insurance and Annuity for Everybody.

LeBrun's

career was a spotty one, and his response to the easy money of
Change Alley was prompt and immediate.

Nor was he in this

period of ingenious schemes to be found wanting.

Upon opening

his office he announced that anybody who paid him five pounds

was to be assured of a hundred pounds annually for the rest of
his life "as soon as a sufficient number had subscribed".
108
The number, however, was never "sufficient".
Nor, as a

107. Martin, op. cit.. p. 89; Walford, op. cit.. v. 1, pp.398-9.
108. Mason,
pp. cit.. p. 59.
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matter of fact, would it ever be.

But this was apparently

Nor did the scores of other rogues

no concern of Mr. Le Brun.

concern themselves with the fulfilling of their promises.
They were concerned chiefly getting the initial payment on a
subscription.
But all great speculative moves seem destined to the

same end.

The stock of the South Sea Company, around which

the craze developed, continued to soar until it had touched the
dizzy figure of 800 per-cent.

Here it hesitated, and those

who had realized great profits began to sell.

This brought

about a decline but the decline was only temporary, and in a

short time the stock ha,d crossed the old high to a figure of
1000 per-cent.

complete.

And then came the crash.

This time it was

Consternation and rage were everywhere, and the

credit of the country was shaken to its very foundations.

Parliament was hastily summoned, and upon investigation frauds
in the affairs of the company were uncovered, in which members
of the government were involved, and the scandal was terrific.
It was in striking the death blow to the bubbles of the period

that brought forth the final development we are here to consider

in the business of insurance.
Strange as it may seem, in this period noted particularly

for its frauds and cheats,

there were organized two great insurance

243

companies that have enjoyed an uninterrupted business from that

day to the present, a span of over two centuries, and they rank
today among the leaders in the field.

We are now concerned

with the events leading to the organization and incorporation
of these companies.
The first of the subscriptions, leading to the organ

ization of an incorporated insurance company was opened in the

fall of 1717.

It was proposed to raise a capital of a million

pounds, for the purpose of insuring ships and merchandise at sea.

.The project was known as the Mercers’ Hell Marine Company.

During the following January the |ist was closed, and a petition

was presented, praying for a charter of incorporation.
petition there was affixed 286 signatures.

To the

The name of Lord

Onslow appears among them.
While the petition expressly stated that there was

no intention to ask for a monoply of marine insurance, and private
insurers were not to be excluded from the business, nevertheless

a storm of bitter opposition broke forth from this quarter.
There was conducted several inquiries, by representatives of

the government, into the feasibility of the undertaking, and it
109
was finally turned down and the charter refused.

109. Mason, op, cit., pp. 62-3; Wright and Fayle, op. cit., pp.45-6.',
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Onslow and. his associates, however, were persistant,
and soon hit upon an idea.

It appears that during the reigns

of Elizabeth and the early Stuarts, charters had been granted

to a number of private monopolists, and while many of the under

takings had long since been abandoned, the charters had not
become without effect.

The associates resorted to the expedient

of buying one of these old companies.

The Mines Royal Mineral

and Battery Works was an amalgamation of two older companies.

Upon advise of council that underwriting might be carried on

under the charters possessed by the amalgamated society, the
Mercers’ Hall subscribers acquired them.

By March, 1719, a

nominal capital of fr 1,152,000 had been subscribed, and the new
company under the name Governors and Court of Assistants and

Societies of the Mines Royal Mineral and Battery Works entered
upon the business of insuring ships and their cargoes.

The next step taken by this agreesive group was the
filing of a petition in their corporate capacity, asking that
they be granted the privilege of insuring ships and cargoes,
exclusive of all other corporations.

As a result of this

petition, there was opposition from the private insurers on the
ground: that the charters were being illegally used.

While the

question was pending Onslow and others of his associates presented
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110

This wasin January of 1720.

a new petition for a charter.

In 1719 a new face; appeared, on the horizon.

Walter

Ohetwynd, a member of an old family and influential in politics,

was in 1717 created Viscount Ohetwynd. of Bearhaven, County Cork,

and Baron of Rathdowne, County Dublin, in the peerage of Ireland.
Lord Ohetwynd was an influential figure.

On December 22, 1917,

at the Marine Coffee House, a new. subscription for marine insur

ance was opened with a capital of 4r 2,000,000.

Ohetwynd was

one of the prime movers in the venture and the following month,

with 380 others, a petition for a charter of incorporation was
111
presented.
Recalling that this petition was presented
while the South Sea mania was raging, it is not surprising that

the undertaking became known as "Ohetwynd*s Bubble."
It would not have been surprising to have found the

Mines Royal group in opposition to the Ohetwynd petition.
however, was not the case.

This,

As a matter of fact there is little

doubt that both Onslow and Ohetwynd had pooled their influence,
and were acting in collusion, believing the field big enough

for a charter for both companies.

But if there was harmony

between the two petitioning groups, there was opposition enough

from the private underwriters.

The battle raged fiercely,

110. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. pp. 47-8.

Mason, op. cit.. p. 64
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a.nd arguments for and against the petitioners were advanced,
while the Attorney General, to whom the petitions were referred,

took them for consideration.

112

In March of 1720 the Attorney

General, Sir Nicholas Lechmere made his report.

The important

point to be found in this report lies in the complete reversal

of the position previously taken by the Government,

The

report stated that there was no objection to a charter of in

corporation, provided others were not excluded from the business.
This represented a decided victory for the proponents of the

corporations.
Just when it seemed to be fair sailing, there was a

new development.

Sir William Thompson charged corruption,

accusing the Attorney general of receiving bribes from the pe

titioners.

exonerated.

An inquiry was held, and Lechmere ftas ultimately
In the meantime the House of Commons had begun

to concern itself with the frauds that were being perpetrated

upon the public through the organization of the innumerable
bubble projects elready mentioned, and in taking steps to curb

the practice made no distinction in favor of marine insurance
113
companies.

112. Ibid., pp. 50-6.
113. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 58.
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Ghetwynd and Onslow were apparently resourceful and
far seeing men.
defeat,

In the face of what seemed to be inevitable

they played another card.

it appears, was heavily in debt.

The Government of George I,

There were great arrears in

the Civil Lists, with no means at hand to make provision for

them.

In this critical juncture there appeared on the scene

two patriotic gentlemen, who realizing the difficulties in which
the King found himself, ventured to offer assistance.

Each,

with his associates, offered the Government the sum of tr 300,000

— provided of course that the Government could see its way to

granting the petitioners the charter for which they were asking.
From this point the story is short.

It is surprising the

light that the promises of ir 300,000 threw upon the subject of
Marine insurance, and the utility of chartered companies.

The

King, through the mouth of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, re

cognized the usefulness and advantages to trade and commerce

that would accrue from the existence of the chartered companies,
incidentally mentioning the additional advantage of taking care

of the Civil Lists, without recourse to the tax payers.

On

May 4, 1720, a Royal Message was sent the House of Commons, con

veying the King's approval and recommendations.

The Commons

were prompt with their response, and voted an address of thanks
to the King for his gracious condescensions in desiring their
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advice upon a matter of such importance.

From this point the petitioners had no further trouble
in securing their charters.

On May 31, 1720 the now famous

Bubble Act passed the House by 123 votes to 22, passed the Lords

soon rafter, and received Royal approval under date of June 10.

Under the terms of the act, the King was authorized to grant the

two charters for marine insurance, and all other corporations
were expressly prohibited to enter upon this business.

The

right was still reserved, however, for individual underwriters

to continue in the business, and this provision exerted a power115
ful force in shaping the trend of the insurance business.
On June 22, 1720 Royal Charters were granted both
companies.

Ohetwynd*s company was chartered under the name of

the London Assurance Oorporation, and Onslow's group was called

the Royal Exchange Assurance Oorporation.

The Mines Royal

Mineral and Battery Works then discontinued business, its

capital being absorbed into the Royal Exchange.

While it was

apparently the intent of the organizers of these companies to

write marine business at the beginning, and for this purpose
charters were granted, the following year both merged fire

insurance offices that had already been established, and in
April, 1720 were granted charters that permitted the writing

114. Street, op. cit., p. 21.
115. Wright and Fayle, op, cit., pp. 60-61.
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116
of fire and life "business.

With the granting of the Royal Charters to the London
Assurance and the Royal Exchange we are brought down to the

early days of the modern business of insurance.

Both of these

companies have been continually in business from the date of

their incorporation.

It is to be remembered, that under the

terms of the Bubble Act, individual underwriters were still

permitted to do business.

As a matter of fact, the Bubble

Act served as a great stimulus to the business of the individual

underwriters, because under its terms, all insurance that was
not placed with the two chartered companies must be given to
them.

It was the further association of these individual

underwriters, that gave rise to the development of Lloyds,
from whose method of doing business has grown not only the
great organization in England that bears the name, but also

the considerable number of similar groups of individual under
writers, whose business is located in different parts of the
world, and who are known as Lloyds groups.
Here we leave the business of insurance as established.

The seed of the idea we have seen was slow in germinating, slower
still in its earlier development, and it can be said in truth

that not until very recent years did the delicate shoots "grow

116. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 63.
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and wax strong,11 and become indeed a tree planted by the river.
The principle has gradually, steadily, and definitely established
itBelf in the economic structure, and spread like a blanket its

protecting influence to every form of human activity, to all
classes and conditions of people, and to the furthermost corners
of the globe.

It has become a very foundation stone of credit,

and a stabilizer of the business expansion that has made possible

the wealth, prosperity, conveniences, high standard of living,

and luxuries we now enjoy.

It was in fact a long precarious

journey from the Royal Charters of 1720 to the present, bu$

with that journey we are not here concerned.
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